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THE COLONIAL ORIGINS OF LIBERAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
ELIZABETH V. MENSCH*
INTRODUCTION

At least since the time of Locke, the notion of a "right" to
property has played a central role in liberal political thought.
Oddly, however, given the subject's significance, scant attention
has been paid to the emergence of property rights conceptualization in early American legal history. Often commentators assume,
for example, that when the framers of the Constitution solemnly
promised to protect "property," they had in mind something with
a clear and commonly understood definition. A close examination
of colonial law, however, reveals that prior to the Revolution the
notion of property right contained within it more incoherence and
self-contradiction than clarity. Moreover, that incoherence did not
result simply from the frontiersmen's crude disregard for common
law forms or unenlightened failure to apply rigorous legal reasoning to the task of defining property relations. Instead, the self-contradiction stemmed directly from the fact that the idea of property
in the colonies was inextricably linked to two irreconcilable visions
of social life-visions which were simultaneously moral, political,
and economic. Each contained its own account of the proper role of
property within the social order and its own version of the source
of legitimate title. Since the struggle between those visions re* Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of
New York at Buffalo. J.D., Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York
at Buffalo, 1976; L.LM., Harvard University, 1978.
Thanks are due, first and always, to the faculty at the State University of New York at
Buffalo Law School-a rare instance of genuine community in an otherwise secular world.
In particular, Jim Atleson, David Engel, Alan Freeman, Bob Gordon, Al Katz, Fred Konefsky, Janet Lindgren, and Jack Schlegel have been an unfailing source of help, inspiration,
advice, encouragement and information. Second, special thanks are also due to Morton Horwitz, who with gentle and perceptive criticism guided the initial research for this project and
read the first draft; and to Duncan Kennedy, whose conversations helped give shape to parts
of the argument. Finally, the Legal History Workshop at the University of Wisconsin Law
School, under the direction of Bob Gordon, Willard Hurst, Stanley Kutler, and Dave
Trubeck, provided a pleasant and stimulating summer during which to finish this article
and start research for a follow-up project, while also providing an invaluable opportunity to
share ideas and information with other legal historians.
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mained unresolved, a coherent definition of property was impossible.
For purposes of this Article, those two competing visions have
been labeled hierarchy and voluntarism. The first assumed the inherent legitimacy of a securely structured and paternalistic political, economic, and ecclesiastical hierarchy, with a corresponding
structure of semi-feudal property relations premised on a divinely
ordained inequality. The second directly challenged that hierarchy
by proclaiming equality and freedom as the only possible foundation for a true republican community and also by regarding actual
settlement and use of land as the only legitimate source of title.
The degree to which the conflict between these two alternative
visions dominated colonial American thought cannot be overemphasized. They struggled against one another in political and religious debate and were lived out as part of the daily experience of
colonial settlers. It was within the context of that struggle that the
idea of rights began to gain its ascendancy as an organizing principle of American legal thought.
The main purpose of this Article is to examine closely the
meaning of property rights in provincial New York, where its definition was especially problematic and closely bound up with the
conflict between the hierarchical and voluntarist models of social
organization. As a preliminary point, however, it is worth noting
that the New York experience was representative of a conceptual
dilemma well recognized by the most sophisticated of early liberal
theorists. Indeed, much early liberal. writing was devoted to the
creation of mediating concepts which served to mask the inevitable
irreconcilability of hierarchy and voluntarism. As one key example,
modern readers of Adam Smith might be struck by the extent to
which Smith's description of a "free" market economy incorporated both contradictory models; as Smith recognized, those models carried with them contradictory assumptions about the nature
of law and morality. Smith's first model was the voluntarist model
of free exchange and cooperative, value-enhancing barter,1 which
Smith explicitly associated with equalitarian societies where each
member was a self-reliant producer and where laws were made by
the participation of equal, independent citizens. Only such socie1. See generally A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
(R. Campbell, A. Skinner & W. Todd eds. 1976).
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ties, Smith maintained, were wholly consistent with the "law of nature."'2 According to Smith, however, conditions of completely free
exchange and legal consensualism existed only in parts of the colonies, where easy availability of land made each colonist potentially
self-reliant. In other countries, "rent and profit eat up wages," 3
and free exchange is inevitably distorted by the fact that some
members of society are dependent on others.4
Nevertheless, such deviations from the purity of the voluntarist model were inevitable for the sake of promoting Smith's second model: the concentrated accumulation of capital and division
of labor which was required for the efficient production of goods.
Because that second model was premised on the protection of inequality, it required a legal, religious, and even epistemological system characterized by hierarchical authority rather than pure consensualism, reason rather than passion, aristocracy rather than
republican equality, Anglicanism rather than radical puritanism. 5
Smith never envisioned an economy-or a legal system-premised wholly on the hierarchy which seemed implicit in
the protection of inequality. Such a hierarchy would lead to the
king's monopoly over resources and the stagnation Smith associated with crown regulation, entail and primogeniture, and the monopoly engrossment of the free market. On the other hand, Smith's
system obviously meant deviation from the model in which each
person is an economically self-reliant republican citizen and therefore a truly free bargainer.' What Smith envisioned instead was a
complex interaction between hierarchy and voluntarism. Each was
denied in its static, pure form, but elements of each were incorporated into a new and dynamic middle ground.
2. See generally A. SmiTH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R. Meek, D. Raphael & P.
Stein eds. 1978).
3. A. SbirrH, supra note 1, at bk. 4, ch. 7, pt. 2, § 3.
4. Id. See also 1 K. MARX, CAprrAL 770-71 (F. Engels ed. 1967):
The labourers most distinctly decline to allow the capitalist to abstain from the
payment of the greater part of their labour..

. . What is now ...

the conse-

quence of this unfortunate state of things in the colonies? A 'barbarizing tendency of dispersion' of producers and national wealth. The parcelling-out of the
means of production among innumerable owners, working on their own' account,
annihilates, along with the centralization of capital, all the foundations of combined labour.
5. See generally A. SMrrH, TH THEORY OP MORAL SENMENTS (D. Raphael & A. Mactie eds. 1976).
6. See generally A. SMrrH, supra, note 2.
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This incorporation of extremes within a dynamic middle
ground required a complex set of mediating devices. With respect
to the market, the key mediator was the market price, that single
figure which claimed objectivity and incorporated the effects of hierarchically imposed inequality, while at the same time reflecting
the free play of subjective values on a supply and demand market.
Similarly, theorists inserted the new notion of "self-interest" between the paternalistic authority of reason and the unpredictable
disruptiveness of passion, describing interest as the driving force in
economic and political life. 7 Smith's own conceptual mediator (still
very crude, compared to later rights formulations) was the "natural
spectator" standard of justice. The natural spectator represented
man's natural feelings of sympathy rather than the outmoded
moral traditionalism of the scholastics and the landed aristocracy.
Therefore, he could be trusted to disapprove entailed estates and
primogeniture, preferring instead that land be on the open market.
On the other hand, the naturally sympathetic impulses of the spectator would be restrained by reason. They would not, for instance,
favor leveling or impulsive benevolence. To those who were poor,
for example, the natural spectator would explain that the protection of inequality, while it resulted in the inescapable poverty of
many, "tended most to the prosperity and order of the whole,
which we ourselves, if we were wise and equitable, ought most of
all to desire." 8
7. See A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 43-44 (1977).
8. A. SMITH, supra note 5,at 274-75. The central role of property as mediator was recognized quite early by David Hume, who elaborated inore fully than Smith its moral and
epistemological implications. Hume started by postulating a system of subjective values and
"bottom up" epistemology. He stated that reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions. See generally D. HUM, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (C.W.
Hendel ed. 1965). His system was premised on a dramatic ethical relativity; morals were, in
effect, no more than shifting values on a supply and demand marketplace. Hume shrewdly
recognized two points, however. If ethical hierarchies were really collapsed into this complete sea of relativity, then the legal authority built around secured property ownership
would have no logical foundation. Moreover, he recognized, perhaps more clearly than did
Smith, that the logic of completely free exchange could lead in the direction of redistribution: given the marginal utility of the dollar, which he assumed, then real exchange equilibrium (as we now say) meant equality. In turn, Hume associated the movement in this direction with sectarian religion, republicanism, and law as consensualism; and he even admitted
that Sparta and Rome under agrarian laws had been said to benefit from the broad republican distribution of property which accompanied a broad distribution of political power. D.
HuM, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES Or MoRALs, in HUM's ETHICAL WRITINGS
44 (A. MacIntyre ed. 1965).
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Notions such as the "natural spectator" were bound to appear
clumsy. Part of the genius of liberal theory lay in its eventual appeal to legal forms as key conceptual mediators. One of the most
central of these legal forms was the notion of an objective "right"
to property, which concealed the fact that decisions about property
relations are inevitably moral and social choices. This supposed

apolitical objectivity masked the reality of continued moral conflict.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the emergence of the
notion of an objective right to property within the context of a particular time and place-colonial New York during the two decades

immediately prior to the Revolution-when the conflict between
competing world views was particularly intense.' During the same
To counteract that theoretical direction, Hume introduced into his description of law a
wholly artificial virtue, "justice," which was to be known by the standard of ultimate, reasoned utility-specifically, the reasoned utility of private property ownership. "Justice,"
Hume announced unequivocally, was property. Notably, the old epistemological hierarchies
were restructured, with artificial reason once again asserting its authority over the natural
passions.
Hume's point was more subtle, however. This new hierarchy of reasoned utility was to
reach no higher than utility itself-it was not, for example, to reach so high as to include
outdated ethical constraints. Morals, he said, must always be handled with a view to public
interest and he criticized the schoolmen for imposing their moral concerns into contract law.
Moreover, this "ultimate" utility of property protection was combined with a more "immediate" utility, which allowed for the flexibility which was needed in a changing market.
Directly paralleling that distinction was the important distinction between the general
legal principle of property protection (as against crown control or, particularly, levelling)
and specific legal rules:
[W]e must ever distinguish between the necessity of a separation [non-communalism] and constancy in man's possessions, and the rules, which assign particular objects to particular persons. The first necessity is obvious strong and invincible: the latter may depend on a public utility more light and frivolous....
Id. at 146 n.3.
Indeed, Hume seems to have recognized that the same capitalism which required the
protection of "property" also required that it be a word of infinite definition, whose meaning
would change with every change in the economy. Thus, Hume could affirm the "inviolable"
nature of private property and at the same time asi "Does any one scruple, in extraordinary cases, to violate all regard to the private property of individuals, and sacrifice to public
interest a distinction which had been established for the sake of that interest? ... All other
particular laws are subordinate to [public interest], and dependent on it." Id. at 48.
Similarly, Hume admitted that, except where changes were demanded by some immediate utility, the actual content of specific rules was rarely important. Many were based only
on the "taste and imagination" characteristic of the lawyers. Id. at 125. The important point
was that these rules were all within a legal system which recognized the bounds defined by
"ultimate" utility-the bounds, in other words, which protected private ownership of property from the "immediate utility" of leveling.
9. This is not meant to be a complete history of property relations in colonial New
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period when Smith was attempting to resolve the conflict between
contradictory economic and moral models on an abstract and theoretical level, New Yorkers were experiencing that conflict as part of
the reality, sometimes violent, of their daily lives.
Section I of this Article will focus on the competing models
central to the attempts to conceptualize property-title by occupancy and title as derived from a hierarchically situated sovereign.
Those models represented in New York the basic conflict between
hierarchy and voluntarism, which was still, simultaneously, a conflict about law, religion, politics, and economics.
Section II will show how those competing models were incorporated into the policy of a very real sovereign-the crown-still
perceived as embodying the union of virtue and authority. Because
crown policies during this period simultaneously affirmed the
claims of both voluntarism and hierarchy, they contributed to the
unintelligibility of property as a concept.
Finally, Section III will focus on specific legal disputes of the
period, drawing on the papers of John Tabor Kempe, who served
both as attorney general of New York and as counsel for private
land claimants. The duality of his role often placed Kempe on opposite sides of the basic conceptual struggle, and, like other colonial lawyers, he was pressed to formulate a legal definition of property "right" which could serve as a mediator in those struggles and
avoid the most extreme implications of either model.
York. Some of the most useful books on colonial New York history include: P. BONOMI, A
FACTIOUS PEOPLE: POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN COLONIAL NEW YORK (1971); E. COUNTRYMAN, A
PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY IN NEW YORK,
1760-1790 (1981); D. DILLON, THE NEW YORK TRIUMVIRATE: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL CAREERS OF WILLIAM LIVINGSTON, JOHN MORIN SCOTT, AND WILLIAM SMITH, JR.

(1949); M. KAMMEN, COLONIAL NEW YORK: A HISTORY (1975); S. KIM, LANDLORD AND TENANT
IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: MANORIAL SOCIETY, 1664-1775 (1978); D. LoVEJOY, THE GLORIOUS
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA (1972); I. MARK, AGRARIAN CONFLICTS IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 17111775 (1940); J. REICH, LEISLER'S REBELLION: A STUDY OF DEMOCRACY IN NEW YORK 1669-1720
(1953); G. SMITH, RELIGION AND TRADE IN NEW NETHERLAND (1973); THE POLITICS OF DIVERsrrY: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF COLONIAL NEW YORK (M. Klein ed. 1974).
My interpretation is based largely on a reading of: 1-4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (E. O'Callaghan ed. 1849-1851) [hereinafter cited as Doc. HIST.]; 114 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (E.

O'Callaghan & B. Fernow eds. 1853-1887) [hereinafter cited as COL. Docs.]; 1-6 NEW YORK
STATE, ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1901-1905) [hereinafter cited
as ECCL. RECS.]; and the Papers of John Tabor Kempe, New York Historical Society. My
interpretation is consistent with Countryman's more thoroughly researched work, but not
with Kim's.
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THE Two MODELS: VOLUNTARISM AND HIERARCHY

The liberal Whig newspaper articles of Gordon and
Trenchard, first published in England during the 1720s, soon became the most widely read English political and economic theory
in the colonies. They also formed the model for the Independent
Reflector, a popular newspaper written in the 1750s by New York's
leading "triumvirate" of ambitious young lawyers, William Smith,
Jr., John Morin Scott, and William Livingston. The Reflector introduced New Yorkers to the most advanced liberal thought of the
period; in its pages provincial citizens learned about the commercial wonders wrought by free exchange on an open market, and
were warned to stand guard against the ever-imminent violation of
their newly conceived civil liberties.
Early Whig rhetoric was characterized by the hearty, optimistic use of words which tended, upon analysis, to elude precise definition. Typical was the following, from Gordon and Trenchard:
"And as Happiness is the Effect of Independency, and Independency is the Effect of Property; so certain Property is the Effect of
Liberty alone, and can only be secured by the Laws of Liberty."10
Presumably, few liberals in the eighteenth century would have disputed the happy connection between independency, property, liberty, and law, nor would they have doubted the Gordon-Trenchard
assumption that those elements in turn provided the conditions
necessary for vigorous commercial development.11 Nevertheless, occasional attempts to define the various elements of "liberty"
tended toward confusion and contradiction rather than clarity.
For example, in 1753 the authors of the Independent Reflector
set out to explain to New Yorkers the meaning and origin of their
right to property. According to their account (drawn somewhat
vaguely from the natural law theorists), before civilization, "every
Man might take to his Use what he pleased."12 This "Use" led to
10. J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, 1-4 CATo's LETTERS No. 28 (Wilkins, Walthoe, Woodward & Peele eds. 1724) [hereinafter cited as CATo's LETTERs].
11. As Gordon and Trenchard declared, in "free" countries, "[m]en bring out their
money for their Use, Pleasure, and Profit, and think of all ways to employ it for their Interest and Advantage, New Projects are every day invented, new Trades searched after, new
Manufactures set up. . ." Id. at No. 68.
12. The Absurdity of the Civil Magistrate'sInterfering in Matters of Religion, Pt. 2
No. XXXVII, Aug. 9, 1753, in W. LIVINGSTON, W. SMITH, JR. & J. SCOTT, THE INDEPENDENT
REFLECTOR: OR, WEEKLY ESSAYS ON SUNDRY IMPORTANT SunJEarS MORE PARTICLALY
ADAPTED TO THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK 313 (M. Klein ed. 1963) (emphasis deleted) [herein-
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an original and natural right derived directly from occupancy and
labor. Claims based on use alone, however, led inevitably to insecurity and disorder. Therefore, under the social contract designed to
protect "liberty" by defining property relations, all property was
necessarily "centered in the supreme Head," ' s or sovereign. Thus,
no man in civilized society could assume to himself a natural use
1 4
right without "breaking in upon the Rights of his Sovereign, 1
which had wholly superseded natural rights. Yet, the triumvirate
also commented, when rights were thus centered in sovereignty,
they seemed always dangerously subject to the "wild and stormy
Administration 1 1 5 of political power. In New York, that adminis-

tration meant crown rule, which, to provincial property holders,
seemed always to be on the verge of violating, not protecting, colonial "liberty.""
The triumvirate's somewhat unsatisfactory discussion of property rights did not stem from a failure to keep abreast of current
legal theory. Indeed, in his great Commentaries on the Law of
England, enormously popular among New York lawyers when it
was published two decades later, Blackstone offered an account of
property which was virtually identical to the triumvirate's. 1 7 Black-

stone, too, located the origin of property in the Lockean natural
and "robust" title by occupancy. To avoid the disorder caused by
constant assertion of this "robust" title, however, the use right had
been necessarily superseded by the feudal fiction that the king was
the fountain of all property, so that all lands were "therefore
holden either mediately or immediately, of the crown."18 Between
those two extremes was structured the whole "hierarchy of actions" which defined property relations in England.1 9
after cited as INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Of Elections, and Election-Jobbers,No. XXXII, July 5, 1753, in id. at 283.
16. Id.
17. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COM~MENARm ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *1-15 (W.D. Lewis ed.
1907).

18. Id. at *53. See also D. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
L. Rlv. 209, 332 (1979).
19. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAiTLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 1-183
(2nd ed. 1898). At the "top," so to speak, was the writ of right, which protected a pure right
of property unconnected to any possessory claim (the claim was not that one was seized, but
that one should have been seized); lower in the hierarchy were all the possessory writs, with
the writ of ejectment close to the bottom. That lower writ was the one most often used in
BUFFALO
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Despite his insistence upon the conceptual importance of centering property in the crown, Blackstone was careful to criticize all
actual remnants of the feudal tenurial system as oppressive, and
decidedly inconsistent with ancient English liberties.20 In contrast,
the natural and "robust" title by occupancy was indirectly retained
even within the hierarchy of writs, incorporated through the prescriptive notion behind the statutes of limitations,2 ' which, at least
indirectly, allowed for title based on use.
Thus the tension between the "natural" and the feudal conception of property was obscured rather than resolved by Blackstone's lengthy description of the still largely procedural causes of
action which made up English land law. Unlike the triumvirate,
however, Blackstone seemed singularly untroubled by the lack of
resolution evident in his account. He could afford complacency because, as he commented, the English people were generally content
with legal decisions as to title and chose not to inquire into the
"original and foundation of this right."2 Moreover, any number of
delicate questions about ultimate right could be comfortably ignored simply by ensuring that sovereign power be located in parliament, where consent was exercised only by those with property.
As Gordon and Trenchard had earlier observed, with that parliamentary protection, property would be neither "barbrously robbed
and engrossed" 23 by the crown, nor ravished by a leveling
24
majority.
That political solution, so conveniently achieved within the
English parliament, was unavailable to the powerful leaders of the
provincial New York bar. Unlike Blackstone, they lived daily with
the direct exercise of crown control over both land use and trade.
On the other hand, provincial leaders were also faced with the social reality of leveling republicanism in the form of politically unruly provincial townships; and those townships often asserted their
claims to land and title in the vocabulary of occupancy and use.2 5
New York by owners against wrongful occupiers because of its procedural advantages. However, it was still a trespass action in form, originally brought by one who held only for a
term of years and had been wrongfully turned out of possession.
20. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *76.
21. Id. at *266 n.7 (editor's note).
22. Id. at *2.
23. CATO'S Lnripm, supra note 10, No. 330.
24. Id.
25. As will become clear from the description that follows, "occupancy and use," when
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In the land disputes which erupted into violence after the midcentury, therefore, liberal lawyers were pressed to formulate a definition of property which avoided both of the extremes they feared:
property as the direct extension of royal prerogative authority and
property as an extension of the all-too-robust will of an independent republican people. Gordon and Trenchard (among others)
had taught them that both extremes were to be avoided-each, in
some clear sense, was alien to the "laws of liberty ' 26 and therefore
destructive of both happiness and commerce- Yet the easy rhetoric
of "liberty" provided no clear indication of exactly where or how
the doctrinal line was to be drawn.
The eighteenth century legal task was not made easier by the
fact that conflicting conceptions of property in New York were
closely identified with two conflicting theories of economic development, and even the most astute provincial leaders found themselves believing in both of those theories simultaneously. On the
one hand there was much talk about the voluntary effort, initiative, and industrious self-reliance required if settlers were ever to
cultivate the vast New York wilderness. Provincial leaders had a
great fondness for the image of the hearty republican farmer cutting his way through the dense New York forest; his was the independent spirit which turned untamed wilderness into settled farmland. Yet the same self-reliant spirit which led to rapid settlement
seemed at odds with another assumed requirement for development-the secured concentration of resources and accumulation of
capital which would allow for a productive work force and investment in new enterprises. Thus, the pleasing image of the independent farmer was countered by the equally pleasing, but contradictory, image of an organized (dependent) work force efficiently
transforming provincial resources into capital for new commercial
ventures. Discussion of that dilemma filled letters, reports to England, and provincial newspapers. The same dilemma was also lodged deep at the core of the provincial definition of property, where
it was expressed specifically in the vocabulary of title by occupancy
actually asserted, bore little resemblance to the highly individualistic conception described
by Locke and repeated by Blackstone. Whereas Locke seemed to envision a single person
staking out a private claim in the wilderness, the occupancy and use argument was more
typically asserted by whole townships on behalf of a complex collective vision about the role
of property in community and religious life.
26. CATO's LTrr, s, supra note 10, No. 68.
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versus title by grant from the crown: the first was asserted as a
(voluntarist) expression of republican self-reliance, while the second was conceived as necessary for the (hierarchical) protection of
concentrated wealth.
Thus, the dilemma of economic development in the eighteenth
century incorporated by reference the two basic models which still
dominated colonial thought-voluntarism and hierarchy. Inevitably, those models were religious and political as well as economic.
For a time, sophisticated provincial leaders became fond of announcing that New York was dominated by self-interest, not morality; unlike Massachusetts Bay, New York was never intended to
be a "City upon a Hill. ' 27 Nevertheless, just as the moral paradoxes of Massachusetts Bay led to complex questions about the
distribution of property, so too the economic dilemma discussed by
New Yorkers merged with questions of morality. Interest and ideology, so to speak, were indistinguishable.
New Yorkers tended to associate the first vision of social life,
that of pure voluntarism, with New England, religious dissent, and
radical, leveling republicanism. Within that model, property was
distributed equally to both protect and express the free will of a
fully participatory congregation/township. The local republican
community, the source of all moral and political authority, was
conceived as the source of all property as well. In contrast, within
the second model authority descended from God to the king, and
from there ever downward through the levels of a carefully ordered
and essentially static social hierarchy. The goal, characteristically
Anglican, was to achieve a single, all-embracing religious and political harmony which would reflect, as nearly as possible in an imperfect world, the harmony of the Heavenly City. That goal could
be obtained only by each person's peaceful submission to the assumed reasonableness of divinely ordained authority. Otherwise,
social order would dissolve into the chaos of civil discord and unleashed private passion, and a peaceful religious harmony would
fragment into the absurdity of a multitude of separatist sects, each
27. "'Tis true, every Man ought to promote the Prosperity of his Country, from a sublimer Motive than his private Advantage: But it is extremely difficult, for the best of Men,
to divest themselves of Self-Interest. .. ." Public Virtue to be distinguished by public
Honours: The Selling of Offices, which requires Skill and Confidence, a dismal Omen of the
Declension of a State, No. IX, Jan. 25, 1753, in INDEPENDENT RFmxCToR, supra note 12, at
111.
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arrogantly asserting its own particular version of truth. Within
that hierarchical model, the king, at the top of the divinely ordained worldly hierarchy,
was conceived as the fountain of both
28
property.
and
justice
Notably, despite the obvious differences between the models
("bottom up" versus "top down," local and particular will versus
universal order, evangelical passion versus authoritative reason,
and so on), both shared an assumed unity of law, religion, politics,
and economics. No liberal wedge had yet been driven between virtue and authority, law and politics, state and civil society.
In New York, the voluntarist model was most clearly approximated within the Long Island towns settled by early Dutch Calvinist immigrants or separatists from New England. In these towns,
land was often distributed in lots which were roughly equal or else
based on family size and ability to cultivate.29 In cases where a
family's land proved to be of poor quality, an additional share
might be added, but all lots were granted on condition of settlement. Absentee landowning led to forfeiture, and contracts to sell
unimproved land could be voided.30 The goal was that all should
28. A much fuller elaboration of these models can be found in D. LITTLE, RELIGION,
A STUDY IN PnE-REvOLUTIONARY ENGLAND (1969), which provides a marvelous description of the difference in world-view between Anglicans and Puritans in England.
See also E. TROELTSCH, TiHE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (1931), for his
important distinction between church-type and sect-type, which is essentially the AnglicanSeparatist distinction. Weber was influenced by Troeltsch in his attempt to relate Puritanism to capitalism. I think Weber's analysis is weakened by a failure to explain the tension
within capitalism between accumulation and free exchange, and concentration versus "free"
competition. In applying Weber to an analysis of England, Little emphasizes the link between sectarian Puritanism and the challenge to established monopolies and aristocratic
economic privileges. Implicitly, however, that was also a challenge to all inequality. I am
convinced that, at least in New York, free exchange and anti-monopoly sentiments were
expressed by the most sectarian communities-during Leisler's rebellion the connection is
quite notable-but the thrust was always against all unequal distribution of wealth and
power.
The importance of the republican tradition has recently been stressed in a number of
studies, for example, J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975); Q. Skinner, The Foundations of
Modern Political Thought, (1978); G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 17761787 (1972). See also T. Schroyer, CulturalSurplus in America, 26 NEw GERMAN CRITIQUE
81 (1982).
29. One report describes lot numbers being distributed by a child, to ensure no favoritism or inequality. At a Special Court at Towne Hall at Kingston, Apr. 5-6, 1760, in 13 COL.
Docs., supra note 9, at 449.
30. See generally The beginning and progressof New Utrecht, Feb. 23, 1660, in 1 Doc.
HIsT., supra note 9, at 635.
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be "supplied with good and valuable lands to give each man as
content as near may be," 31 but that none should use land for
purely speculative profit3 2 or to gain power over others.

That township model seems to have implied a complex (and at
times difficult) combination of individualism and community. The
often-repeated desire of township settlers was to labor only for the
sake of themselves and their posterity.3 As one Long Island petition for township land stated, the petitioners had previously "hired
land of others

'3 4

but now wanted to "settle ourselves whilst we be

in our strength to goe through our labour."35 Otherwise, they said,
they could make "no provision for their agge and families." 36 This
independent spirit continued until the Revolution. As Colden
wrote to the Lords of Trade in 1761, it explained why farmers preferred independent land ownership, even on stiff mortgage terms,
to tenancy. They wanted "to bestow their labour where they think
their posterity shall enjoy the benefit of it, rather than on lands,
the property of others, however low the rent may be in proportion
to the value of the lands. 37
That preference, however, was not necessarily individualistic
in the liberal sense. In other words, the desire to use one's labor for
one's own benefit did not lead to a firm private/public line as be31. A Commission to CaptainDudley Lovelace and others, Mar. 24, 1669, in 13 COL.
Docs., supra note 9, at 443.
32. Stuyvesant, the first governor of New York, vigorously supported absentee landlord
regulations, agreeing that nobody should "seek for pay or profit in such manner as to retard
Cultivation." The beginning and progress of New Utrecht, Feb. 23, 1660, in 1 Doc. HisT.,
supra note 9, at 636. That policy was to be achieved by insuring that "everyone of what
condition or quality 'soever he may be should cultivate, build and live on the lot he had
obtained.. ." on penalty of forfeiture. Id. Similarly, as to contracts for the sale of land,
sellers should restore anything over "the true value of his [seller's] fencing, and what he has
expended in his cultivation of his lot, including the value of his own labour." Id. However,
Stuyvesant did not contemplate a prohibition on servant labor or tenancy.
33. Letter from President Colden to the Lords of Trade, May 15, 1761, in 7 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 465.
34. Petition of the Settlers of Jamaica,New York for Land on Long Island and Leave
to Settle a Town (undated), in 14 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 456.
35. Id.
36. Id. Similarly, the New Englanders who settled Jamaica petitioned for land by explaining they were "desirous to [provide] for their posterities, so as their outward comfortable subsistence and their soulles welfare might in the case of suitable means.., be attained." Letter from Mathew Gilbert to the Director General, Nov. 8, 1661, in 13 COL.
Docs., supra note 9, at 208.
37. Letter from PresidentColden to the Lords of Trade, May 15, 1761, in 7 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 465.
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tween inhabitants and town community. Indeed, land in townships
was held on the condition that owners contribute to community
projects-maintenance of common pastures, road building, and
even construction of grain mills. 8 This held true even if community purpose included grants to new inhabitants. A case illustrating
that point arose in 1653, in the village of Middleburgh, Long Island. John Gray, defendant, was moved to "insolence and disobedience" 9 when asked to forfeit part of his land after the community (apparently by vote of town meeting) invited new inhabitants
from the north. Later he admitted that the disobedience, for which
he was imprisoned, was the result of an "ungovernable passion,
roused by .. . [his] belief that the land belonged to him absolutely, by virtue of patent and conveyance, therefore he had a right
to defend and protect it." ° He was brought by the magistrates to
41
understand that the land was "granted to the village in common"
and held only on the condition that the owners would, when required, "surrender the patents, they had received, and in the interest of the community assert no claims of more right and title in the
lands, covered by the patents, than other inhabitants, if more people should come to the village.. .". Like his neighbors, Gray was
required to surrender his patent for the readjustment necessary for
equality. He was then ordered to ask God, with "uncovered head
and bent knees to forgive him ' 43 for his defense of absolute individual ownership."
Despite this (sometimes forced) communitarianism, a firm
public/private line seems to have been drawn for the sake of negating and excluding inappropriate assertions of private interest. One
could not derive purely private advantage from the community labor of others. The "property" that was to be protected, in other
words, was not abstract ownership, but the willing (even if public)
use of one's labor. Thus, for example, riots broke out in the town
38. See, e.g., The beginning and progress of New Utrecht, Feb. 23, 1660, in 1 Doc.
HIST., supra note 9, at 645.
39. In re John Gray, Charge of the Fiscal, Aug. 17, 1654, in 14 COL. Docs., supra note
9, at 285.
40. Sentance of John Gray by the Director-GeneralPeter Stuyvesant, Aug. 17, 1654,
in 14 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 286.
41.

Id.

42. Id. at 286-87.
43. Id. at 287.
44. Id.
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of New Castle when magistrates ordered the inhabitants to help
repair not only a general cartway, but also a dike belonging to a
Mr. Hans Block. 45 Block had requested the magistrates' aid, claiming his dike helped prevent flooding on a public footpath and was
therefore "necessary and convenient"4 for the town. The inhabitants willingly agreed to build a road and footbridge, and even to
"secure the Dike... with a sufficient sluyce to draine the water
outt.' 4 They would not, however, make further repairs on the dike

or flyer, which they called "not a publique butt a privett Concerne. ' '48 As they declared, they would not be forced to be "slaves
' 49
to Hans Block's particular Interest.

Given the close link between property and sovereignty, it is
not surprising to find that the township model of land distribution
was closely associated with the most direct forms of participatory
democracy. In early East Hampton, for example, where lots were
distributed equally, laws were also enacted directly by all the citizens assembled at town meeting (called the General Court), and
fines were issued for failure to appear.50 Every year three magistrates were elected to administer laws, but any decision by the
magistrates could be appealed to the General Court. In an early
history of the town it is reported that these town meetings were
frequent and "became burdensome on the people,"51 for "being
their own lawmakers they made a multiplicity of laws for regulating the fences to fields pastured in common; for division of lands;
making highways; building a mill or meeting house and this took
up much of their time. '5 2 Nevertheless, this "burdensome" free-

dom to make laws, and especially to try disputes by town meeting,
was often referred to in petitions as a condition to town settle45. Petition from the Inhabitants of the District of New Castle Relative to Making
Two Dikes or Highways Through the Marsh Belonging to Mr. Carr to Governor Andros,
June, 1675, in 12 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 532.
46. Letter from William Tom, Clerk of the Court at New Castle to Governor Andros,
June 8, 1675, in 12 COL. Does., supra note 9, at 535.
47. Petition from the Inhabitants of the District of New Castle Relative to Making
Two Dikes or Highways Through the Marsh Belonging to Mr. Carr to Governor Andros,
June, 1675, in 12 COL. Does., supra note 9, at 532.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See John Gardner'sNotes and Observations on the Town of East Hampton, Long
Island, Apr. 1798, in 1 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 680.
51. Id. at 680-81.
52. Id.
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ment. This was the cherished "[iliberty for the judging of such
difarances as may [in] any way hapin amongst as to give a final
determination thereof. . . ."53
This equalitarian republicanism was, more often than not, also
related to separatism or sectarian enthusiasm. In the petition
quoted above, for example, the township founders stipulated that
they were to have "[iliberty in point of worship ' 5 4 and the

"[c]hoise of our owne Ministar and that nothing may be imposed
upon him which may be ofensive unto his Conshence."5 5 This did
not reflect a desire for a civil libertarianism, but for a cohesive sectarian community; the "enlargement of the Kingdom of Christ in
the Congregational way and all other means of Comfort in subordination thereunto," as another petition stated.5
An important tract by John Leydt, a radical Dutch churchman, illustrates the connection between political and religious voluntarism.5 7 Leydt directly challenged the conservative tenets of the
Anglican and Dutch Churches. Conservative Dutch ministers in
America had, like the Anglicans, always maintained that the mysterious process of redemption was a wholly private and invisible
experience, without social or political significance. That private
and inward experience, they insisted, was to be carefully separated
from the world of external action, where peace and harmony could
be achieved only through submission to a hierarchial structure
which ultimately linked both church and state. Otherwise, the radical impulse to realize here on earth the perfect community of "visible saints" could lead to a rejection of all law and earthly authority as unnecessary and irrelevant.5 8 Those who had experienced the
possibility of an unmediated and regenerate relationship with God
and the human community were bound to find that all fixed, formal structures (legal, political, or intellectual) were oppressive and
53. Petition for a grant of 4,000 acres of land above and below the fall on the
Deleware, with the privilege of liberty of worship, calling a minister, holding court, etc.,
May 8, 1671, in 12 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 521-22. Here the petitioner recognized that
some "matters" would go to the Court of Assizes.
54. Id. at 522.
55. Id.
56. Letter from Mathew Gilbert to the Director-General,Nov. 8, 1661, in 13 COL.
Docs., supra note 9, at 208.
57. J. LE.YDT, True Liberty the Way to Peace:or an Account to Show how the Negotiations with a View to Peace and Unity were Broken Off, and What Retarded the Happy
Consumation,Aug. 10, 1760, in V ECCL. RECS., supra note 9, at 3762-92.
58. Id.
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illegitimate. According to the Anglicans, the inevitable result of
such impatience was a frightening social chaos.
During the 1750s John Leydt directly assaulted those traditional assumptions by heading his argument with the startling title
"True Liberty the Way to Peace." 59 Like the conservatives, Leydt
stressed the importance of peace and harmony in household,
church and state. He insisted, however, that peace could not be
imposed from above, but must be founded on "proper conditions,"
which meant that it must be "wrought by the Spirit of Peace in
the heart," 60 which in turn produces "reconciliation," or unity,
with both God and the human community."
Leydt's definition of peace through individual reconciliation
implied that only reconciled individuals, gathered together in the
"true communion" of love, could establish laws consistent with
"true peace"6 2 and the "Fundamental Law of Christ."6 " Since justice was thus conceived as following from the hearts of a loving
people, not as a standard to be imposed by authority, just laws
could best be determined by participatory democracy at the local
level. This "liberty" in the introduction of laws "as each locality
shall require, '6 4 constituted "the very distinction between the pious laws of the congregation and the tyrannical commandments of
the Pope."6' 5 That radical religious conception of law paralleled the
59. Id.
60. Id. at 3764.
61. Id. at 3764-65.
62. Id. at 3764.
63. Id. at 3775.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3763-87. Leydt was one of a group of Dutch churchmen who caused no end of
trouble to the established Dutch church in New York (which shared with the Anglicans the
distinct privilege of incorporation), and to the classis in Holland, their ecclesiastical overseer. Leydt eventually led the widespread opposition to the established church. Both he and
Reverend Goetschius, another influential radical, were students of Reverend Frelinghuysen,
minister of the Raritan Valley church, who from the time of his arrival antagonized even
members of his own congregation by insisting upon separating out the visibly elect from the
unregenerate. Moreover, he demonstrated an outrageous tendency to find that the true
saints were more likely to be found among the "crushed, lowly, broken in heart... The
wretched and needy" than among the prosperous landowners of the Raritan community.
J.R. TANIS,

DUTCH CALVINISTIC PIETISM IN THE MIDDLE COLONIES

118 (1967).

In many ways Frelinghuysen was the New York counterpart of Jonathan Edwards in
New England. See generallyP. MILLER, JONATHAN EDWARDS (1948). Through Frelinghuysen,
the Great Awakening arrived early in New York, and arrived there first among the Dutch,
who then frequently invited English-speaking New Light ministers from outside the colony
to speak in their churches (the influential Whitefield from England, for example). For an
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republican conception of property. The individual's willing labor
on the land, like the individual experience of redemption, was
something to be valued, protected, and encouraged. Ideally, moreover, that protection enhanced rather than destroyed a spirit of
public labor and community participation.
There were many variations on what I have here described as
an abstract model-Long Island records show some townships with
more inequality of land ownership than others, less religious orientation, more extensive political authority by magistrates, and so
on. Nevertheless, when New Yorkers described leveling republican
communities dangerously influenced by New England dissenters,
they clearly meant that combination of self-government and
roughly equal distribution of land which characterized much of
Long Island. Moreover, that system, with its complex combination
of individual initiative and community cooperation, seemed in
many ways ideally suited to promote rapid cultivation. Indeed, it is
possible to trace a continuous line of crown and provincial rhetoric
favoring the Long Island model for purely economic reasons-from
the West India Company's insistence that Peter Stuyvesant (who
became Governor of New York in 1647) not impose religious and
political restraints on Long Islanders despite their unruly tendencies, 6 to a group of proprietor/investors in 1779 trying to promote
profitable settlement in the Genesee area and describing the New
England system of common gardens, equal lots, and so forth as
ideal for that purpose.6 Nobody doubted that Long Island was
more rapidly settled than any other rural area in the colony.
The voluntarist model, so often praised, was nonetheless
feared. To many, of course, it represented the complete diffusion of
property and therefore of both moral and political authority.
Colden, for example, viewed republicanism as privatized anarchy:
the degeneration of all public authority-and therefore all spirit of
account of Dutch church controversies, the importance of which has been underestimated
by historians, see generally the ECCLESuSTICAL REcoRDs, supra note 9, and J.R. TANIS,
supra.
66. G. SMITH, supra note 9, at 194-96, describes at length the West India Company's
tendency to favor a high degree of political and religious freedom as a means of encouraging
both cultivation and free trade. To Stuyvesant's dismay, even Quakers were protected.
67. As they added somewhat incidentally, it was also conducive to the "satisfaction" of
being part of a "society laboring together." Letter V of T. Romeyn Beck, Esq. from a Gentleman to his Friend, Nov. 8, 1779, in 2 Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at 1146-51.
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public good, justice, and decency-into an atomized chaos.6 8 Long
Islanders did, in fact, have a long history of political disruption in
relation to crown authority, opposing trade restrictions, colonial
administration, crown taxation, monopolies, and forced salary payments to Anglican ministers. Thus, Governor Nicolls in 1666 complained that the citizens of Southold, Southampton, and East
Hampton "distill into ye hearts of his Maties good subjects, such
refractory and mutinous humours, as tend to ye disturbance and
breach of the Lawes Establish't."' 9 That potentially mutinous
spirit was expressed with special force in a remarkable "Remonstrance ' 7 0 the citizens of Flushing directed against an anti-Quaker
law imposed by Stuyvesant. The inhabitants (dissenting, but nonQuaker) admitted that their refusal to prosecute Quakers might
make them "seeme unsensible of the law and the Lawgiver." 7 1
Nevertheless, they explained that the purpose of all civil law was
to "give an outward libertie in the State by the law written in
man's heart designed for the good of all."'7 2 Given that purpose, it
necessarily followed that any law inconsistent with the "law of loue
peace and libertie" 7' as written in the hearts of the local inhabitants was no law at all.74 As they explained their primary legal obligation to the uncomprehending Stuyvesant: 7"Maister, wee are
bounde by the Law to doe good unto all men."
Fear of this radical potential, however, related not only to disputes between crown and colony. The voluntarist thrust of sectarian republicanism was perceived by provincial leaders as a threat
to all legal continuity and order, leading to Colden's dreaded vi68. See, e.g., Letter from Lieutenant-GovernorColden to the Earl of Dartmouth, Aug.
22, 1774, in 8 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 486. This view was expressed frequently. For
example, Samuel Johnson, President of King's College, endessly railed against the enthusiastic anarchy and "mere democracy" of New England townships. Letter of Reverend Dr.
Johnson to the Archbishop of Canterbury,May 15, 1761, in 7 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at
440.
69. Letter from the Governor to Captain Topping, Apr. 19, 1666, in 14 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 577.
70. Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of Flushing, Long Island Against the Law
Against Quakers and Subsequent Proceedings By the Government Against Them and
Others Favoring Quakers, Jan. 1, 1658, in 1 ECCL. REcs., supra note 9, at 412-14.
71. Id. at 412.
72. Id. at 413.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 412.
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sion of atomized chaos. Furthermore, this much-feared radical voluntarism emerged within specific legal argumentation as well as in
political rhetoric. For example, in a dispute concerning a minister's
salary and glebe, the defendant congregation questioned the legal
enforceability of even voluntarily entered contracts. The minister
claimed that if there had been an initial agreement to the contract
terms (as there had been in this case), then that agreement rendered the terms enforceable "to the end."7 Only passion, not reason, could lead to resistance. The congregation, however, replied
that if the issue were really one of voluntary consent, then the
question should be focused, not on the merely "legal" contract
terms themselves, but on the question of voluntary consent itself-and therefore on the continuing free will of the congregation. Since in this case the will had ceased, so also had the contract.7 ' That point of view, extended broadly, was no less
destructive to the liberal social contract theory then espoused by
the Whig triumvirate of lawyers (William Livingston, William
Smith, Jr., John Scott) than it was to crown authority. Not surprisingly, William Livingston, a firm believer in the civil libertarian
"right" to freedom of religion, was suspicious of both enthusiasm
and republicanism.
The republican threat to legal authority was also conceived, of
course, to be a threat to all secured inequality of wealth. William
Smith, Jr. stated the general assumption about the real content of
popular will: "The poor never want will to devour the Rich if it can
be done with impunity. ' 7 By the time of the Revolution this paranoia reached its full intensity, but it was also apparent throughout
the colonial period.8 0
Moreover, the fear of leveling was a fear specifically about labor as well as land. For example, in the Hans Block case cited
76. Mr. Lewis Ron's Third Memorial, Apr. 10, 1724, in 3 Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at
1175.
77. Id. at 1162-63 (emphasis added).
78. Id. This seems to have been a complex and difficult case. There are several references to it in the documents; the question of legal contract as opposed to continuing will was
only one aspect.
79. Quoted in L.F.S. UPTON, THE LOGICAL WHIG: WILLIAM SMITH OF NEW YORK & QUE.
BEC 113 (1969).
80. The intensity of the paranoia can be seen in the following statement: "[L]eveling
principles are held up-the country is convulsed everywhere. God knows what the end will
be." E. SPAULDING, NEW YORK IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD 85 (1932).
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above, 8 ' the inhabitants had made no attempt to seize Block's
property-they had simply refused to be coerced into working for
him. Yet that refusal was perceived as a direct threat to secured
property protection. William Tom, a magistrate of New Town, justified his pro-Block stand by invoking, with mounting incoherence,
scenes of leveling chaos: When a "plebian faccon"82 with "there
frenzicall braynes" 83 takes legal decisions into its own hands, then
"noe man knowes his owne and trade must dye when noe man is
sure of his owne estate, witness former examples as Mazinello John
of Leyden Jack Gade and Wat Tyler and DeWitts. . ."8". He petitioned Governor Andros that "two fyle of soldiers may be sent
hither to ly in this river to keepe the people in awe and vs in
security."8 5
William Tom was not wrong in perceiving a link between
"free" labor and legal self-determination, for, from the republican
perspective, the defense of one's title by labor also meant a defense
of the ultimate liberty to decide law by community will: that connection flowed naturally from the perceived unity of property and
sovereignty. As one township figuratively described the khadi-justice court the inhabitants had established to defend their land,
they had "put their hands to the plow and would not quit it till
they had got justice to take place." 8 During the Revolution, the
notion described by Gordon Wood,8 7 that the "people out-ofdoors"88 were the source of all law, was closely linked to the idea
that "the people at large" were the "true proprietors of land."8' 9
81. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
82. Documents Relating to the History of the Dutch and Swedish settlements on the
Delaware River, June 23, 1675, in 12 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 536. Similarly, attempts
were made to quash the influence of both Whitefield and the Moravians in New York, because they had "debauched the Minds of the people with Enthusiastical Notions." Id. The
danger was illustrated in part by the fact that they enticed "[s]imple, illiterate persons, who
were wont to be Content to busy themselves in their Native Country in the Ordinary &
humble Occupations they were bred to vixt Brick-layers, Carpenters, Woolcombers, Taylors
and Such like Mechanical or handy-Craft Trades," till they were infatuated with a dangerous and disruptive degree of "[e]nthusiasm or Folly. ..

83.
84.
85.
86.
note 9,

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 537.
Affidavit of Solomon Boyle of Morris County, May 13, 1747, in 6 COL. Docs., supra
at 347.

87. G. WOOD, THE CREA TON O THE AMEmicAN REmULIC, 1776-1787 (1972).

88.
89.

Id. at 319.
See, e.g., Petitions of the Protestants of New York, Dec. 30, 1701, in 4 Doc. HIsT.,
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Both assertions had roots deep in the colonial past.
The republican tendency to protect freedom of choice in labor
and not to protect the unequal accumulation of property was
clearly recognized as a threat to the second model of economic development: secured concentration of wealth, capital investment,
and a productive work force. In this second model, what required
protection was not property as a source and expression of republican self-reliance, but property as a source and product of wealth
accumulated from the work of others. That model, in turn, required a decidedly anti-republican definition of property rights.
Since its Dutch founding, provincial New York had been characterized not only by small republican townships, but also by huge
land grants which extended for hundreds of thousands of acres.
Originally conferred on a few politically favored families, those
grants had once been conceived, especially by Tories, as a way of
maintaining a hierarchically structured, crown-centered political
authority, as against an alarming trend in the direction of rampant, separatist diversity.90 Many grant proprietors had been given
the authority to conduct manor courts and name ministers, as well
as to collect rents.91 Such authority was understood as an extension
of the crown's ultimate prerogative authority over law and religion,
as well as land. During the disruptive 1760s, proprietors reasserted
generally unexercised prerogative privileges with renewed vigor.
Undeniably, a number of proprietors exercised their authority
with a paternalistic regard for the public good which exemplified
the best of the Anglican tradition. William Johnson, who took a
special interest in the welfare of the Indians, is an outstanding example.9 2 Increasingly, however, sophisticated proprietors linked
that transcendent vision of the public good which can only be located at the top of a moral/political hierarchy with the forced extraction of surplus value from tenant labor. Thus, the defense of
hierarchical authority became closely linked to the defense of capital accumulation.
One clearly pro-accumulation, and therefore anti-republican,
argument can be found in Judge Robert R. Livingston's public paper denouncing taxation of uncultivated land (a measure designed
supra note 9, at 935.
90. See S. KIM, supra note 9, at 10-14.
91. Id.

92. See E.

COUNTRYMAN,

supra note 9, at ch. 1.
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to discourage the accumulation of land in the hands of a few families, and force it onto the open market).93 His argument was specifically about the organization of resources and labor. Livingston
noted that the New England system of equal "small parcels"
(gradually made smaller by the rules of partible inheritance) led
townships to be generally "poor and incapable of bringing anything
to market." '4 It was a system conducive to subsistence farming and
barter rather than either profitable agricultural productivity or
manufacture: "For when the Farms are small the Husband Man
will consume the whole produce, and a Habit of Idleness and Sloth
is produced for want of Employment. 9 1 5 Livingston admitted that

the republican tradition of independent self-sufficiency promoted a
hearty martial spirit, useful for defense against the French, but he
93. Some proprietors combined tenant farming with the speculative investment in uncultivated land. "Selling I am not fond of att all," stoutly declared Phillip Livingston, second Lord of Livingston Manor. P. BONOMI, supra note 9, at 186. Therefore, there was much
pressure to put more land on the open market. Taxing uncultivated land was one measure
designed with that end in view; not surprisingly, the tax was supported by merchants. It
should be noted, however, that there really was no consistent "landed" viewpoint as opposed
to "market" viewpoint. The real question was where the line was to be drawn between the
two extremes of complete, monopolized concentration and complete diffusion of resources.
From the start, proprietors were interested in the market value of their land. Livingston,
opposing the tax, explained that the land's value would increase with an increase in population. The Livingstons' decision to hold rather than sell was an investment decision based on
an obviously rising market. Moreover, as prices did rise and leasing proved increasingly unprofitable, proprietors started to sell. However, they did so at high prices or on stiff mortgage terms and they fiercely resisted official plans to put ungranted land on the open market. Letter from Governor Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, Oct. 17, 1700, in 7 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 465. (Colden said that mortgages after the mid-century were often given
without down payment which farmers could not afford but at high interest rates. As a result,
there were many forfeitures, after which farmers lost even the value of their improvements-something they retained, at least in large part, under leases). In other words, proprietors wanted to take advantage of a market they controlled, while merchants wanted to
enter speculative land ventures at lower than monopolistic prices. Those merchants who did
speculate in land, like DeLancey, were then just as keen as the other landowners to protect
their investment from the threat of even greater diffusion.
Undeniably, the contests between merchants and landowners (the DeLancey faction versus the Livingston-Morrisites) were the subject of much bitter quarreling over specific issues, including tax allocation, fur trade, and defense policies. That quarreling dominated
New York politics in the eighteenth century. Such infighting, however, need not obscure the
broader issues which also were being discussed. From a more general perspective, land policies could be viewed as one part of the basic question New Yorkers debated so often: how
best to organize resources and labor in order to promote productivity.
94. McAnear, Mr. Robert R. Livingston's Reasons Against a Land Tax, 48 J. POL.
ECoN. 63, 88 (1940).
95. Id.
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warned that self-reliant republican farmers would soon find themselves defending a "[c]ountry scarce worth the Trouble of Defending" because it would be a country with no concentrated wealth.20
Attacking the whole potent historical tradition of republicanism,
Livingston asserted that the much admired independent martial
spirit of the early Roman republic had only been achieved at the
expense of productivity:
By dividing the Lands into smaller Parcels the Romans became formidable,
But at the same Time it is evident that . . .they were so far from furnishing

Materials for Trade, that they were frequently in Danger of Starving for want
of Bread, & when this was imported to them from abroad they had nothing
wherewith to purchase.... 1

In contrast, Livingston argued that proprietors of large tracts
could force from tenants a production that exceeded subsistence:
"The Proprietors of Large Tracts by parcelling them out in a
proper Manner (i.e., in lots of sufficient size, to tenants) enable, &
by the Rents they insist on, oblige their Tenants to.

.

.raise more

than they consume." ' Moreover, because landlords had the capital
necessary for investment in mills, over which they held an effective
monopoly to the extent of their own land, the wheat output could
be both efficiently processed and also concentrated in the hands of
a few landlord-merchants for investment on the world market.
With wheat a prime commodity in world trade, the manor system
of farming was viewed as a source of capital needed for further
provincial development. By the 1760s most landlords were, in fact,
also traders on the world market-products included iron from
manor mines and forest products as well as flour and biscuits from
wheat. 99
Livingston concluded his argument by recognizing more astutely than most writers of the period that "liberty" was a word
capable of holding two contradictory definitions. His purpose was
to warn New Yorkers not to be beguiled by the New England republican definition:
[I]t will be worth every Man's while, who has a proper regard for his Posterity, to consider how dangerous this [policy of discouraging accumulation] may
become to their Liberty for what is a security to the Liberties of the Charter
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 88.
See generally S. KIM, supra note 9, at 135-75.
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Governments to the Northward, i.e., the granting of Lands as they are settled, I have shewn already would be very dangerous to ours. 10

According to Livingston, liberty meant the "Independency" and
"Happiness" of secured inequality, not secured self-reliance.1 0 1
Nevertheless, the tenancy system was also generally believed
to hinder rapid, industrious cultivation and population growth.
The assumption was that tenancy, even on easy lease terms, was at
odds with those useful virtues which republicanism, despite its
dangers, seemed to promote-voluntary initiative and a hearty
spirit of self-reliance. Governor Bellomont's comment on the subject became well-known: If it were not for the huge land grants,
New York
would out thrive the Massachusetts Province and quickly outdoe them in
people and trade ... for to use Mr. Grahm's [the attorney general] expression to me and that often too, what man will be such a fool to become a base
tenant to ... our mighty landgraves when for crossing Hudson's river that
man can for a song purchase a good freehold in the Jersies. 102

Similarly, in the legal correspondence of the eighteenth century
one reads often that large tracts granted to single families inevitably introduced a spirit of feudal "vassalage" and "internal weakness" inappropriate in the New World, and there were proposals
for agrarian laws to limit holdings.0 3 The Independent Reflector
praised the "Spartan" spirit of republicanism and glowingly described a spirit of unrestrained freedom as essential for economic
growth.1 04 Yet, as if to illustrate the dilemma, the same paper
warned against following the New England model of land distribution, which led to the "mischievous Consequence"10 5 of encouraging settlement without first providing the investment necessary for
100. McAnear, supra note 94, at 90.
101. Id. at 72.
102. Letter from Governor Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, Nov. 28, 1700, in 4 COL.
Docs, supra note 9, at 791.
103. See, e.g., R. MORRIS, STUDIES AND HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 76 (1930).
104. The Advantages of Education, with the Necessity of instituting Grammar
Schools for the Instruction of Youth, preparatory to their Admission into our intended
College, No. L, Nov. 8, 1753, in INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR, supra note 12, at 419-26. See also
The Considerationof the naturalAdvantages of NEw YORK, Resumed and Concluded, No.
LII, Nov. 22, 1753, in INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR, supra note 12 at 433-38.
105. A brief Considerationof New-York, with respect to its naturalAdvantages: Its
Superiority in several Instances, over some of the neighbouring Colonies, No. VIII, Jan. 18,
1753, inINDEPENDENT REFLECTOR, supra note 12, at 106.
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the "[rise of Arts and useful Manufactures."'10 6 The triumvirate
described "[e]very Town Unemployed in those"'107 as a "dead
Weight upon the Public,"108 for inhabitants in such towns would
only "endeavor to support themselves by Barter and Exchange,"10 9
which by itself can "by no Means augment the Riches of the
Public."'110
The general view, in other words, was that while republican
equality led to the stagnation inherent in completely diffuse resources (matching the diffusion of moral and political authority),
massive concentration of resources led to the vaguely feudal stagnation that comes from sapping voluntary initiative. Put in such
starkly negative terms, the dilemma would seem almost immobilizing. Typically, however, provincial leaders simply incorporated elements of both conceptual models into a vaguely conceived combination, never fully articulated, which would simultaneously draw
on the virtues of both self-reliance and inequality. The combination was inherently unstable, however, and seemed always on the
verge of unravelling into its two contradictory elements.
The depth of the provincial dilemma was underscored by the
fact that crown policy during the provincial period also reflected
both models of development and quite specifically enacted them
into the "law" of title in New York. Thus title was simultaneously
said to derive from occupancy and labor, but also, exclusively, from
crown grant. As a direct result, by the 1760s "property" in New
York was a virtually unintelligible concept. The relationship between crown policy and New York property law will be examined
in the next Section.
H.

CROWN POLICY

Despite the presence of relatively autonomous local government institutions (assembly, governor, courts), under the British
constitution the crown remained supreme in its authority over provincial New York and, with respect to property conflicts, served as
the only legitimate source of title. The existence of the crown as an
institution operated both administratively and conceptually to pro106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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mote, however inconsistently, both basic models of property.
This was true in part simply because the Board of Trade
(charged with implementing crown policy in the colonies) tended
to favor, simultaneously, both the hierarchical and the voluntarist
models of economic development. Consistently with the former,
the Board viewed the colonies from an early corporatist, mercantile
perspective and conceived of provincial resources as naturally subject to whatever direct regulation was required for promoting the
broadly conceived "public good" of Britain. In New York this led,
in particular, to an emphasis on the centrally managed production
of naval stores and a consequent reservation of all pine trees for
crown use. More generally, it led to a conception of property as an
extension of prerogative authority, so that a primary method of
maintaining order in the colony was through extensive land grants
which were conveyed to a few political favorites. In theory, as the
provincial aristocracy, those landlords would reflect and maintain
the crown's own paternalistic authority throughout the reach of
their vast semi-feudal estates.
Paradoxically, however, the Board of Trade also viewed rapid
settlement as one of its key goals-indeed, according to the widelyread natural law treatises of the continent, the promotion of cultivation was one of the solemn obligations of sovereignty.' Like
others of the period, the Board assumed that rapid settlement
could best be achieved through toleration of an essentially voluntarist model of social organization, which discouraged the accumulation of uncultivated land in the hands of a few. Thus, crown grants
contained direct conditions of settlement and quit-rent reservations, both of which served to negate claims not based on use and
occupation, even while affirming the sovereign's authority as a
source of title by the very fact that only conditional, not absolute,
titles were conveyed. Those grant conditions were coupled with explicit instructions to governors stressing the importance of encouraging settlement by giving effect to land claims based on actual
occupancy and labor. In addition, there was an indirect tendency
to determine private disputes according to a general equitable use
and occupancy standard, which served to affirm the substantive
relevance of local township practices. In effect, at the very top of
the hierarchical legal structure (the king, as fountain of both jus111.

E. VATELL, 1 LAW OF NATIONS, ch. VII, (T. & J.W. Johnson eds. 1852).
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tice and property) there was support for the claims at the very bottom-property rights derived from occupancy and use, as consistent with local republican township standards.
This practical correspondence between actual crown standards
and radical settler standards parallels a broader conceptual correspondence. The crown's position at the top of a feudal hierarchy
seemingly affirmed the hierarchical model, with title and justice
both flowing down from the sovereign. Yet the crown as the single
embodiment of sovereignty tends to suggest, as well, the crown as
the embodiment of the whole people-the people themselves as
contained within the king. In fact, kingship has traditionally derived much of its force from precisely that fusion of kingship and
people: because the king and people are one, the king legitimately
speaks with the voice of the whole community.
That fusion, however, proves potentially dangerous to the hierarchical model upon which it is based. If the people see in the
crown the embodiment of their own sovereignty, it is not surprising
to find them invoking crown authority on behalf of the standards
they have evolved themselves, within their own participatory communities. In New York, this included invoking the crown in support of the claim to land title based on occupancy and use; and the
crown's own policies made the invocation far from implausible.
With that invocation, however, the notion of a single sovereign at
the top, embodying virtue, authority, and the people, lost its unity
and began to suggest the notion of a diffuse sovereignty at the bottom, eventually invoked by the people in their own name. Thus,
hierarchy carried with it the seeds of its own destruction: when all
the intermediate levels between crown and people are collapsed,
then the local people are the sovereign, the particular becomes universalized, and so on.
In that sense, the struggle between hierarchy and voluntarism.
is a struggle that has always been part of the inner dynamic of
hierarchical structures themselves. Even as Constantine made his
pact with institutionalized Christianity, welcoming the moral sanction it provided for wealth and worldly authority, he had learned
from the radical sectarian Christians of his own day how readily
the same moral categories used to sanction inequality could also be
invoked to challenge it-calling for a collapse of all intermediate
hierarchical steps between that embodiment of perfection which
stands only at the top of the hierarchy and the people themselves
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at the bottom. That internal tension has been a fundamental part
of the intellectual and social history of the Western world. Thus,
the Flushing remonstrance on behalf of the disruptive Quakers and
the dissenter challenge to the established Anglican and Conservative Dutch churches in New York are only a small part of a much
longer story; so too are the assertions, mounted with increasing frequency during the eighteenth century, that the "people out of
doors" are the only true sovereigns.112
A. Settlement and Cultivation as Conditions to Crown Grants
Express conditions of settlement had been a part of land ownership since the time of the Dutch. The West India Company
(WIC) in 1654 confirmed Stuyvesant's authority to "dispose of lots
already granted but not occupied,"11 3 and repeatedly encouraged
him to enforce tillage conditions and to grant no more land to any
one individual than could be cultivated.11 4 For the sake of promot-

ing population, the WIC directed, Stuyvesant must "keep good order, that every one may find a suitable place and that the land
may be divided with. .. equality.""1 5 As the WIC managers insisted, they were "willing to grant as much land to everybody, as
he will undertake to cultivate and populate, but we do not intend
to give away the land with unlimited boundaries ...

.""' Other-

wise, "many valuable pieces of land might be claimed
as property
17
.. . and the land itself would remain unpeopled.'1
The chief exception to this pro-cultivation and anti-accumulation policy was Van Rensselaer's manor, and from the time of the
initial grant by the WIC to this successful patroon, disputes
erupted between the managers of Rensselaerswyck and the WIC
over the extent of Van Rensselaer's authority over his property.118
For example, Stuyvesant objected when the manager of the manor
112. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
113. Letter from the Directors of the West India Company to Peter Stuyvesant, May
18, 1654, in 14 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 262.
114. Id.
115. Letter from the Directors of the West India Company to PeterStuyvesant, Apr.
4, 1652, in 14 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 168.
116. Id.
117. Letter from the Directorsof the West India Company to PeterStuyvesant, Mar.
21, 1651, in 14 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 132.
118. Minutes of the Council of New Netherlands, Jan. 24, 1652, in 14 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 149-51.
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refused to allow other settlers to bring wagons and carts onto the
manor to chop and carry away wood, and required that the settlers
take wood only from an area where the thickets and underbrush
were heavy. Thus, people needing wood were forced "to carry the
wood begged from him on their shoulders in slavish trouble and
dependence through thick and thin, ice and snow, for the amusement of this overbearing Commander and his merciless associates." 11 9 A proclamation was issued, affirming the WIC's intent to
allow the colonists to use Van Rensselaer's manor, but only for gardens, plantations, or summer homes. 120
Seventeenth-century English governors generally followed the
same policy as the Dutch, avoiding excessive grants and enforcing
the conditions of settlement. Specific grant terms varied slightly as
to exactly how much land had to be cultivated within a given number of years, but there seems to have been no question about the
enforceability of the terms. In fact, in one instance Governor Lovelace warned that the forfeiture policy would be enforced even 12
in1
the absence of a specific forfeiture clause written into the patent.
Land granted by Governor Nicolls to Matthias Nicolls had been
sold to a Captain Berry, who had made no effort to settle it. In
1671/2 Lovelace warned Berry that it was a "[clustome ... that a

certaine time is usually prfixt wherein some Improvement is to bee
made... ,,122 Although no time was "menconed in the said Patent
for the settlement thereof, 1 28 Lovelace noted that in Berry's case

"nothing hath as yett been expected thereupon towards a Settlem't,'

24

and warned Berry that within three years the land must

be settled "according to the Custome of New Plantacions and of ye
5
12
Intent of ye Graunts of such Patents of New Lands.1

Similarly, in 1675, Governor Andros referred to lands in the
Delaware which he had granted without reservation of quit rents,
in order to promote cultivation. This, he said, had
prov'd Inconvenient, by many takeing up land and not seating at all I Doe
therefore repeal and recall the same, Except for Such as have seated and
119.! Id. at 149.
120. Id. at 150.
121. Proclamationof Governor Lovelace, Jan. 24, 1671/2, in 12 COL. Docs., supra note
9, at 494-95.
122. Id. at 494.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 495.
125. Id.
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Improved but... all Such as have taken up land, and not Seated and Improved. . . to bee recorded to forfeit the same, and the land not seated and
Improved, to bee disposed as Vacant lands ....126

The pressure to prevent private engrossment of uncultivated
land also came from town inhabitants, who sometimes sought the
governor's aid in enforcement. For example, a petition to Governor
Andros from the magistrates of Whorekill, in 1680, described the
original plan by which the town was to be divided into equal lots
127
and "the Land and woods that lye back was to be common.
After a survey of the area had been conducted, attempts were
made by some outsiders to claim the common woods for themselves, and also a "greate marsh. . . which if it should be at any
time here after taken vp by any perticolar person it would be a
great Inconuenancey. 1 28 Whorekill magistrates asked that the
land be protected by the governor, so that it may "[l]ye in common. 1' 29 It was, they reported, too much in the practice of courtappointed surveyors to "lay out such Large tracts of land for a peticolar person, that might sarue many famileys to liue Comfortably
vpon; there haue been Expearance of the like."1 30 Objecting that
"sume persons... sall land before they make any plantation or
1 31 they requested Andros' "positive order as
Settlement thereon,"
13 2
to that Concerne.1
So far as I can determine, the governors seem to have complied with such requests-for example, Nicolls wrote to the Oyster
Bay magistrates: "[A]s to the business of Samuell Daytons having
foure Lotts.. .. Its thought fitt hee should have one either to enjoy or otherwise to dispose of, but no more, the other three may be
reserved for the Encouragement of other families to come and settle upon them."' 3 3
This policy of limiting private holdings of uncultivated land
126. Order of Governor Andros Regulating the Payments of Quitrents in Delaware,
Oct. 26, 1678, in 12 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 609.
127. Letter from Whorekill Magistratesto Governor Andros, June 26, 1680, in 12 COL.
Docs., supra note 9, at 654.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 655.
132. Id. at 654-55.
133. Report from the Governor to the Committee of Trade on the Province of New
York, Feb. 22, 1687, in 1 Doc. HIsT., supra note 9, at 179.
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was paradoxically allowed to coexist with the vast holdings of a few
proprietors, chiefly Van Rensselaer and Livingston, the Dutch patroon, a favorite of early English governors. These two tracts covered vast areas, but evidently constituted an exception to general
practice. According to the Board of Trade, prior to Governor
Fletcher's administration in the 1690s, almost all land grants were
under 1,000 acres. 134 The fact that a very few grants were immense
and later became notorious has obscured the extent to which the
dominant policy was one of limitation; it was that policy with
which most provincial settlers were likely to be familiar. Although
this anti-accumulation policy became increasingly difficult to enforce, it was hardly peculiar to think of it as "law."
The most extensive land grants were issued under Governor
Fletcher, and those grants raised troublesome legal questions that
plagued the colony until the Revolution. Under Fletcher, a few political favorites received huge tracts. For example, Reverend Dellius, a powerful conservative Dutch minister with close ties to the
Anglicans, received the largest tract, 620,000 acres, granted with no
condition of settlement and with a quit rent reservation of only
135
one beaver skin per year.
Prior to Fletcher's administration, instructions from the crown
had expressly stipulated that no grants were to exceed 2,000
acres. 136 For some reason, explicit restrictions to granting authority
were omitted from Fletcher's instructions, but it was argued that
the restriction was implicit given the history of land grant policy.
Although the precise legal force of an implied restriction in royal
institutions was something of an open question, in 1698 the Board
of Trade instructed Fletcher's successor-, Bellomont, to revoke the
massive Fletcher grants:
And whereas we have also been informed... that many exorbitant grants of
vast tracts of land have been made of late years (and particularly some in the
Mohacques Country) without any reservation of competent Quit Rents to His
Majesty, or any obligation upon the... grantees to cultivate and improve
the same, as reason requires:. . . the improvement and peopling of the whole
Province must of necessity be in great measure obstructed, together with
many other inconveniences evidently attending the same: We do hereby di134. Report of the Board of Trade on the Affairs of the Province of New York, Oct. 16,
1698, in 4 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 392.
135. Answer of the Agent of New York to a Memorial against the Act vacating certain
Grants of Land, Oct. 26, 1700, in 5 CoL. Docs., supra note 9, at 11.
136. Id. at 10.

1982]

ORIGINS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

rect and require you to put in practice all methods whatsoever allowed by
law, for the breaking and annulling of the said exorbitant irregular and un-

conditioned grants;...

117

They further ordered that no grants be allowed in the future for a
quit rent of less than two shillings per 100 acres, nor without obligation to "settle and effectively cultivate" within three years. 3 8
Bellomont, who fiercely opposed the large proprietors and also
wanted land available for naval stores production, was eager to
carry out the instructions. The question was, what methods, if any,
were "allowed by law." Attorney General Graham advised him that
the instructions could not legally be followed, "telling me it could
not be done, 'twas the grantees' property right an originall right by
vertue of the Great Seal of England and the publick faith of
England."1 9
Bellomont, however, argued that all grants without condition
of settlement constituted a fraud against the king's still essentially
feudal authority over land. Legal doctrine on that authority was
still highly protective. As Bellomont declared: "'Tis a very presumptuous and unnatural act to make the King degrand himself
• . . as by that clause in the instructions allowing grants without
imposing restrictions he is made to do."140 He argued that the policy of reserving quit rents and requiring settlement was so clearly a
part of previous instructions, and of colonial land practice, that
grants failing to conform to it were by definition fraudulent and
destructive of royal authority, and "how common a thing it is in
England to break grants of land made immediately by the King
himself, when 'tis found that the King is deceived in his grants."1 4
He cited a recent act of Parliament to resume all the Irish forfeitures,1 42 and added that as a result of similar large grants in New
York, many people were being "stripped of their land by these
grantees,"1 43 stressing also the extent to which the Mohawks had
137. Instructionsfrom the Lords Justice to Governor Bellomont, Nov. 10, 1698, in 4
COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 425.
138. Id.
139. Governor Bellomont's Notes on His Conversation with Mr. Graham, May 4, 1699,
in 4 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 813.
140. Letter from Governor Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, Jan. 2, 1701, in 4 COL.
Docs. supra note 9, at 823.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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been deceived and bribed in their sales to Dellius and Bayard,
both Fletcher grantees."
Instead of instituting legal proceedings (which he thought
doomed to failure due to the opposition of the legal profession),
Bellomont successfully urged the then anti-Fletcher assembly 1to
4
pass a vacating law, annulling the largest grants under Fletcher.
144. Id.
145. Letter from Governor Bellomont to the Lords of Trade Jan. 2, 1701, in 4 COL.
Docs., supra note 9, at 823-24.
The English spent one hundred years bemoaning the evil influence of the legal profession. In large part, complaints both of governors and colonists had to do with self-interested
dealing in land. Later governors like Colden have often been quoted on the subject, but the
problem seems to have arisen early. In 1699, for example, Governor Bellomont reported that
Chief Justice William Smith "arbitrarily and by strong hand" forced Southhampton to take
only £10 for a large tract of beach land; that £10, he said, was not even "a valuable consideration at law, for Colonel Smith owned himself to me that ... he cleared £500 a year for
whales taken there." Letter from Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, July 22, 1699, in
4 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 535. Similarly, William Pinhorne, an important judge under
Governor Fletcher in the 1690s, agreed to act as a factor for a woolen draper in London. He
sold four or five thousand pounds worth of goods entrusted to him and invested the money
in land. Then, to evade liability to the merchants, he conveyed the estate in trust to the use
of his wife and children. Letter from the Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, June 22,
1698, in 4 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 321.
It is hard to know whether such outright dishonesty was as typical as many at the time
claimed, but by the middle of the eighteenth century most leading lawyers were, by family,
marriage, and/or skillful manipulation of opportunity, also major landowners. Vigorous efforts were undertaken to ensure that the legal profession remain within carefully restricted,
elite circles. See, e.g., W. UPTON, SELECT CASES OF THE MAJOR'S COURT 1-62 (R. Morris ed.
1935) [hereinafter cited as SELECT CASES].

This colonial history of elitism and self-interest seems indisputable. One might be
tempted, therefore, to see the colony's legal history entirely as a history of selfish opportunism. That would ignore, however, at least two points. First, by the mid-eighteenth century,
the elitism of the profession carried with it the requirement of a rigorous training period-seven years of clerkship after a Bachelor of Arts degree. Lawyers clerking under William Smith, Sr., for example, were required first to master political theory, geography, history, divinity and rhetoric-knowledge designed to make a complete lawyer. Actual legal
studies included major civil and natural law treaties (Tyrell, Pufendorf, Vattel, Grotius),
general common law theory (Fortescue, St. German, Hale, Bacon) and the technicalities of
Coke, Brackton, and the writ system. Id. at 53.
As a result of such training, Goebel claims, New York lawyers at the dawn of the Revolution were the beft lawyers the state has ever seen-not yet made degenerate by the
"pabalum" of Blackstone's "cloying text." J. Goebel, Courts and the Law in Colonial New
York, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AiERICAN LAW 271, (D. Flaherty ed. 1969). So
much learning certainly produced a shared culture that was inevitably elitist; that shared
culture, however, did not necessarily imply "self-interest" as something apart from culture.
Second, and more to the point here, the "self-interest" of lawyers was intimately linked
to the economic development of the colony, and the viewpoint of lawyers on how best to
achieve that development was marked more by self-contradiction than by a single consistent
policy. I think the legal doctrine of the period came to embody those contradictions, but the
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He intended to urge passage of a subsequent act to vacate earlier
exorbitant grants-vacating a total of thirteen grants which together constituted seven million acres.
Predictably, the Vacating Act of 1698/9 met with fierce opposition. Even the Board of Trade delayed final confirmation, announcing itself absolutely obliged to scrutinize the language of
each annulled grant before confirming the Act. Bayard, whose land
was vacated, publically declared that Bellomont "projected the
reduceing ye whole plantation to poverty and misery by spolying
and eradicating all foundations of property,"1 4 and by "tending to
freeholds and inheritances of His
ye destruction of ye'14properties
7
subjects.
Majesties
Governor Cornbury, who succeeded Bellomont, immediately
and vigorously opposed the Act as "passed in [the] form of [a] Law
to forfeit and confiscate ye estates of ye subject without any crime
Conviction or attainder to deprive the subject of his just legal and
natural right."14 Under Cornbury, an act was passed in the assembly to repeal the Vacating Act. As it was later explained, new assemblymen thought "titles precarious" while it was still in effect.
In 1708, however, Queen Anne disallowed the Act of Repeal and
instead confirmed the Vacating Act by Order of Council. Governor
Hunter, who succeeded Cornbury, was instructed to regrant to
each proprietor "a suitable number of Acres not exceeding 2000 to
any one person. '149 When the proprietors angrily refused to accept
"such a proportion of Acres," the lands reverted to the crown and
were regranted in small parcels to others.1 50
subtle process by which that happened was surely more complex than the judicial calculation of self-interest in each specific case.
146. Letter of William Atwood to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations,Oct.
26, 1709, in 5 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 105. Several others, including Atwood, made
similar public declarations. Id.
147. Id.
148. Lord Cornbury'sReasons for Suspending Abraham De Peyster,Esq., Oct. 2, 1702,
in 4 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 1014.
149. Letter of the Lords of Trade to Secretary Cragg, Apr. 12, 1720, in 5 COL. Docs,
supra note 9, at 536.
150. Id. Apparently, the only form of redress was through petition to England. One
petitioner claimed that he had, in fact, settled and improved his land, and then was out of
the country serving "in your Majesty's sea service" when the assembly of "[i]gnorant, necessitous, and profligate persons" passed the Vacating Act, stripping him even of his improvements. In that case, the Board recommended that the queen would "be graciously pleased"
to restore the land to him, or grant an equivalent. Petition of Captain John Evans to Her
Majesty the Queen, Nov. 1, 1711, in 5 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 284. So far as I can tell,
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These events left dangerously unresolved the exact legal status
of other accumulated uncultivated land and of grants, like Livingston's, made contrary to express crown instruction as well as policy. In the eighteenth century, the political situation in New York
was such that no vacating law could have passed, but some governors (for example, Cosby and Colden) were convinced that the
grants were invalid even in the absence of a vacating law, and were
anxious to attack the proprietors' titles in court. Proprietors especially feared that chancery courts might be used to try titles and
collect long overdue quit rents.151 The Independent Reflector expressed a similar fear. Arguing against accepting a crown charter
for a provincial college, the Reflector described the inherent precariousness of all grants dependent upon Crown authority. Crown
charters were
subject to certain express or implied Conditions, and may, in particular, be
annulled, either on a Prosecution in the Court of King's Bench or Quo warranto or by Scire Faciasin Chancery or by Surrender.Nor does it require a

great Abuse of Privilege to determine its Fate by the first Two means, while
mere Caprice, or some thing worse, may at any Time work its Dissolution by
the latter... . Besides, upon its Disolution all the Lands given to it are absolutely lost.... They revert to the Donor. Nor is there much Reason to expect a charitable Reconveyance from the Reversioner.' 52

So far as I can determine, there had been no instances in the province of dissolved corporations, nor reason to fear such dissolution.
The suspicion of arbitrary crown authority expressed here was derived more directly from experience with crown land grants and
the precarious status of provincial land titles. That experience
seemed to provincial leaders to parallel the English experience
with corporate charters, which were also still viewed, like land
grants, as the extension of prerogative authority.153
Fletcher's other grants were, however, not affected; Bellomont died before a subsequent act
was passed.
151. Quit rents, of course, operated like a tax on uncultivated land. If quit rent reservations were high and also enforced, accumulation of land would be too expensive to be worthwhile. Thus, quit rents also served as a source of revenue, independent of the assembly.
152. Remarks on Our Intended College, continued, No. XIX, Apr. 1, 1753, in INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR, supra note 12, at 185-86.
153. See H. HORTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE PowER: CORPORATION OF THE CITY
OF NE W YORK INAmsmc LAW, 1730-1870, ch. 4 (to be published in 1983).
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B. Conflicting Notions of Title: Title Based on Cultivation Versus Title Based on Crown Grant in Private Dispute Resolution
Titles were rendered precarious not only by lingering crown
conditions, but also by the practical difficulty within the colony of
basing title right on anything other than a use and cultivation
standard. Thus, governors, arbitrators, and the early courts all
tended to favor an equitable use and cultivation standard to determine ownership in cases of private dispute."M In fact, that standard seemed almost compelled given the often confused testimony
about Indian deeds and rights, boundary markers, conflicting
surveys, and so on. It was typical for plaintiff and defendant each
to have an Indian deed, purchased with the governor's permission,
but from different tribes. Equally typical were boundaries called
by Indian names meaning merely "tree" or "stream." The courts
would then hear complex testimony about landmarks and about
Indian tribal "ownership" rights. In fact, of course, the Indians
often did not understand those rights in an English legal sense at
all, and would patiently explain they had never conveyed the soil,
but only the grass, for a season. Under those circumstances, a formal definition of ownership rights based on title or deed seemed
virtually impossible.
One of the first suits brought specifically as an ejectment action (although without fictionalized pleadings) was Stevens v.
Richardson,15 5 brought in 1679/80 in the Court of Assizes during
Governor Andros' administration. Stevens, the plaintiff, asserted
his patent as against Richardson, who claimed to have a valid Indian deed and to be "first settler by virtue of his improvements. ' 156 The court first announced that Richardson should be
154. Many land disputes were settled directly by the governors, through arbitrators appointed by them or by town agreement. The latter, in fact, was the method governors
tended to encourage as most conducive to peaceful settlement. Even after the establishment
of a structured court system to try property rights ("as is proscribed and Enacted in the
present Lawes, and the right determined accordingly without any distinction of Persons or
places," as was declared of East Riding), one could apparently also appeal directly to the
governor, who would, in turn, issue orders or appoint arbitrators. The courts were, so far as I
can tell, simply an available alternative. See, e.g., A Letter Written by Orderof the Governor to the Constable of Flushing, Mar. 27, 1665, in 14 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 566.
155. The case is also captioned as Gloven v. Jones, where Jones was Richardson's attorney, and Gloven was another interested party. Letter from EphraimHerman to Secretary
Nicolls, Relating to Various Matters in Delaware,Jan. 17, 1689/90, in 12 COL. Docs., supra
note 9, at 641.
156. Id. at 636-41.
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presumed to be entitled to his quiet possession, but would be answerable to "any other just Claim. 1

7

The testimony then offered

went almost entirely to the question of first settler, and illustrated
the extent to which "ownership" depended upon that settlement.
It was reported by a surveyor that Richardson had once tried to
sell the land and wanted his title confirmed by survey: "The surveyor refused, saying that sales of land were not permitted before
settlement." 158
Other witnesses, however, confirmed Richardson's claim that
he had settled the land, and that the plaintiff had failed to do so.
Two deponents had once refused to buy the land from the plaintiff's representatives, who offered to "sell their land to yor Depont
for a pr of shoos apeece and yor Depon't told them if they would
not [be] Seated they had noe Right of Land here and yor Deponant tould them he would not by it."' 59 After hearing the evidence
the jury found for Richardson, "being hee is the first settler to
have Right to the Same hee hath seated.'

60

Apparently settlement

superseded Steven's undisputed patent. The court affirmed the
jury verdict.'
Petitions sent to the early English governors also indicate that
a use and labor standard seems to have been applied. It is difficult
to determine exactly how often such petitions were successful, but
the underlying assumption seems to have been that if one could
show actual cultivation and a genuinely equitable claim, that claim
would defeat even an official patent. For example, in a petition for
a rehearing of a trial in Whorekill, the petitioner claimed that he
had a certificate of survey and an Indian deed and had also
"[s]eatead and Improved ye sad Land by my Seullefe and fammalley."'162 He also claimed he had gone "throu maney hardshipes by
lying in ye Wendes maney neightis and Many days trauell and
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 641.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 636-41.
162. Petition by BarnardHodges for a Rehearing of his claim to a tract of land 400
acres,granted by the court of Horekill, 1680, in 12 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 657. I could
not determine exactly what the lawyer threatened, because the court had already refused to
give "[g]ugment in aney maneur of way." Id. Only seven men could be found willing to serve

as jurors. Id.
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Loues of all my children. ' 163 After these hardships he was informed that a man from Maryland claimed the land by bill of sale
from a Thomas Merrit, who had held it by patent from Governor
Lovelace. The petitioner claimed that the "[s]ad Merit did Departe
for England and Thare Resides haveing thare by Deserted his
Clame and tytalle to ye said Land."1 6 ' The Maryland purchaser,
however, had "[i]mployed a Cuning aturney," who was harassing
with a trespass suit; the governor's direct aid was
the petitioner
1 65
sought.
Another typical petition, sent to the governor in 1678, explained that after the petitioner had settled his land a Mr. Whitwell produced a patent for "fower hundred acceres wheare I was
setted wheare vpon I was forced to beecome his tennant."'16 The
petitioner asked that
I may haue my Land which hee hath suruayed from mee... he is bute a
single man & hath besides that .

.

. other seates of Land... and newly

is
theare Commeth seuerall men who would gladley settell but that the land
167
into such menes handes that they must either bey or go without....

Similarly, in Schaggen v. Jacquet,168 Jacquet apparently held
a patent for the land on which Schaggen had "expended my labor
and sown 4 schepels of rye." 6 9 Schaggen agreed to share the labor
and profits if he were allowed to remain unmolested on the land.
Jacquet later refused to provide the help and storage facilities
agreed upon and attempted to drive Schaggen off the land, "so
that I was compelled to suspend my work and leave the land in a
bad plight.' 7 0° Schaggen charged Jacquet with "obstructing . . .
possession, cultivation, and occupation of lands,"17 1 and asked that
the land simply be granted to him. In Council it was agreed that
Schaggen should have the land "upon which he... lived, worked
163. Id.
164. Id. at 658.
165. Id.
166. Petition by George Mertin in relation to his land on DelawareBay, July 30, 1678,
in 12 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 601.
167. Id.
168. This caption is imaginary,'and only for the reader's convenience. See Complaints
against Vice-DirectorJean Paul Jacquet and his subsequent removal from office, Mar. 20,
1657, in 12 COL. Docs, supra note 9, at 167-68.
169. Id. at 167.
170. Id. at 168.
171. Id. at 169.

674
and planted,
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despite Jacquet's title.

Another petition explained that the petitioner's neighbors,
who had, like good community members, always been "redy to assist us at any time,"""3 suddenly found that their land had been
previously granted to another. The neighbors were, it was reported,
"discouraged in that they are like to bee put out of there
places."' 174 On their neighbor's behalf, petitioners said, "wee can
doe noe lesse than giue our testimony ... And doe not question
that if the Gouernorr comes to understand things throughly butt
that hee will sett all to writes."'17 5
Another aspect of the tendency to protect cultivation over "title" as a source of right was illustrated in trespass rules, which
tended to protect owners from trespassers only when their land
was in active use; there was no protection of absolute rights of
ownership as such. The clear assumption was that if an owner had
not fenced land, as a sign of cultivation and use, then another settler could enter the land for uses such as gathering wood. This was
emphatically stated in a 1679 case, 76 decided by Governor Andros.
Two men had entered another's land to burn a lime kiln, about a
mile and a half from the owner's house. They complained to the
governor that the owner "fors't them from Thence, upon pretence
that it was . . . [the owner's] land and though out of fence, you
wuld not suffer it."'17 7 The official order from the governor to the

defendant stated:
These are to Acquaint you, and lett you know, that it hath been the Constant
practice (Throughout the whole Government, that all persons may & have
had Liberty & soe adjudged) to cutt wood, timber, fetch stones, make & carry
a way lime & c., upon & from any Land or Ground not within Fence ...
according to which you are also to have regard and not only suffer those men

to proceed in their Lawful Labour, (if without fence) but also to take care so
to Satisfy them, that they do not further Complaine of your obstructing
172. Id. at 168.
173. Petition by Thomas Olive and other Inhabitantsof Burlington,N.J., in favor of
Henry Jacobs, Tenant in Possession of Matiniconk Island, Oct. 5, 1678, in 12 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 615.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The case is not mentioned by name in the documents. See Letter from Secretary
Nicolls to Mrs. Billop at Staten Island, June 18, 1679, in 13 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at
535.
177. Id.
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17 8
them, nor any other in the like occation.

Similarly, while regulations about the fencing of animals varied among the townships, the general rule of the colony was that
animals could roam at large; owners of land fenced animals out.
This was even mentioned in the Zenger17 trial: "I believe it would

be looked upon as a strange Attempt for one Man here, to bring an
action against another, whose Cattele and Horses feed upon his
Grounds not enclosed, or indeed for eating and treading down his
Corns if that were not inclosed."1i 0 The analogy was to the fence of
honest and upright conduct which one built to protect one's own
reputation.
This fencing-out rule was affirmed by act of assembly; one
could kill a hog doing damage to one's property, but even then the
dead hog was to be returned to the owner. The rule was opposed,
however, by the "men of Estates," as Hunter termed them, who
complained that it would cost the estate owners more to fence in
their property than the farmers' hogs were worth.""1 The farmers
successfully opposed that position until roughly the middle of the
eighteenth century; after that, it is possible to trace a long series of
assembly acts confirming fencing-in regulations.
While property rights tended to be protected only to the extent of cultivation and fencing (a recurring symbol of use), it is
important to note that property use, including fencing, could also
be restricted according to a more general community benefit standard. "Use" was generally protected over title, but the privilege of
use was not unlimited. Once, when a fence obstructed a common
passageway for cattle and wagons, it was declared that "everybody
must have liberty to fence in the land granted to him in the easiest
and least expensive manner, but also good roads are required and
necessary for the welfare and growth of the village, .

"82

The

178. Id. at 535-36.
179. August, 1735 (charges of printing and publishing seditious libels).
180. A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, in L. RUTHERFURD,
JOHN PETER ZENGER, His PREss, His TRuIL 205 (1904).
181. Letter from GovernorHunter to the Lords of Trade, May 7, 1711, in 5 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 208.
182. Council Minutes: Magistrate appointed for Long Island Towns; Land granted
and Land matters on Long Island; Ferry to Long Island, Apr. 19, 1663, in 14 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9 at 524. This case was reviewed by Stuyvesant, who had appointed arbitrators
to review the situations complained of by the magistrates. In regard to the meadowland,
Stuyvesant affirmed the policy that "no private bouwery or plantation should prejudice a
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Similarly, the magistrates of New Middleburgh complained in
1656 that one citizen, Thomas Stevensen, was using his land in a
manner destructive to community welfare. For example, he closed
a publicly used wagon road running near his house, and caused it
to run instead near a river, where he had also built a dam. This
new road was dangerous to the animals, who were likely to "come
to grief"18 4 as they made a sharp turn near the dam. Stevensen

maintained that the old road had separated his house from his
barn, and prevented him from fencing them in together. It was decided, however, that "common interests must be preferred to individual interests.

18

5

The old road on his land was to be reopened

because it was straighter and more convenient, but only to the
point where the new one became easily passable.
Stevensen had also fenced in two strips of meadowland which
his neighbors claimed were to be used by the community in general, in return for which he was to receive equally large shares in
the "large meadow"18'6 (apparently owned in common). Stevensen
claimed a patent right to the meadowland, but this right was not
acknowledged to allow strictly private use. He was allowed only
one-third of the meadowland for his own private possession.187
The rough correspondence between local communitarian standards and the crown's pro-cultivation policy in the province produced paradoxical results. The crown's own policies, favoring the
cultivation standard for the sake of promoting settlement, for the
most part corresponded to and reinforced the voluntarist conception of property associated with local republican townships. Yet
while a single town inhabitant might sternly be ordered to forfeit
three of his four small lots, a few families, like the Livingstons,
Van Rensselaers, and Van Cortlandts, still claimed uncultivated
tracts extending for hundreds of thousands of acres, and did so
village community." Id.
183. Id.
184. Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into some Differences between
inhabitantsof Middleburgh, (Newton), L.L, Sept. 22, 1656, in 14 COL. Docs., supra note 9,
at 367.
185. Id. Stevenson was also prevented from running a fence into a river and thereby
hindering passage of cattle coming from the woods "which causes the same frequently to
return into the woods to their great disadvantage." Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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expressly by virtue of crown grant. What emerged was a peculiar
juxtaposition of two conflicting policies and legal standards. The
tension between them eventually erupted into armed conflict, resulting in the famous land riots of the third quarter of the eighteenth century. While border disputes with the New England colonies during the 1760s and 1770s exacerbated those conflicts, the
tension had already been evident well before the second quarter of
the century. As Cadwallader Colden reported to the Board of
Trade in 1726, since a few vast tracts had been granted to men
who "had no thoughts of improveing them for their own use," settlers in other parts of the colony who had "wanted land for their
children" had been "[o]bliged to send them into the Neighboring
Colonys."' 8' This resulted in conflict between proprietors and local
townships, and "began lately to raise a Clamor & uneasiness &
make the Proprietors of these large Tracts affray'd of reassuming
as once has been practised in this Government or that the Government might be enduced to enquire into these Grants which some
people imagine are defective in some material points."1 89
By the time these conflicts arose, many provincial settlers had
come to associate their own equitable use standard of property
with law. When the correspondence between their conception and
official court standards began to break down, as it did by the middle of the century, some settlers were quite ready to seize control
of both land and the legal system. They did so explicitly in the
name of "justice," and many assumed they would have the backing
of the crown. Thus the inhabitants of Elizabethtown, defending
their settlement by force against the claims of proprietors as early
as 1747, explained to the proprietors' representative:
[W]hen the King should have notice that such a multitute of his Subjects

are turned Mob and act as they do, he will say or think, what's the mattar with my subjects? [S]urely they are wronged or oppressed or else they
...

would never Rebell against my Laws, and some grivious oppression hath

caused them to act thus or else they never would have done it or some words
to this effect or so, said they, he will order us to have our land;... 1o
188. Letter from CadwallderColden to Secretary Popple, Dec. 4, 1726, in 5 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9 at 806.
189. Id.
190. Affidavit of Solomon Boyle of Morris County, N.J., May 13, 1747, in 6 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 347. A correspondence between the king's law and community practice was

once argued with considerable sophistication in relation to a question at least analogous, if
not identical, to property rights in land. An inhabitant of East Hampton, Samuel Mulford,

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

While in this instance settlers still invoked the name of the crown,
they did so after making their own determination as to the substantive content of "justice." It is hardly surprising that within decades, when anti-proprietor rioters again violently seized local
courts, they did so in the name of the people themselves, having
both transcended and discarded any explicit basis in crown
authority.
C. Conflicting Crown Policies: Encouraging Settlement and Republican Self-Sufficiency Versus Encouraging Productivity
Through the Central Management of Resources and Labor
Although such settler declarations as to the king's true intent
were not wholly inaccurate, the question of land title was enormously complicated in New York by another express policy of the
crown-encouragement of productive manufacture. This was not
an across-the-board policy, since English mercantile policies favored discouraging, rather than encouraging, competition with
British manufacture. Nevertheless, the crown was determined to
use the great forest resources of the New World for the production
of naval stores, and New York was especially blessed with the
claimed as an "antient Custom" the right to freely hunt whales off the coast. Samuel Mulford's Defence for his Whale-Fishing, Mar. 15, 1715/16, in 3 Doc. HisT. supra note 9, at
372. The governor had attempted to impose a licensing requirement, claiming that the
whale was a royal fish and fell under the crown's prerogative authority, which superseded
prescriptive right by customary usage. Id. Mulford argued that any particular local custom
which was neither contrary to reason nor expressly forbidden by township patent, or governor's instructions, etc., was itself "law." Id at 374. Moreover, this was a law which could not
be defined by a judge, but should be determined by twelve men from the town. During trial,
the chief justice of the New York Supreme Court considered the only question for the jury
to be whether whales had value; the authority to license he treated as a question of law.
Mulford objected, however, on the grounds that
in a particular Custom (as this is) the Student of Law saith... if it rise in
Question in the King's Courts, Whether there by any such particular Custom or
not? It shall be tried by Twelve Men, .

.

. So I crave and Request of this

Honoured Court, the judgement of Twelve Men, my Peers of the Same
Vicknaye, that may know something of this Matter.
Id. at 374-75. Mulford insisted that local standards, over time, became by prescription, the
"law," and could not be abrogated by the governor, nor annulled by a judge. Mulford declared after the whale case: "So execution was issued out, and Distress made upon our Estates, for using an Antient Custom; because one Single judge was of Opinion, that they had
not right by Prescription though they [the East Hampton residents] had by Law, but we
know not what is Law." Id. at 378. This also shows, of course, the link between the freedom
of township self-determination and freedom from economic restrictions imposed from
outside the town itself. See supra note 28.
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highly valued white pine trees. There was a peculiar intensity' to
this preoccupation with naval stores-best appreciated, perhaps,
by noting that in 1691 Matthew Hale, the great English judge and
legal scholar, cited the existence of tar, hemp, and mastheads in
the colonies as no less than proof of a divine creator. 191 As he explained, God had not only provided that people learn to navigate
the waters of the world to trade their goods; He had also wonderfully provided the resources by which that magnificent design
could be accomplished. Thus colonial naval stores were an important part of that perfect "Constitution" in nature, which in its ordered "economy" bore such a satisfying resemblance to the constitutional structure of England.19 2
Because of the significance attached to naval stores, clauses
were written into land grants forbidding destruction of the valuable pine trees and allowing crown officials to enter for the sake of
cutting and taking timber.9 3 This was, of course, a dramatic form
of concentrated resources-theoretically, every white pine tree in
the colony belonged to the crown, available for productive use in a
centrally managed, corporatist mercantile economy and legally
protected from the irreversible diffusion of private burning. Moreover, the English expected those clauses to be strictly enforced as
utterly crucial for the public good. Laws were passed in Parliament
confirming them,'9 4 and when they were disobeyed the Board of
Trade described the burning of pines as a barberous custom, of
very great consequence to the king's service. Repeated cases of failure to abide by similar provisions in the Massachusetts Charter
resulted in orders from the Privy Council."9 5
Nevertheless, this direct crown control over resources cut
against the other express policy of the crown-rapid settlement.
Governor Colden and John Tabor Kempe both pointed out that
191. M. HALE, MAGNETiSMUS MAGNUS; OR METAPHYSICAL AND DEviNE CONTEMPLATIONS
ON THE MAGNET, OR LOADSTONE 47 (London 1695) (microfilm, Early English Books-16411700, reel no. 495). Governor Bellomont cited Bacon on the same subject, quoting from the
essays on the plantations. Letter from the Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, Nov.
28, 1700, in 4 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 787.
192. M. HALE, supra note 191, at 130.
193. See, e.g. Letter of Governor Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, Apr. 17, 1699, in 4
COL. Docs, supra note 9, at 506-07.
194. 9 Ann., ch. 17, 8 Geo., ch. 12; 2 Geo. 2, ch. 35.
195.

J.H.

SMITH, APPEALS TO THE

PRvY COUNCIL

FOR THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS

332

(1950). At issue was the appealability of a trespass action brought against an officer who had
entered private land pursuant to the charter provision.
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the two conditions thus attached to crown grants-preservation of
pine trees and cultivation-rendered each grant a contradiction in
its own terms. As Colden explained, since the grantor must cultivate or forfeit his land,
it will not be supposed that it is the intent of the Law to put a stop to cultivating the Land which however cannot be done without destroying the Timber that grows upon it. One . . . is ready to fear that the poor Planter is
under a sad Dilemma-If he does not cultivate he cannot maintain his family
and must lose his Land; if he does cultivate, he cuts down Trees, for which he
is in danger of being undone by prosecutions fines-The inhabitants cannot
build Houses without pine for boards. .

.

. It cannot surely be the intent of

the Legislature to put the inhabitants under such extreme hardships.'",

Those conflicting clauses potentially destroyed all notions of
valid title based on crown grant, since a grantee, as a practical
matter, could fulfill one condition of ownership only by violating
the other, and was thereby always in the position of having forfeited title. That fact led to troublesome and recurring legal
problems. The conflicting clauses also illustrated a sharp split in
the crown's vision of economic development. Nobody doubted that
the production of naval stores required a vast organization of capital, resources, and labor. Yet, as colonial leaders repeated so often,
that mercantile goal could only be achieved at the expense of the
image of the independent farmer settling his own land.
The parallel conflict between self-reliant farming and a productive, dependent work force was a continuing theme of colonial
correspondence. As Colden reported to the Board of Trade, specifically in reference to the production of naval stores:
Every one is able to procure a piece of Land at an inconsiderable rate and
therefore is fond to set up for himself rather than work for hire. This makes
labor continue very dear a common laborer usually earning 3 shillings by the
day and consequently any undertaking which requires many hands must be
undertaken at a far greater expence than in Europe & too often this charge
only overballances all the advantages which the country naturally affords & is
the hardest to overcome to make any commodity or Manufacture profitable.
197

For this reason, he advised the Board of Trade that the desired
production of hemp and tar would never be undertaken directly by
196. Mr. Colden's Account of the Trade of New-York, May 28, 1723, in 5 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 688. Forfeiture clauses relating to cultivation also varied in specific terms.
197. Id.
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the inhabitants themselves; even a merchant who had available
capital would not "readily adventure his Stock in raising Hemp or
making Tar"' 9 when so little profit would remain "after he has'
deducted the charge of labor."19
Ironically, however, Colden also criticized the crown's alternative proposal-to engage directly in the production of mastheads-precisely because that production would lead to inefficient
and oppressive central management rather than reliance on the
voluntary initiative of the colonists: "The King in this Case must
have a great many hands and overseers in constant pay-He must
buy horses, Oxen & Carriages and maintain them or hire them after the most chargeable manner..

,.o. In fact, Colden linked the

proposal to the general problem of liberty.and self-determination,
reminding the Board of the maxim2 0 that
"free subjects are more
1
useful to their Prince than Slaves."

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 689.
201. Id. To add to the dilemma, development in other areas, when it was successful,
threatened the naval stores' resources. Governor Bellomont reported, for example, that unregulated colonial sawmills were becoming too efficient, and that competition cut against the
desired concentration of resources and centralization of management:
[Four] saws are the most in New Hampshire that work in one mill, and here is a
Dutchman lately come over who is an extraordinary artist in those mills. Mr.
Livingston told me this last summer he had made him a mill that went with 12
saws. A few such mills will quickly destroy all the woods in the Province at a
reasonable distance from them.
Letter from the Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, Jan. 2, 1700/1, in 4 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 825.
By the mid-eighteenth century the problem of expensive and/or unavailable labor became the key economic preoccupation. Repeatedly the statement was made that development would be stifled so long as settlers preferred to cultivate their own lands. As late as
1767, for example, the following description was sent back to England:
[T]he Price of Labour is so great in this part of the World that it will always
prove the greatest obstacle to any Manufactures attempted to be set up here,
and the genius of the People in a Country where every one can have Land to
work upon leads then so naturally into Agriculture, that it prevails over every
other occupation.
Letter from Governor Moore to the Lords of Trade, Jan. 12, 1767, in 1 Doc. HIsT., supra
note 9 at 734.
Of course slaves provided some labor, and there were the predictable reports of cruel
punishment and paranoid fear about conspiracies. Apparently, however, slaves were never a
source of large profits. By the 1750s the Livingstons had already attempted to employ slave
labor in the manor mines, but had abandoned the attempt as unsuccessful. William Livingston complained that only this "[w]ant of Workmen and the high Price of Labour" kept the
mines from being productive. The Considerationof the natural Advantages of New-York,
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The problem of supplying a sufficient labor force became a lay
resumed and concluded, No. LII, Nov. 22, 1753, in INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR, supra note 12,
at 437-38. Robert Livingston earlier had stated that even slaves earned three times a soldier's salary just for "splitting of fire wood and carrying the hodd." Letter from Mr. Robert
Livingston to the Lords of Trade, May 13, 1701, in 4 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 875.
Similarly, indentured servants were common but did not provide efficient labor. Control
problems arose early. For example, the magistrates of one town passed an ordinance forbidding boatmen to transport "any Strainge person" who did not have a ticket from the magistrates. Otherwise, both debtors and indentured servants would cross the river to escape
their obligations and "we shall not bee able to keepe any servant on this syde." Letter from
the Court at New-Castle to Governor Andros, Feb. 8, 1677, in 12 COL. Docs., supra note 9,
at 591.
By the mid-eighteenth century, however, a more difficult problem was the servants' unwillingness to stay with their trade after terms of service had expired. Masters who bad
invested in shipping servants to New York found themselves deserted:
[A]s soon as the time stipulated in their Indentures is Expired, they immediately
quit their masters, and get a small tract of Land, in settling which for the first
three or four years they lead miserable lives, and in the most abject Poverty; but
all this is patiently borne and submitted to with the greatest cheerfulness, the
satisfaction of being landholders smooths every difficulty....
Letter from Governor Moore to the Lords of Trade, Jan. 12, 1767, in 1 Doc. HisT., supra
note 9, at 735. Thus, a master of a glass house had "assured me [Moore] that his ruin was
owning to no other cause than being deserted in this manner by the Servants, which he had
Imported at a great expense." Id.
Efforts were made to enslave the Indians, but his practice was considered illegal. Although the legal status of the Indians was far from certain, especially with respect to land
ownership, they were deemed the king's subjects and could not be made the property of
white settlers. In 1679 the Governor in Council declared unequivocally that "all Indyans
here, are free and not slaves, nor can be forct to be servants." Council Minutes; Indians
Declared Free and not Slaves, Dec. 5,1679, in 13 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 537. There
was an exception, of course, for those brought from "foreign parts." Id. In the 1760s, attempts were made to train the Indians to be, if not slaves, at least willing workers. They
were instructed, for example, that God testified his displeasure against those who will not
work for a living. William Johnson, who worked closely with the Indians, explained with
some admiration that most were too "Spartan" to accept fully such teachings, which they
suspected would "enervate and divert them from that warfare on which they conceive their
liberty and happiness depend." Letter from William Johnson to Arthur Lee, Feb. 28, 1771,
in 4 Doc. HIsT., supra note 9, at 435.
During the same decade, William Smith, Jr., John Scott, James Duane, and others established a subscription "Society for the Promotion of Arts," dedicated to considering "all
Manner of proposals that may be for the Public Benefit in Arts, Manufactures, Agriculture,
and Economy." See CircularOf The Society For The Promotion Of Arts, Dec. 10, 1764, in 4
Doc. His., supra note 9, at 345. The Society organized successfully some of the most destitute in New York City to work in a linen manufacturing establishment, which was meant to
be a model for future organizations. Letter from Governor Moore to the Lords of Trade,
Jan. 12, 1767, in 1 Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at 733.
Increasingly, however, discussion of the labor question was focused on immigration. By
the middle of the eighteenth century there were already large numbers of immigrants in
New York City, but this fact offered problems as well as advantages. The authors of the
Independent Reflector pointed out that some immigrants were unable to support them-
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colonial preoccupation; not surprisingly, therefore, one of the most

direct and important confrontations between title by occupancy
and title by crown grant resulted from an early experiment with
both immigrant labor and naval stores production. Since that confrontation draws together various strands of the economic development dilemma and its relation to provincial land law, the experiment is worth describing in some detail.
In 1708, an Order of Council was passed for transporting to
New York between three and four thousand Lutheran Palatines,
refugees from the war with France. The order stated that the Palatines would be "usefull" as settlers, serving as a military defense
against the French (the potent image, again, of the stout-hearted
republican farmer defending his township), and also as workers in
the naval stores industry.202 The third "use" was viewed, naively,
as wholly compatible with the first two. Meanwhile, part of a tract
of land released by the Vacating Act of2031698-named Schoharie-was set aside for Palatine settlement.
Originally it was probably intended that the Palatines would
first settle on their land and then enter into naval stores production. That was, at any rate, the understanding of*the Palatines.
Officials decided, however, that a more centrally organized enterprise was required. Therefore, after all those who could not work
were left behind ("Widdows and other useless people" 2 04 -for

in-

selves for a variety of reasons, including illness, ignorance, and large families. A small pox
epidemic had spread from poor immigrants to other citizens, including William Livingston's
son. Nevertheless, the Reflector was firm in its resolve not to give way to the temptation of
providing paternalistic philanthropy for those who lacked self-reliance: "Nor should we dispense our Bounties, with an unlimited Profusion, to the Poor, . . . we must often shut the
Bowels of our Mercy, or injure the Community - that which is virtuous in Theory, becomes
vicious in Practice." On the Importationof Mendicant Foreigners,No. V, Dec. 28, 1752, in
INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR, supra note 12, at 85-86.
202. Letter from Reverend Mr. Seabury to the Secretary, Oct. 6, 1764, in 3 Doc. HIsT.,
supra note 9, at 327.
203. Order of Council for Naturalizingand Sending Certain Palatinesto New York,
May 10, 1708, in 3 Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at 542-43. Actually, Bellomont had hoped to
use soldiers, who could be made to work in the production of naval stores at a low soldier's
salary (thereby solving the high cost of labor problem). After seven years of service as workers, they would be given plots of land and would be hearty cultivators as well. Some had
predicted that too many would desert naval stores manufacture when they realized how low
a soldier's salary was, compared to provincial wages. For an account of Bellomont's scheme,
see Letter from Governor Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, June 22, 1700, in 4 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 669-679. Much of Bellomont's determination to break up the large grants
stemmed from his desire to make lots available for soldiers under that scheme.
204. Letter from Mr. du Pre to the Lords of Trade, Dec. 6, 1711, in 5 COL. Docs, supra
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stance, those too ill from the long passage and children from families judged too large-who were left "at their own disposal" in New
York City20 5), the roughly 1,800 remaining immigrants were taken
to Livingston Manor. There, Robert Livingston and his overseers
had jurisdiction to try workers who created disorder. Soldiers were
later dispatched to provide enforcement. 20 e Furthermore, Livingston, who was a successful merchant as well as landlord, entered
into a victualling contract with the government according to which
he would provide workers with supplies from his manor brewhouse,
flour mill, and central storehouse. Critics objected that Livingston
would "make a very good addition to his Estate ' 20 7 from this contract. Similar contracts for supplying military troops had been notoriously profitable, but such centralized supply arrangements
seemed essential if workers were to be provided with the necessary
tools, food and management. Livingston also provided some of the
necessary capital for initial investment. Such complex blends of
public and private financings were typical of the period. Later, to
ensure a religious outlook supportive of the enterprise, the Anglicans sent ministers to Livingston Manor whose mission was to
preach submission to authority and quash a dangerous tendency
towards radical pietism among the Palatines. °s
•The early expectations of great productivity were never quite
realized. For at least two years the Palatines were kept working on
the manor, and there were occasional reports of successful manufacture ("that noe hands may be idle, wee imployed the Boys and
Girls in gathering knotts . . .out of which he has made about
three score barrels of good Tarr" 209 ). Nevertheless, all work was
done "manifestly with repugnance, and merely temporarily, 21 0 for
the Palatines kept demanding the land in Schoharie that had been
promised them. Even after overseers had learned to extract extra
work by withholding food and other necessary supplies ("thus doth
note 9, at 289.

205. Id. See also Order for Apprentencing the Palatine Children, June 20, 1710, in 3
Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at 553. The famous Peter Zenger was the son of a Palatine widow.
206. Court Over The Palatines,June 12, 1711, in 3 Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at 669.
207. Letter from Earl Clarendon to Lord Dartmouth, Mar. 8,1710, in 5 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 196.

208. Council Minutes, May 26, 1709, in 3 Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at 544.
209. Letter from Mr. John Cast to Governor Hunter, Mar. 27, 1711, in 5 CoL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 214.
210.

Id.
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folly change with circumstances," they happily reported 211), unrest
continued. The arms which had initially been issued to the Palatines, as consistent with the image of the Spartan republican martial spirit, so useful against the French, were quickly removed lest
those same arms be used against the overseers.2 1 2
After the second year the combination of public and private
financing for the operation began to run out,213 and the Palatines
were told they would have to survive for a winter on their own.
Between the fall of 1712 and spring of 1713, roughly 150 Palatine
families made their way through the forests to Schoharie, where
the Indians gave them deeds to land and helped them to make
their winter settlements. Governor Hunter and Livingston, however, were determined to keep the Palatines as dependent workers,
available for later labor. Thus, Hunter first forbade the Palatine
settlement in Schoharie and then in 1714 officially granted the
Schoharie land to some proprietors from Albany, who were authorized to claim the Palatines as mere tenants. 21 4" The hope was that if
the immigrants had no valid claim of their own to Schoharie, they
could be forced back into further naval stores work, having no pretense to possession of any lands.
Stubbornly, the Palatines refused either to become tenants of
the Albany proprietors or to leave Schoharie. Preliminary efforts to
enforce the Albany proprietors' claims were met with mob violence.21 5 A confrontation finally occurred in 1717, when Governor
Hunter and Livingston both appeared at Schoharie to order obedience. Instead of obedience, however, the Palatines offered Hunter
and Livingston a relatively sophisticated legal argument. First,
they asserted that they held the land in Schoharie under an equitable title based on their settlement, insisting they had incurred
211.
212.

Id. at 215.
Letter from Governor Lovelace to the Mayor of New York City, Oct. 6, 1669, in 3

Doc. HIsT., supra note 9, at 398.
213. The Condition, Grievances and Oppressions of the Germans, Aug. 20, 1722, in 3
Doc. HiST., supra note 9, at 709. The excuse was that there were no supplies from England,
and Governor Hunter, who had expended much of his own credit for the sake of underwriting the project, had run short of funds. The financing scheme seems to have been a very
complex combination of public and private investment, with no clear line between the two.
That was typical of the period. See, e.g., Letter from Governor Hunter to the Lords of
Trade, Oct. 31, 1712, in 5 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 347.
214. See Reverend Peter Peiret'sPetition,Dec. 10, 1702, in 3 Doc. HIsT., supra note 9,
at 412.
215. Id.
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and had "continu'd their settlement

. . . in expectation of His Majesty's grace and His Excellency's

favor" 217 -presumably a reference to the clear policy of encouraging settlement by recognizing labor as a source of right to title.
Second, the Palatines claimed the Indians had, by giving them
deeds to the land, in effect reconveyed their own "use" right over
to the crown for the benefit of the Palatines. 218 They then concluded by declaring that "if they serv'd anybody, it must be the
King, and not some private person."2 1 9

Hunter made no serious attempt to answer those arguments,
merely hinting darkly that an order from the crown would be
forthcoming and then conceding that the Palatines did, at least,
have a claim to the full value of their improvements.220 In fact, the
legal questions raised by the Schoharie issue were so fraught with
ambiguity that probably no coherent response was possible. The
first problem was that the Schoharie land had been released in
1698 from a previous grant precisely because large grants of uncultivated land were said to impede settlement and therefore to be, by
definition, a fraud against the crown. Ironically, Hunter had regranted the same land to the Albany proprietors for the specific
purpose of impeding settlement. Yet the goal of impeding settlement was, in this instance, for the purpose of achieving that other
clearly articulated but contradictory crown goal-production of naval stores. It would have been difficult to call promotion of that
goal a fraud against the crown.
A second ambiguity related to the delicate question of Indian
rights. In some colonies that question had long since been settled
by simply assuming that Indians had no legal property rights. In
Massachusetts Bay, for example, that position was elaborately defended as an inevitable deduction from the fact that a civil (as opposed to natural) right to land could be based only upon cultivation, not mere hunting and fishing-an explanation which led to no
slight difficulty whenever New England lawyers attempted to ex216. The Condition, Grievances and Oppressions of the Germans, Aug. 20, 1722, in 3
Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at 712.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 712-13.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 713.
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plain the validity of crown grants of uncultivated land. 21

In contrast, New Yorkers never doubted that the Indians had
some variety of property right, an assumption reflected, for example, in the title requirement that all patents be accompanied by
Indian deed. Despite a good deal of official effort to enforce such
requirements (Indian cooperation was needed in the wars with
France), Indians were routinely deceived, made drunk, or bribed
for the sake of procuring deeds, so the right afforded them scant

protection. Nevertheless, it was not without legal significance. As
in the Palatine instance, there was some real question as to
whether a grant unaccompanied by Indian deed was enough to de-

feat title based on cultivation and an Indian deed.
The answer to that question depended upon the precise rela-

tion between the crown's authority over land and the Indians'
221. Eisinger, Puritan'sJustification for Taking Land, in LXXXIV EssEX INST. HIST.
COLLECrION 131, 135 (1948). In Massachusetts, Indians were considered to have a merely

"natural" right to the soil because they only hunted on the land they held in common, and
had never cultivated it. In contrast, since white settlers improved the land, they procured
for themselves a right which was sometimes described as "natural" but which was civil and
legal as well. This right was legally superior to the rights of Indians. Winthrop carefully
made the distinction:
The first right was naturall when men held the earth in common every man
soweing and feeding where he pleased; and then as men and the cattle increased
they appropriated certaine Pcells of ground by enclosing, and peculiar
manurance, and this in Tyme gave themn a Civil right.
Id. at 136. Similarly, John Cotton asserted that God "admitteth it as a Principle of Nature,
that in a vacant soyle, bee that taketh possession of it, and bestoweth culture and husbandry upon it, his Right it is." Id. at 136.
This formulation left open, of course, the difficult question of what happened if labor
and cultivation conflicted with "legal" title. Puritans were certain that it was unbridled natural liberty which led to disruptive disputes over land ownership. Without the civil power of
magistrates, "Might would bear down Right. Men, like Dogs, would try their titles with
their teeth; and all differences between Meum and Tuum would be abolished." P. MILLER,
THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 417 (1967). Presumably, a wanton
tendency to settle on even the uncultivated land of others would be discouraged. Neverthe-

less, some New Englanders scrupulously followed out the logic of their position in relation
to the Indians. Since they were basing their right to the soil upon the "Grand Covenant" to
cultivate the earth, then that cultivation was a condition to all ownership. Title could not be
sustained "without a faithful practicall care of the performance of this principall Condition
of that Grand Covenant assigned vnto him: what pretence of Civell Right soeuer he may
challenge vnto himselfe concerneing the same." Eisinger, supra, at 137 n.13. Labor on the
land might therefore confer title superior both to abstract legal title and Indian hunting.
Roger Williams was, typically, prepared to draw the extreme conclusion, describing the
"Sinne of the Pattents," wherein kings claimed to be authorized to "give away the Lands
and Countries of other men." Id. (emphasis added). Williams argued that the land should be
returned to the Indians.
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right, and on that subject lawyers tended to admit ignorance. As
late as 1765, for example, John Tabor Kempe listed a number of
possible interpretations, but was satisfied with none.222 Indians
might, he wrote, be treated simply as English subjects with
equivalent property rights. This he thought probably wrong; but if
Indians were not full subjects, then the "Indians are to be considered as States in Alliance

' 223

and entirely outside the dominion of

the king's laws, including common law rules respecting land. That,
too, seemed wrong. Kempe concluded that the "policy of our Constitution warrnts the view" 224 that the land should be "considered
the King's and held by him for the use of the Natives til they
should part with this Right.

'225

By the 1760s, this convenient trus-

teeship notion was probably the dominant view of the question,228
but Kempe was by no means certain that it was incorrect (however
startling) to suppose "that the Crown has no property in the Lands
22 7
of the Natives, but that the Right of the Soil is in them.P

The whole issue might have been resolved at the time of the
1698 Vacating Act releasing Schoharie, for then there was some
concern as to whether the released lands should revert to the
crown, to the Indians, or to both. Some even dared to suggest that
no right at all could revert to the crown since such a result "seizes
into the King's hands lands that were never the possession of the
Crown.

' 228

Nevertheless, a colonial correspondent explained to the

Board of Trade that in 1698 both crown and Indians were simply
said to have received back whatever rights they held before the
grants were made-with, apparently, no clarification of exactly
what those rights were.229 Since the Indians publicly thanked the
king for the return of the lands, it was obvious they received some
right, but the nature of that right and its relation to crown author222. Letter from John Tabor Kempe to Sir William Johnson, Sept. 23, 1765, in 11 Sit
949 (M. Hamilton & A. Corey eds. 1953).
223. Id. at 950-51.
224. Id. at 951.
,225. Id.
226. For Chief Justice Marshall's similar formulation, see Johnson of Graham's Lessee
v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8Wheat.) 543, 574-75 (1823).
227. Letter from John Tabor Kempe to Sir William Johnson, Sept. 23, 1765, in 11 SIR
WILLIAM JOHNSON'S PAPERS, supra note 222, at 950.
228. Answer of the Agent of New-York to a Memorial against the Act vacating certain
Grants of Land, Oct. 26, 1700, in 5 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 12.
229. Id. at 13.
WILLIAM JOHNSON'S PAPERS
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ity remained peculiarly undefined.23 °
In their informal confrontation with Hunter, the Palatines in
effect claimed the "use" allowed them by the Indians, apparently
assuming that possession was in the king as trustee and a beneficial use was in the Indians, which could be conveyed to others.
They also claimed additional rights that flowed from actual settlement. Whether a governor could defeat that combination of cultivation plus Indian deed simply by crown grant unaccompanied by
Indian deed was no easy question. Nor was it answered during the
Palatine conflict, for the confrontation ended in a legal impasse.
Both Palatine representatives and Hunter carried the dispute to
London. 231 There, Hunter's influence with officials prevailed. In
fact, the Palatine deputies arrived in such an impoverished state
that they were imprisoned for debt when they reached London.
Hunter's successor, Burnet, was ordered to resettle the recalcitrant
Palatines on other land. At that point many of the Palatines simply left for Pennsylvania, where they were allowed secure titles.
The crown's protective policy toward settlers, which complicated the question of title in the Palatine case, masked rather than
highlighted the single most fundamental question about colonial
property: Whether the ultimate source of authority-and thus entitlement-derived from local usage or a centralized hierarchy.
Even before the Palatine incident Governor Hunter was painfully
familiar with the question, for during his administration church
property cases had posed it with dramatic and troubling intensity.
For example, in 1710 the inhabitants of Jamaica committed a
"Riot or forceable Detainer of ye Church at Jamaica..

.,23

By

force they seized the glebe, church and parsonage, which they had
built originally for their own dissenting minister. The Anglican Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) in England had then
sent over an Anglican minister to fill the Jamaican position. With
the backing of the SPG and the Bishop of London, the Anglican
minister, Reverend Poyer, claimed the church property for
233
himself.
230. Id.
231. A. SNELL, PAATINES ALONG THE MoHAwK AND THEIR CHURCH IN THE WILDERNESS
20 (1948).
232. Order of Council of Queens County, Apr. 13, 1710, in 3 ECCL. REcs., supra note 9,
at 1846.
233.

Id.
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This was a property issue which went directly to the structuring of moral authority. If John Leydt's "true peace" could only be
achieved through the unifying moral vision located at the top of
all-inclusive, structured, static hierarchy, then the property belonged to the Anglicans. Conversely, if peace could only be
achieved through a voluntarily expressed spirit of reconciliation
(with God and community), by its very nature both local and participatory, then the property belonged to the inhabitants of Jamaica. At each moral extreme, virtue, authority, and property were
unified; yet the extremes were irreconcilable.
Governor Hunter, forced to cope with that confrontation, announced that the Jamaica issue should be decided legally, not politically, as a "sure [matter] of property. . .[to] be determined by
the ordinary course of the law. '213 He offered to help Poyer with
the expenses of a lawsuit and even to guarantee that Anglicans
rather than dissenters sit on the jury. He would not, however, simply invoke crown authority to enforce the Anglican claim.2 3 5
Notably, both Jamaicans and Anglicans initially resisted this
appeal to a legal solution. The Jamaicans continued to hold their
church by force, while the Anglicans manuevered in England for
the removal of Hunter and the direct imposition of royal authority
on their behalf. As both Anglicans and Jamaicans recognized, there
really was no coherent middle ground of legal property right which
could resolve their two fundamentally irreconcilable moral
positions.
The disputes of the mid-century were increasingly focused
upon the exact meaning of property "right"-a word often used
but never explicitly defined. The problem faced by lawyers was the
one Hunter recognized-finding a source of entitlement to property rooted neither in crown authority nor in local use; i.e., to formulate a conception of property abstracted from either of the two
moral/political extremes. On the secular level, those extremes
meant either direct crown control over land ownership and use, or,
alternatively, the collapse of property into the chaos (as it was perceived) of local self-determination and the "robust" title by cultivation. John Tabor Kempe's tentative effort to formulate such a
234. Letter from Colonel Morris to the Secretary of the Society for Propagatingthe
Gospel, Feb. 20, 1711, in 3 Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at 246.
235. Id.
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mediating conception is the subject of the next Section.
III. JOHN TABOR KEMPE AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROPERTY
RIGHT AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

The papers of John Tabor Kempe, which include the briefs,
opinion letters, and memoranda of one of the most eminent lawyers in provincial New York, reflect the chaotic and uncertain nature of property rights. According to one of his students, Kempe
was distinguished by "understanding, learning, generosity, sensibility, and courage."2 36 As a lawyer, he was regarded by contemporaries as equal in both skill and integrity.23 7 Kempe was the last attorney general of the Royal Province of New York, succeeding his
father and serving from 1759 to 1782. During the same period he
maintained a rather extensive private practice and also acquired
more than 150,000 acres of land. 2 5 Because Kempe played that
dual role in the province, as both attorney general and private
practitioner, his papers provide a useful insight into the provincial
definition of property. As attorney general, Kempe was asked to
argue for the crown in title challenge cases brought against provincial proprietors, but as private attorney he often represented those
same proprietors in their disputes with local settlers. Proprietors
often sought to confirm or extend the boundaries of their vast
holdings by ejectment proceedings, brought to challenge the title
of farmers-and whole townships-that were settled near their estates. Because of fierce settler resistance, by the third quarter of
the eighteenth century those local disputes had turned into riots
which took over whole counties. In legal terms, they represented
the stark confrontation between grant title and title by occupancy.
A few preliminary points should be noted at the outset.
Kempe often used the word "right," but by right he did not mean
a Lockean fence around a purely privitized individual. Instead,
right in relation to property was bound up with legal title, and title
was derived directly from the crown. 39 Although grants in fact
236.

Crary, The American Dream: John Tabor Kempe's Rise from Poverty to Riches,

in COURTS AND LAW IN EARLY NEW
(Statement of William Rowles).
237.

YORK

75, 84 (L.Hershkowitz & M. Klein eds. 1978).

Id. The analysis that follows primarily is based upon a reading of the Papers of

John Tabor Kempe, New York Historical Society Collection.
238. Crary, supra note 236, at 84.
239. See, e.g., Reasons in Support of the Objection of the inhabitants of King's District
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were issued by the governor or his Board, sometimes contrary to
crown instructions, in theory the legitimacy of grant title still depended upon the feudal conception of the king as "fountain" of
property as well as of justice. The legal right a grantee (owner)
asserted against a squatter was the original feudal right of the
crown, -now vested by grant in the grantee.
This conception was elaborated with some intensity by New
York lawyers. Even counsel representing squatting settlers conceded that their clients' land, if unpatented, was still vested in the
crown; all they claimed was the recognition, within the colony, that
sovereign authority had traditionally given to cultivation and labor. It was in this sense that they argued both equity and utility
on behalf of their clients. As against the king himself, they made
no claim.
The close link between crown right and legal title meant that
title still suggested an extension of prerogative-a grant of royal
authority by the crown to the manor lord. This was so despite the
fact that actual jurisdictionalauthority, even when expressly conveyed in manor grants, had rarely been exercised in New York. Indeed, from the time of Dutch rule, one can trace a gradual conceptual separation of jurisdiction from property. Occasionally, for
example, jurisdiction was reconveyed to the sovereign, while the
land was retained. Nevertheless, proprietors of large tracts were
still said in the colony to be exercising "prerogative" authority.
This did not necessarily mean they conducted manor courts, but it
did mean that the legal right they claimed was conceived as the
same right which the king once held by virtue of his feudal lordship over the lands of his colonial dominion. This was the legal
premise which provided legitimacy for title to land as asserted
against "unlawful" occupiers.
A doctrinal structure based upon crown authority posed some
theoretical dilemmas in the province. First, as discussed already,
neither the crown nor provincial lawyers had determined what
rights the king held vis-a-vis the Indians; the exact rights that either the crown or the Indians could convey remained uncertain.
Another obvious problem was posed by the conditions of settleand others against granting the confirmation petitioned for by the Propriety of Westenhook,
Feb. 22, 1775, in Papers of John Tabor Kempe, N.Y. Hist. Soc. Box 5, Miscellaneous. [hereinafter cited as Papers],
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ment, quit rent, and pine tree reservation attached to all crown
grants. Strictly speaking, most grants in the colony had reverted to
the crown, and English policy still favored enforcement of such
clauses. More subtly, restrictive common law rules still protected
the prerogative interest in land. Crown grants were either to be
forfeited or construed in favor of the crown in case of ambiguity in
form or boundaries; yet most grants in the colony were deficient in
either or both boundary description or legal formality. One might
argue (as lawyers so often did) that the king should "in justice"
refrain from employing legal technicalities to assert oppressive
land claims against his subjects in the colonies. Once the legal category of title collapsed into that of royal (or judicial) discretion,
however, the equity of liberal construction claimed by the proprietor was matched by a competing equity of cultivation in the settler. As both settlers and proprietors knew, the crown's express
policy was to favor the settlers.
Underlying the doctrinal ambiguities, and surfacing repeatedly, was the problem of "utility." There was a utility which favored the security even of faulty title, as against the "confusion"
which would result if the whole crown grant structure were allowed
to crumble, and there was a utility which favored settler initiative
and possession even at the expense of secured title. Clearly in the
background were the two models outlined in Section I. Whenever
the notion of legal right disintegrated into competing equities,
those models came to the fore.
At certain key points, some of which are evident in the Kempe
materials, the legal elite in the colony made decisions which protected proprietors against the crown's actual assertions of prerogative authority over land while also protecting them against the "robust" claim of rights based solely on cultivation and labor.
Potentially, the claims of the king threatened an end to all secured
legal title no less than did the "usurpatious" claims of settlers. In
part through such choices, which in effect created a protective legal
barrier between crown and colonial owner, the notion of legal title
was abstracted from its base in either royal prerogative authority
or republican community will. The result was to sever the theoretical connection between property and sovereignty and to assert a
"right" that was absolute and unqualified. Notably, however, title
as a legal category was still almost inconceivable in the colony
without reference to crown authority. Therefore, the process of ab-
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straction was a halting one, and the meaning of ownership in the
colony more elusive and precarious than one might suppose. The
idea of property itself was still concrete and land-based, not yet
the mysterious abstraction of a commercial economy. A legal right
to property, however, was not nearly so concrete and easily
identified.
The halting nature of the process described in this Section,
however, should not obscure the significance of the conceptual direction in which Kempe and other members of the legal elite were
moving. In part, of course, Kempe's arguments as outlined below
were simply strategic responses to opposing argumentation-like
all skilled lawyers, Kempe could generate arguments on both sides
of any question. Yet there was also an inner, perhaps unwitting,
genius in the net effect of those arguments when taken as a whole.
That genius lay in Kempe's underlying perception that a new, mediating conceptual form would need to be created unless the whole
doctrinal structure of property law were to collapse into an all too
hopeless and evident contradiction. That new form-the notion of
an abstract right to property-was achieved only by denying the
validity of both the hierarchical and the voluntarist models in their
purest form. Elements from each model were, however, destined to
be retained in a dramatically new combination. From the hierarchical model Kempe borrowed the notion of formal legal title, secure from the disruptive claims based on actual occupancy, while
from the voluntarist model Kempe borrowed the "bottom up" notion of property as freed from the imposition of hierarchical political controls-in the colony, specifically the direct exercise of crown
authority. Using those two elements in novel combination, while at
the same time denying, in their pure form, both the hierarchical
and voluntarist models from which those elements were derived,
Kempe and other colonial lawyers began to fashion our liberal conception of property "right."
This Section will illustrate the basic property conflict, and
Kempe's response, in the context of specific and recurring legal
disputes. The major issues that all too easily exposed the underlying dilemma were the condition of settlement clause, formal defects in grants, boundary problems, settler claims based on use and
cultivation, Indian rights problems, and the relevance of mere possession to the question of title. Within the context of those often
complex issues, and the sometimes violent disputes within which
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they arose, the -liberal conception of "right" haltingly began to
emerge.
A.

The Problem of Conditions

No single issue potentially undercut the legitimacy of land titles more than the crown conditions still attached to grants. On
that point alone the legal authority of most patent rights simply
collapsed. Significantly, as late as the 1760s it was still impossible
to procure a land grant free from the condition to settle and cultivate.240 Even when Anglican King's College requested exemption,
the request was flatly denied.24 ' In that case, too, the condition to
settle and cultivate was taken seriously, for soon after the exemption was denied, Kempe, Smith, Duane, Livingston, and Morris all
met to plan the required settlement on the new grant to the college.24 2 Indeed, pressure to ensure settlement had increased by the
mid-century. The Board of Trade during the 1760s and 1770s an'243
nounced that settlement was a "right to be preferred to others,
warned against the effect of large grants, and proposed that authorities reduce the limit on individual holdings to 500 acres or
44
make them exactly proportional to ability to settle.
Kempe dealt specifically with forfeiture for want of settlement
clauses both as attorney general and in ejectment suits directed
against farmers. As one striking example, Kempe's own land in
Princeton, held in common with James Duane and Walter Rutherford, carried with it the usual condition to settle. When Kempe
and Duane brought ejectment suits against farmers who had settled in the area, the settlers' defense was based in part upon
Kempe's failure to cultivate his land within the three year period
stipulated by the grant clause .245 The settlers claimed that the uncultivated land therefore had reverted to the crown after three
years and was available for new settlement. In response, Kempe
240. See, e.g., Petition of Sir James Jay to the King, July 17, 1764, in 7 COL. Docs.,
supra note 9, at 643-45.
241. Id. The Board of Trade explicitly requested the exemption.
242. Order of the Governors of the New York College for the Settlement of their

Township of Kingsland, Feb. 17, 1772, in 4 Doc. HIST., supra note 9, at 767.
243. Letter from the Board of Trade to the Lords of the Privy Council,June 6, 1771, in
4 Doc. HIsT. supra note 9, at 437-39.
244. Id.
245. Jackson v. Stiles, in Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits VZ (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1769) (declaration in ejectment).
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successfully argued that the condition attached only in favor of the
crown, and therefore the defending settlers "can take no advantage
of this in a Suit, between us & them. If any advantage can be
taken of this, it must be by the crown in a Suit brought on
Purpose."" 8
Ironically, two years earlier, Kempe, as attorney general, was
consulted about the legal status of the uncultivated Kayadesosus
patent, and William Johnson had in fact suggested that the patent
'247
might be "forfeited for Breach of the Condition of Settlement.

Then, Kempe had replied that the grantees were no doubt "Liable" to the crown because there had been no settlement or improvement, but he cautiously advised that the point should not be
argued on behalf of the crown: "I fear upon the same Principle
almost every Estate in the province may be defeated and this
would breed a dreadful Confusion-How far a proceeding on that
Principle may be good in Policy is worth well considering.

' 248

Since

the condition of cultivation was thus made unavailable to either
settlers or the crown, the effect was simply to exclude voidness for
want of settlement from the range of available argumentation, thus
protecting (in fact and conceptually) the notion of property both
from crown authority and from the claims of actual settlers.
On his own initiative Kempe wrote three memos to the governor and Council on the troublesome subject of conditions. He was
concerned not only with the condition of settlement, but also the
pine tree reservation clauses.24 While the crown's own transcendent view of the public good still tended to focus upon active naval
stores production as well as rapid settlement, Kempe pointed out
that when conditions reserving all pine -trees in the colony for the
crown were combined with conditions of settlement, grants inevitably became "big with Contradictions and Inconsistencies"250 since
cultivation required the destruction of pine trees. Explanatory
clauses had been added by some governors to the effect that preservation of pine trees should not be construed to hinder grantees
246. Brief for Petitioner, Jackson v. Stiles, in Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal
including Lawsuits V-Z, at 8.
247. Letter from John Tabor Kempe to William Johnson, July 22, 1765, in Papers,
supra note 239, Box 1, Letters A-Z, Jackson-Kuyser folder.
248. Id.
249. Papers, supra note 239, Box 3.
250. Id. On the issue of pine tree reservation clauses, see also Letter Concerning Grants
of Land, Feb. 24, 1761, in Papers, supra note 239, Box 1, Letters A-Z.
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from "burning or cutting as shall be necessary and conducive to
the clearing or effectively cultivating the Lands, or for their own
use. ' 251 Kempe was nonetheless unsatisfied. By this explanatory
clause, he maintained, the original clause which it was intended to
elucidate "seems to be destroyed."2 52 If use really were allowed,
then the reservation of pine trees was meaningless. Kempe suggested amending the clauses, but he conscientiously added that "I
dare not alter the Form until I know how far they have been inserted without Warrant. 253 Apparently he feared that if the specific language reserving pine trees had been stipulated by crown
authority, there could be no amendment.
Governor Colden responded to the dilemma by insisting that
the "reservation as to Pine Trees be in the words of his Majesty's
Instructions, 25 4 even while also, paradoxically, proposing more rigorous conditions of settlement. Meanwhile, on the disputed New
Hampshire border, New York proprietors were being officially
charged with the destruction of pine trees on their land-clearly
an attempt, aided by New England, to challenge the proprietors'
patent rights on behalf of the border settlers.255
William Smith, Jr., then chief justice, announced his own
opinion that the pine tree reservation clauses should not be strictly
construed:
[I]t is for his Majesty's Service that his subjects meet with all Suitable Encouragement so as they may be induced to take up Settlement and improve
the Lands of this Province ... that Wood Land cannot be cleared without
burning up the Woods and Brush to render it fit for Tillage and that his
Majesty did not intend to prohibit such Burning of the Woods or Falling of
the Trees as are necessary and conducive to the clearing and effectually Cultivating of the Lands or for the use of the Owner.2'

Apparently, this became the prevailing view in New York courts.
Notably, however, Smith did not go to the extreme of suggesting
251. Papers, supra note 239, Box 3.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Copy of Order of Council relative to the Forms of Grants of Lands & particularly
of the Clause reserving the pine Trees, Mar. 25, 1761, in Papers, supra note 239, Box 5,
Miscellaneous.
255. Letter from Governor Wentworth to Governor Clinton, June 22, 1750, in 4 Doc.
HIsT., supra note 9, at 333.
256. Copy or Order of Council relative to the Forms of Grants of Lands & particularly
of the Clause reserving the pine Trees, Mar. 25, 1761, in Papers, supra note 239, Box 5,
Miscellaneous.
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that the "encouragement" of settlement should mean favoring actual occupiers over proprietors, although there was no logical reason why the free use arguments proprietors used against the crown
could not also be used by settlers against the crown's "patentees."
Again, the effect was to insulate property from direct crown control by reference to "bottom up" claims, while never allowing the
full voluntarist model to prevail.
B. Defective Grants

The problem posed by insufficiency of legal form was similar
to the problem posed by conditions. Kempe complained often that
during the infancy of the colony too little attention was paid to
legal technicalities, which meant that many deeds and grants were
formally defective. For example, some property located in Albany
originally had been granted by the governor in his own name to the
corporation of Albany. 21"The grant language specifying the governor as grantor then had been written into the Albany charter.
Since theoretically lands could only be granted in the name of the
crown, the grant was arguably invalid. Kempe was consulted by
the governor on the legality of the grant, for the lands were desired
for military purposes. Kempe first admitted his "reluctance" to
give an opinion on the subject, since he did not want to be accused
of oppressively asserting crown authority as against colonial proprietors who had come to resent any British interference with their
property rights, acknowledging the "general feeling about himself
and predecessors of waiting for an opportunity of taking all possible advantage against the subject" 258 on questions of property. He
then advised that the grant was indeed defective "in strictures of
Law" 259 since the governor "could not grant the Crown Lands in
his own Name.

' 26 0

He felt that the governor should remember,

however, that the grant was "as long ago as 1686, when the Legal
Forms of Business were little known. .

.

. How far the Crown

ought to take advantage of the Mistakes of its own officers, your
Excellency is *avery proper Judge it being a point of Honor." 261 He
concluded by reminding the governor:
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, A-B.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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It is further to be considered that if such advantage were to be taken the

greatest Confusion might be introduced in the Province, many of the Oldest
Titles to Land in the Province being founded on such Grants, made at times
when the due Attention to Form was not observed ....
Upon the Whole I think in strictness of law it is not good, but also I
262
think Exception should not be taken to it merely for Want of Form ...

The huge Van Rensselaer grant was plagued by a similar technical
defect in title. When the Van Rensselaers had received British confirmation for their Dutch grant, the confirmation had been in the
form of a conveyance to the crown followed by a new grant. Yet, as
Kempe noted, since Van Rensselaer had held his lands in fee tail,
he was, strictly speaking, unable to make the necessary conveyance
to the crown in exchange for the confirmation. 6 3 Therefore,
Kempe concluded in his notes, there was no "good consideration
'2
and doubtless all that Transaction with the crown is void. 4
A Dutchess County action raised a similar technical problem,
related directly to the problem of basing grants upon crown authority. Hardenbergh, a proprietor represented by Kempe, held
land under a grant issued on the 28th of April 1701/2, in the name
of King William. William had died on the 8th of March, forty-one
days before Anne took the throne. The question was whether Hardenbergh could plead good title based on a grant from a dead monarch. Kempe, representing Hardenbergh, knew the problem might
be awkward and hoped the court could be convinced to ignore it.
Since the date was written in the "[m]ergin of the Thing' 265 rather
than at the top of the grant, he initially hoped that the court
might simply consider it a mistake. 266 Nevertheless, in order to
plead title, Hardenbergh would have to plead a specific date, and
there was apparently no evidence of an alternative date that could
262. Id.
263. Notes for Reply, Beby & Others v. Van Rensselaers 1759, in Papers, supra note
239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
264. Id. Confirmation was a process, conceived as an exchange for consideration, by
which a grantee surrendered an old claim for a new one. As a result of the exchange, land
would revert in the crown and therefore be available for regranting. The technical definition
of confirmation was not unimportant; as in Van Rensselaer's case, one could question the
validity of a confirmation for which there had been no valuable consideration, e.g., if the old
claim itself were faulty. Thus, confirmation did not automatically give clear title.
265. Points of Law to be considered, Johannis Hardenbergh v. James Jackson ex dim,
David Turbos & Others, 1764, in Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
266. Id.

700

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

be pleaded. Finally, Kempe concluded that the court was bound to
take judicial notice of the king's death. Since the issue could not
be avoided, Kempe assumed that he would lose the case on that
point alone:
By the death of William the Right of the Crown Lands immediately vested in
Queen Anne, and could not be granted in the name of King Win-and this
for a plain Reason a dead Person can grant nothing besides
it
" 7 was the Right
must take place here.28

of the Queen ....

These Principles

At trial, Smith, Scott, Livingston and Kempe all debated the issue.268 Livingston stated the chief difficulty: there were "Diverse
patents in the same Situation," in the colony. 26 9 As Smith elaborated, there would be "Mischievious Consequences to what we
allege. "270
The case was complicated by the fact that in England a warrant issued to the chief justice in the name of the crown after the
king's death was considered void.27 " It was argued that the governor had received no notice of the king's death; but according to
Coke, where "noBody is obliged to give Notice - the party must
take it at its peril.

' 272

Furthermore, in England, commissions given

in the name of the crown during an interregnum were apparently
void by statute. 73
Nevertheless, the consequences of giving effect to the principle
were obviously grave. Since legislatures in the colony required the
governor's approval, it was suggested that even acts of Assembly
passed during that period would be "bad on the principles of Common Law."274 Therefore, in this case, "[n]ecessity obliges the giving
way of the Rules of Common Law.12 7 Coke was quoted as stating
267. Id.
268. Id. I could not tell who was/were judging the case. Notes on the trial were
incomplete.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Points of Uaw to be considered, Johannis Hardenbergh v. James Jackson, ex dim,
David Turbos & Others, in Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
273. The argument was hard to follow here. Reception of English statutes in the province was made official by Act of the Assembly in 1768. Until then, their reception was "arbitrary and changeable." Letter from Governor Moore to the Lords of Trade, Feb. 26, 1768, in
8 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 14.
274. Points of Law to be considered, Johannis Hardenbergh v. James Jackson ex dim,
David Turbos & Others, in Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
275. Id.
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Inconvenience
that "cases out of the words of a statute, if of equal
276
should be included by equitable construction.

Similarly, Plow-

den was also quoted: "Not the words of a law, but the Integral
sense of it" 277 should be followed. In the present case, it should be

remembered that grants in the colonies were far removed from actual royal control. "Formerly England had no Foreign Domin279
ion ' 278 but now the "[ciourt must take up a new principle,
rather than rigidly adhering to common law technicalities.
The perceived difficulty of the question highlighted the
problems inherent in basing a conception of right directly on crown
authority, while at the same time defining that authority as a mere
technical abstraction. There seemed an evident tension between
crown right as taken literally and taken as a formality: legitimacy
depended upon the former, but the stability of property ownership
often depended upon the latter. The clear direction of colonial
cases was to exclude claims based on actual crown authority, even
while fiercely retaining the validity of title as formality. That
posed an obvious problem of legitimacy, which would eventually be
solved only by the creation of the abstracted, liberal notion of
right. Kempe and the other lawyers moved at least tentatively in
that direction.
C.

Uncertain Boundaries

By traditional common law rules, grants with uncertain
boundaries, like grants deficient in legal form, were to be construed
in favor of the crown or simply declared void.2 0 This argument,
too, was more or less self-consciously excluded from the realm of
acceptable legal discourse. Repeated suits brought by the crown
against Van Rensselaer's huge estate made the problem of boundaries notorious. For example, one critical Van Rennsalaer boundary
marker was a creek called Pattenhook, 81 yet in 1606 there were at
least two streams and many creek branches given that name. As
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Letter from Governor Wentworth to Governor Clinton, June 22, 1750, 4 Doc.
HIST., supra note 9, at 333.
281. Notes for Reply to Beby & Others v. Van Rensselaer, 1759, in Papers, supra note
239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
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Kempe wrote in his notes for the case Beby v. Van Rensselaer,28 2
"[w]hat Course is it which way is it to stretch itself into the wood?
The deed is silent! No-one can tell! 2

3

Later testimony indicated

that the Indians called "every fall of Water" Pattenhook2 4
Another disputed Van Rensselaer boundary was indicated on
the grant as marked by "Wawanaquasick," which Van Rensselaer
claimed to be a particular stone Indian mound located on the
boundary he claimed for himself.285 He derived that claim somewhat vaguely from the fact that the Indian word wawanaquasick
referred to "heap of stones." 286 Yet one witness testified that the
word did not mean heap of stones at all, but rather referred to any
landmark considered in some sense sacred: "There being nothing
relative to stone in the words ...

such places have something sa-

cred in them... whether made of stone, wood, Earth or any other
matter.

18

7

The word had been compared to a heap of stones only

because the Indians sometimes threw stones in front of them to
make a sacred place before praying, but sacred areas might be
marked by other materials as well.
In the decisive case of King v. Van Rensselaer,288 Kempe had

requested jury instructions specifically concerning the common law
rules of grant construction. Kempe argued that in cases of uncertain boundaries, "[t]he Law is that where a Grant, of the crown for
lands is doubtful and will admit of two constructions, such construction shall take place as will pass the least Land ...

and that

the said Grant to Van Rennsalaer is void in Law for Uncertainty. ' 28 9 Chief Justice David James admitted Kempe's point as a

matter of law, but he pointed to the fact that vague boundaries
were the rule rather than the exception -in the province. To adhere
strictly to the law on that point would be to call into question most
of the land grants in the colony:
282. Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
283. Notes for Reply to Beby & Others v. Van Rensselaer, 1759, in Papers, supra note
239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
284. Id.
285. Notes of Argument for Westenhook and Van Rensselaer v. Beby & Others, Oct. 7,
1762, in Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
286. Papers, supra note 239, Box 5, Miscellaneous.
287. Id.
288. See Reasons in support of the Objection of the inhabitants of King's District and
others against granting the confirmation petitioned for by the Proprietor of Westenhook,
Feb. 22, 1775, in Papers, supra note 239, Box 5, Miscellaneous.
289. Id.
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As there are a number of Patents for lands in this Province, which are imperfect in their Description. . . the said justice could not adopt an opinion that
such grants were Void for such Uncertainty in Description and gave the
charge that tho by Law the King's grants are void for uncertainty and that to
where the King's grants are capable of two Constructions, such Construction
ought by law to prevail as will pass the least land to the subject yet in the
present case is certainly enough.2 '

Smith, as counsel for Van Rensselaer, won.the case by arguing the
"heavy Arm of the Crown" in imposing an "[o]ppressive prosecution. '

21

He also pointed to the fact that there were many grants

"in like Circumstances,"2 92 apparently meaning based on indeterminate boundaries and faulty Indian deed. This argument was persuasive, especially to the property-owning jurors.
During the trial Kempe had asked the justice to sign a bill of
exception so that the denial of his own instructions as to voidness
could be appealed. Although Kempe
for indeterminate boundaries
"strenuously requested"29 3 the signature several times, after as well
as during the trial, the chief justice delayed until the period for
filing for appeal had lapsed. By such means, proprietor titles were
protected from legal challenge and rendered more "secure," but
only by further undermining (albeit by "prudential" rather than
substantive ploys) the only legitimate source of title-crown auyet offering any distinctly "legal" notion as a
thority-without
94
substitute.
D. The Collapse into Contradictory Arguments About Policy
and Morality
With no coherent basis for legal title in the crown, colonial
lawyers commonly fell back on arguments based upon "equity"
and "utility." When that happened, the two competing models
outlined in Section I quickly emerged. For example, confronted by
the numerous defects in the Van Rensselaer title in Beby, William
Smith had argued for the family that if there were not a clear title
there was at least an equitable claim.2 95 This was so in part simply
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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because of the position the Van Rensselaer family occupied in the
province. Thus, obscure boundaries were construed generously, for
'2 6
the Van Rensselaers were "not considered as common planters,"
so that not a "small grant but a handsome grant was clearly intended. ' 297 Kempe, however, planned to use the competing equity
argument, that any Van Rensselaer title based on equity was invalid since it so clearly could not include equity by settlement: "Settlement on the lands cannot be any Reason-for it does not appear
he has settled any Person therein, it lies Waste for any settlers
under him for ought appears."2 9 Moreover, the Van Rensselaers
already held "upwards of Eleven hundred square Miles surely
enough for one Family."2 99
In Beby, Smith had also argued the "maxim" that it was contrary to good public policy to allow settlers to challenge legal title
and then be rewarded by grant-if faulty title were discovered, the
proprietor himself should receive the "right" rather than the settler, in order to secure title, discourage disruptive settlers, and generally promote the peace and harmony of an ordered, hierarchial
society.3 0 0 Kempe, however, had argued for the crown that "it
seems to be right in policy to reward those who should discover
any Injury of this kind. . . and as in this Country the settlement
of the Lands being most for the publick Benefit, a grant of Part of
the Lands seems to be the proper reward."30 1 As Kempe understood, a pro-cultivation policy argument was always available to
cut against the policy of securing title.
Ironically, Kempe's own arguments were turned against him in
the important Nobletown and New Canaan cases, where Kempe
represented Van Rensselaer in his claim against two "squatter"
townships. No cases show more clearly the tendency of the concept
"legal right" to disintegrate when subjected to serious attack and
to turn into arguments about competing policies.
The New Canaan briefs were argued before the governor's
Land Board, apparently a small administrative agency which re296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Notes for Reply, Beby & Others v. Van Rensselaers, 1759, in Papers, supra note
239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
301. Papers, supra note 239, Box 5.
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ceived petitions for grants and heard legal arguments about confficting claims. 0 2 The boilerplate language of the petitions addressed to it suggests the standards that the Board had generally
applied. Routinely, petitioners stated an intent to "cultivate and
improve the said Tract,"303 "Settle himself and Family on such
Lands,"'3'0 and so on. Also included were petitions from those who
had actually settled, and then requested official title. 0 5 Petitioners
generally30 referred to the particular tract they requested as
"vacant."
The definition of "vacant" posed two problems. First, there
had been a crown proclamation stating that all land available for
grants should have been purchased earlier directly by the crown
from the Indian tribe, at public meeting. This was designed to prevent the "Frauds and Abuses"307 which characterized land
purchases from the Indians, and which were thought to "prejudice
his Majesty's interest"' 08 and to cause "great disatisfaction of the
said Indians." 09 According to the proclamation, no private person
could "presume to purchase of the Native Indian proprietors any
lands not ceded to or purchased by his Majesty."3 10 Therefore, in
order for land to be "vacant," it could not be subject to Indian
claims.
This requirement was evidently ignored more frequently than
not. One petition, for example, stated an intent to "cultivate, and
improve" lands" "Occupied by the Native Indian Proprietors
thereof.'312 The petitioner then simply stated his assumption that
302. I have gathered this from the materials. I do not know exactly how broad was its
scope of authority.
303. E.g., A Lycence Granted to Cornelius Van Bursum to PurchaseLand of the Indians Back of the Highlands of the Hudson, in 13 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 554.
304. Id.
305. See Petition of Issac Truax and Others, XXIV NEw YORK STATE INDORSED LAND
PAPER, 1643-1803, N.Y. State Archives Collection, 1 [hereinafter cited as LAND PAPERS].
306.

"Your petitioners did discover a certain ... Tract of vacant Land.. . ." Petition

of James Sacket and Others, Apr. 2, 1770, in XXVH LAND PAPERS, supra note 305, at 6.
Sometimes, petitioners added that the vacant land was "vested in the crown," or "vacant
and unpatented." Id.
307.

Petition of Henry White and Associates, July 16, 1767, in XXIV LAND PAPERS,

supra note 305, at 5.:
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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the royal proclamation was meant "Soley to prevent the Defrauding of the Indians in purchases made by Private Parties and
not to inhibit purchases for the benefit of Private Persons if made
in His Majesty's Name . . . and at the expense of such Private
Persons . .*3 This language became routine; despite crown intent, land was apparently considered "vacant" even if occupied by
the Indians, and it could be privately purchased from them. 14
Nevertheless, the always complex problem of the relation of Indian
deeds to crown title was by no means resolved, and the proclamation could in theory be used as authority for challenging titles.
A second problem was whether "vacant" land included land
which was claimed by patent but which in fact remained uncultivated. This question arose when granted but uncultivated land was
discovered by settlers and then improved by them. That posed the
squatter question: Did cultivation lead to a better title than crown
grant without cultivation?
The recurring Indian deed and squatter issues were both
raised by the disputes between Van Rensselaer and the inhabitants
of Nobletown and New Canaan, near the Claverack patent. The
Nobletown inhabitants, in a petition to the Board, stated that they
occupied lands that were vacant and almost destitute of inhabitants except for Indians when they first came to settle them.""
The land was then purchased from the Indians and cultivated until
1759 when the inhabitants were "molested" by the claims of Van
Rensselaer and Schuyler, under the 1743 patent for Claverack.
According to the Nobletown petitioners, the patent for Claverack contained, like many patents, an unintelligible description of
boundaries.3 1 6 Moreover, the patent was given upon the express
condition that settlement and improvement should take place
17
within a specific period of time, which had not been done.$
Therefore, the petitioners concluded that the land they lived on
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. They had received permission to settle from Massachusetts, when the land was
still
claimed as part of the colony. Since New York did not recognize the Massachusetts
permission as a crown patent, however, it had no legal effect. This point was made several
times during border disputes cases; a New England grant could go to the question of jurisdiction, but once it was conceded that New York had jurisdicton, no alternative source of
title could be argued. This was expressly contrary to crown instruction-discussed below.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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was vested in the crown, and that the expense they had incurred in
procuring title from the Indians along with the labor they had bestowed in improving the land at Nobletown would entitle them to
a patent.3 18
A similar petition was presented by the town of New Canaan,
where inhabitants had purchased land from the Indians and cultivated it. The land was then claimed by Van Rensselaer. When he
attempted to survey it and when sheriffs later sought to enforce
ejectment orders, riots had broken out and the inhabitants had refused to leave. The town had petitioned the Board for its own
grant, to which Van Rensselaer had interposed objections. The
Board, favoring Van Rensselaer, had denied the original New Canaan petition on the specific grounds that it did not appear with
sufficient certainty whether the land was vacant or not. 19 The New
Canaanites repeated their petition for a grant, claiming that the
land could be shown to have been "vacant." Van Rensselaer had
then petitioned the Board for a confirmation of his own patent so
as to include New Canaan within the boundaries.2 0
In his presentation before the Board on behalf of Van Rensselaer, Kempe emphatically argued a clear conceptual distinction between legal title and squatter or Indian title. The whole notion of
legal "right," he said, was incompatible with claims based either on
Indian deed or cultivation. Allowing the latter led to the result he
pointed to in New Canaan: Settlers who "manifested a daring
Spirit of maintaining their usurpations by Force, in which Blood
had more than once spilled.

3

21

On the question of Indian deed,

Kempe argued that the New Canaanites had made the purchase
"to give Colour to their Pretenses" '22 without the king's license
and contrary to royal proclamation. Therefore, the purchase was
"irregular, no Equity can be founded on it."32 3 Instead, "[g]ood
Policy requires such Purchases, instead of being cause of Favor
318. Id.
319. Petition of John Burghart and Others, Jan. 15, 1753, in XXXIII LAND PAPERS,
supra note 305, at 4.
320. Id.
321. Notes on the Pretensions, to Suggestions of the Inhabitants of New Canaan, as set
forth in their Case presented to Governor Tryon and read in Council [hereinafter cited as
Notes], Jan. 20, 1773, in Papers, supra note 239, Box 6, New Hampshire Grants, 1763-1773.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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should be a Ground for the Refusal of a Grant.

'324

In response to New Canaan's claim that the land had been vacant, and considered so by the general "Sense of the Country,"3 25
Kempe argued that the sense of the country could only be formed
by the "Sense of Government,

'326

specifically, as articulated in the

King v. Van Rensselaer trial, which Van Rensselaer had won, and
in an earlier confirmation of Van Rensselaer's title. Alternatively,
if the New Canaanites did believe the land to be vacant, then they
must have intended an intrusion onto the king's land, for they
knew they had no legal title. Either way, they must have understood they "had no Right. 3 27 Therefore, only the "Enterprising
Spirit 3* 28 typical of their countrymen New Englanders induced

29
them to "swarm" onto the land-not a belief in title.
The settlers had attempted to compare themselves to Schuyler
and the patentees of Kinderhooks; each was similarly involved in
border disputes with Van Rensselaer. Kempe, however, carefully
distinguished the New Canaan dispute from those other disputes,
which were specifically about the boundaries contained in a legal
title. Unlike Schuyler, the New Canaanites had no pretense to a
legal claim: "Here it appears clearly that they do not pretend to
any legal title.., yet they have seized the Lands and hope to hold

them agt. those that have. '330

The New Canaanites had also invoked the equitable "maxim
of favoring settlers (provided they were bona fide Settlers)," 3 1 and
had appealed to the favor of a "Board distinguished for the Equity
of its Proceedings.' 3s 2 Kempe argued that such an appeal ex-

pressed "very strange ideas of Government:"

333

What can they mean by bona fide settlers-they can only mean such Persons
as like Crows settle down on the Lands to the Injury of the Proprietors ....
they can't mean such as settle under a legal Title, or even an imaginary one,
for they frankly confess they know they have none.. .. This may be settling
324. Id.

325. Id.
326. Id.

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

333.

Id.
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bona fide on their Ideas, but whence could they understand that this Government entertained the like Strange Ideas....33,

Although the New Canaanites had affirmed their loyalty to the
sovereign king and to the "laws of this Province," ' according to
Kempe that affirmation was controverted by "the General Perseverance of that Title even to Blood . . . and their frequent Riots '' 336

when proprietors surveyed their land.

Similarly, the New Canaanites had stated their assumption
that they would obtain a patent "confirming to them by a legal
' 37
Title Title [sic] the fruit of many years honest Industry. )
Kempe declared that this assumption was "of a piece with their
ideas of what is meant by bona fide. ' 3 38 Honest industry in this
case meant no more than "settling on Lands to which they pretend
no Title,"' 3 and "holding those lands against the consent of the
proprietors 34 0 in addition to "arming themselves and firing upon
the commissioners. 3' 4 1 Therefore, "[clommon principles of Equity
and Justice 3 4 2 required that such usurpations be quashed. The
Board should help to "restore Peace to the County"' 3s by denying
34
the petition. '
The thrust of Kempe's argument was clear. Essentially, it was
a repetition of the theory of property advanced in the Independent Reflector. In the chaotic state of nature each person seized
and used what he could, but in an ordered society property could
be conceived only as flowing from the sovereign. Unless chaos were
to prevail, some conception of legal title would have to replace the
"robust" title by occupancy and labor. Whatever the Board's discretionary policies might have been in the past, eventually the line
would have to be drawn between a legal conception of property
and the theory of property implicitly advanced by the rioters. For
the sake of "peace," claiming under title would have to be clearly
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

344.

Id.
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distinguished from settling "like a crow" on the property of others.
The brilliant and well-researched New Canaan argument, in
reply to Kempe and in opposition to Van Rensselaer's petition for
confirmation, was drawn in part from Kempe's earlier argument
against Van Rensselaer. The counsel (whose name could not be
found) did not simply argue the equity of title by labor as opposed
to legal title. Instead, he carefully demonstrated Kempe's category
of "legal" title to be one that could have no clear or coherent definition in the case; he then reduced the question to a choice between competing equitable principles, rather than a choice between title and occupancy.
The New Canaanites treated the Board's grounds for denying
their petition (it "not appearing with sufficient certainty whether
the Lands prayed for as Vacant were Vacant" 3' ") as shedding a
"great Light on this Controversy. ' 348 It meant, they said, that the
question would not turn on the strength of their own title to the
land. Their land, they admitted, was still vested in the crown.
Rather, it would turn upon the weakness of their opponents' title.M7 In effect, the question was one of degree. Given the general
equitable principle of favoring settlement, their claim would be
good unless Van Rensselaer could clearly show a better one, i.e.,
could show that the land was not really "vacant, but his by
Right."3' 48 This meant, in part, that the burden was shifted to Van
Rensselaer to show a superior "right."
Discussing the nature of that alleged right, the New
Canaanites' lawyer first considered the "[b]arren Subject of
Boundaries,"' 49 in which "we are left in the dark to find our way;
by the help only of Indian Burying place, and a few Indian
Names."3 50 For example, one important boundary was the legendary Wawanaquasick, which was the Indian name either for any
"heap of stones," or alternatively, for other burying places well inside the boundaries Van Rensselaer claimed for himself. Furthermore, the bounds Van Rensselaer now wanted confirmed exceeded
by 300,000 acres the bounds previously claimed by the family.
345.

Papers, supra note 239, Box 5, Miscellaneous.

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Notes, supra note 321, Box 6.
Id.
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Id.
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While the general explanation was that the Van Rensselaers were a
"good Nurtured family and [in the past had been] indifferent to
their Interest,

3

51

the New

Canaan counsel suggested that

"[indifference about their property cannot be said to be one of
their characteristics." 352 As he pointed out, the Van Rensselaers
had quarrelled with the Livingstons over a much smaller area for
over sixty years. In addition, he reminded the Board of the common law rule calling for indefinite boundaries to be construed in
favor of the crown and reminded Kempe that the requested bill of
exception on that point had never been prosecuted from King v.
Van Rensselear for "reasons of which are too well known not only
to the Counsil on the other side but also to this Honourable Board
to make an Enquiry into them Necessary."' 53
The purpose of raising the boundary issue was not to dispute
particular lines. Instead, the key point was that the decision to give
legal effect to old patents, no less than the decision to give effect to
cultivation, was based on equitable principles rather than on a
strictly conceived legal right. It had been generally insisted that,
given the indeterminacy of old patents, grants should be given a
"liberal construction." The New Canaanites graciously accepted
this principle: "We readily agree that old Patents granted in the
Infancy of the Province ought to be considered with great Indulgence.

' 354

This principle was, however, no less discretionary than

other equitable standards.
The Van Rensselaers had also frequently argued that they
should be especially favored in patent construction because they
were among the first settlers in the colony and because their family
was of special (i.e., aristocratic) merit. The lawyer commented that
it "must be a matter of surprise, that after all the Bounties of the
Crown, this Meritt should be pleaded ... for still further

Favours.3 5 The Van Rensselaers already had one of the most extensive tracts in the province. More importantly, counsel for New
Canaan pointed out that to give effect to old and indeterminate
patents was therefore simply to favor one form of merit over an351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id.
Id.
King v. Van Rensselaer, 1769, in Papers, supra note 239, Sorted Legal, B.S.W. 6
Notes, supra note 321, Box 6.
Id.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

712

[Vol. 31

other. The "high Prerogative Ideas of the Proprietors"35 were generally favored over the alternative principle that a "[q]uestion of
Right will be decided upon the Merits only without respect of Persons."35 He then reminded the Board that the crown had always
considered industrious settlers "Meritorious,"3' 58 and "in the granting of Lands, as well his Majesty, as this Honorable Board, has
ever considered all his Majesty's Subjects, as such, upon an equal
Footing, and that the Royal Bounty has ever been Extended to the
359
Occupants of Vacant Land in preference to others."
Thus, the question of whether to give effect to the Van Rensselaer claims was not simply a question of giving effect to a
"right," but rather one of competing conceptions of merit. It was
then further reduced to the question of whether
[t]he Favour of Government should be extended to a Party who desires the
Benefit of the Laborer and Improvements of others, Without offering any
Compensation for them, and these Improvements much at the hazard of the
Lives of the Occupants. . . . Is there either Justice or Equity, or since the

Gentlemen have appealed to Maxims of Policy, has Experience shown that
there is Policy in Granting away lands in the Actual Possession of others; Or
has this contributed to establish Peace .... 3o

The New Canaanites then argued that "peace" was no less
hindered by the equitable principle of title by cultivation than it
was by the principle of liberally construing old patents. Under the
latter principle, the "most Enormous Claims may be set up, and
unbounded Scope of Contention and Litigation be introduced."' 361
Since many old patents were no less indeterminate than Van Rensselaer's, others would make the "same pretentions, then mutually
clash and interfere with each other."3 2 The only standard for de3 03
ciding among them was which was "more or less Absurd.
Included on land claimed both by Van Rensselaer and Schuyler was a small town called Wawiginauk, which had obtained a pat356. Reasons in Support of the Objection of the inhabitants of King's District and
others against granting the confirmation petitioned for by the Proprietors of Westenhook,
Feb. 22, 1775, in Papers, supra note 239, Box 5, Miscellaneous.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
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ent in 1743. That town would be split by conflicting proprietor
claims: "Claimants (who hold the Rights of Property so sacred)
have very decently divided this little Patent among Themselves.

'8
4
1

Thus, "[pjroperty after being so well secured by every

Sanction of Government ... will again be set afloat. ' 36 5 Inevitably, therefore, the question was not "property," but whose property was to be protected: "Why then should Government be asked
366
to interpose its aid, in Favor of one Party more than another?"
Thus the New Canaanites challenged Kempe's easy categorization which pitted peace, security, and tranquility against "usurpation" and "rioting." An extensive claim was itself "pernicious and
destructive, as it renders property precarious, unhinges other patents, and ouersels ancient possessors, and evidently tends to produce contention and Litigation in the County. 3 6 7 Therefore, the

Board should construe Van Rensselaer's boundaries so as to exclude the New Canaanites-especially as that construction "coincides in the present case, with the benevolent Principle of Quieting
and Securing Possession, both ancient and modern.

36 8

Having reduced the question of "right" to one of competing
principles of "peace," "Meritt," and secure property, the New Canaan counsel stressed again the fact that royal favor had generally
been extended to settlers, both on grounds of equity and "public
Utility":
His Majesty has ever viewed the Condition of honest tho Ignorant Settlers
with a more indulgent eye; and it is not from him, that we can think his
Attorney General Kempe is authorized; to call the Settlers of his Majesty's
Lands in America Intruders, holding as in the Present Case, not in Opposi-

tion to the Crown, but with an avowed Recognition of the Royal Title.361

This recognition included New Canaan's expressed willingness to
pay quit rents, which the Van Rensselaers, like other proprietors,
were notorious for evading. Similarly, New Canaan's lawyer quoted
from an address in the Assembly, which had stated that lands
should be given to "those who would occupy them; in such Case
should any Patents interfere with the Publick Utility, such Part of
364. Id.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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them ought to be Vacated, the Person or Persons settling them
Vested with a full and Legal Title..
-37o He then concluded the
argument by asserting that if, following Kempe's principles, no
land had ever been settled except that which could be shown to be
out of legal dispute, then we "might indeed have had more Lawyers, Casuists and Statesmen, but in the mean time ... the Country had been left Waste and uncultivated its Population
' '3 1
retarded. 7
The New Canaan case highlights both the importance and fragility of Kempe's practical and conceptual efforts to accommodate
the competing models of hierarchy and voluntarism. The goal was
to affirm the hierarchial idea of formal title while ignoring the literal conditions that served to connect title to crown authority.
Once severed from the terms that gave it legitimacy, however, the
emerging concept of title quickly confronted a chaotic social legality where rebellious settlers demanded land claimed by absentee
owners. As the New Canaan case shows, clever representatives of
the people could easily seize upon the same rhetoric proprietors
had employed to justify insulating their holdings from the actuality of crown control. Ultimately, by replacing a discredited crown
with themselves as the source of sovereignty, the people threatened
to seize the land in their own name. Their assertion, accompanied
by actual social upheval, made the liberal, middle-position accommodation seem a compelling necessity.
E. Indian Rights
As the unclear definition of "vacant" suggested, the problem
of Indian rights was almost as troublesome as the problem of indeterminate boundaries. As in the New Canaan cases, this was an
issue which arose most frequently when settlers asserted Indian
deeds and their own occupancy against a crown grant unaccompanied by Indian deed. Conceptually, the link between Indian rights
and settler occupancy might seem appropriate, since both rights
were "lower" rights, in contrast to the grant right, flowing from
sovereign authority, at the top of the hierarchy. In practice, the
combination stemmed from the fact that settlers could often produce Indian deeds, sometimes as a result of anti-proprietor cooper370. Id.
371. Id.
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ation between settlers and Indians, as in the Palatine case.
In principle, the trustee formulation of the crown/Indian property relation left available the argument that the crown grant was,
by definition, superior to any right based on the Indians' "use"
right, since grants derived from the crown's supreme authority
over land. As Kempe often in fact announced, a denial of the validity of a crown grant, on any grounds, could be construed as a denial of the king's right under the English Constitution to rule over
his colonial dominions.
That clear conceptualization of the question was complicated,
however, by the crown's own protective policy towards Indian
rights. For example, the important Kayaderossus patent had come
under challenge in 1765. Kempe was asked to investigate its legal
status and discovered that it was accompanied by an Indian deed
which did not, in boundry description, come close to matching the
tract claimed under the patent. Typically, Kempe lamented that
"[t]he Business in those Days [of early patents] was not done here
with the greatest Regularity," 372 but he thought that if a matching
deed had existed it would have been registered. He admitted, "I
am really perplexed, and do not know what to think of it.

3 73

Wil-

liam Johnson wanted to attack the patent on behalf of the crown
and Indians; the question was whether the patentee's failure to
produce a matching Indian deed rendered the patent invalid. Advising Johnson, Kempe was uncertain of the answer-chiefly because the crown had obligated itself to honor the Indian right. As
he explained:
[I]t is the Policy of our Constitution, that wheresoever [the] Kings Dominions extend, he is the Fountain of all Property in Lands, and to deny that
Right in the Crown in any Place is in Effect denying his Right to rule
there-Hence it follows that in a legal Consideration the King can grant

lands within his Dominions here, as well without a previous Conveyance
37
from the Indians as with. 4

Nevertheless, he added: "The Crown has thought fit by its Instructions to its Govt. here to direct them not to Grant lands before
372. Letter
supra note 239,
373. Letter
supra note 239,
374. Letter
supra note 239,

from John Tabor Kempe to William Johnson, Aug. 12, 1765, in Papers,
Box 1, Letters A-Z, Jackson-Kuyser folder.
from John Tabor Kempe to William Johnson, Sept. 23, 1765, in Papers,
Box 1, Letters A-Z, Jackson-Kuyser folder.
from John Tabor Kempe to William Johnson, Aug. 12, 1765, in Papers,
Box 1, Letters A-Z, Jackson-Kuyser folder.
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He also pointed out that a purchase from the Indians was
technically invalid if not made publicly from the chiefs, for "I understand no Individuals among these Indians had any Property in
Lands but Occupancy, the Right of the Soil being in the Nation or
Public. 3

76

This position, explicitly confirmed by the crown's proc-

lamation, had been established at the request of the tribal leaders,
since a few individual Indians often could be induced by bribes or
liquor to convey the land of a whole tribe.
Kempe then discussed whether a grant contrary to crown instructions was invalid, or only grounds for exposing the governor to
the "King's Displeasure. '' 7 According to Kempe, this point
seemed to depend upon whether the governor was acting within
the land grant authority expressly conveyed by his commission,
and "of this I speak doubtfully, rather inclining to think there is a
Clause in the [Commission that] would make [the grant] void. 3' 7 8

Kempe's doubts were not without dangerous potential. If
Kempe were correct when he suggested that grants without Indian
purchase were void by crown authority and that the rights of the
soil could only be purchased from the whole tribe, then many of
the land grants in the colony were void. An earlier case illustrates
Kempe's possibly self-conscious effort to avoid such implications.
In 1762 Kempe had been consulted by the Governor and by William Johnson concerning some purchases from the Canajoharie Indians. An unscrupulous speculator named Flock, who handled the
purchase, had procured the deed by getting some Indians drunk
and then inducing them to sign it. Johnson and the governor suggested that Kempe attack the patent by defending settlers who
were being ejected by the new proprietors. Apparently the settlers
had already purchased deeds from the Indians or would be allowed
to do so, and a successful defense on their behalf would serve to
defeat the patent claim. Kempe replied, however, that
[William] Smith as well as myself is of opinion that in these Ejectments we
must be ... [deliberate] should We defend [against] them, as the plaintiffs
will produce a Title by the King's Patent, against which no Indian Right can
by the Policy of the Constitution be heard of in the King's Court, The King
375. Id.
376. Id.

377. Id.
378. Id.

ORIGINS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

717

being Lord Paramount."

Johnson pressured Kempe to take some action, and accused
him of deliberately delaying. At one point Kempe claimed that he
could not proceed because there were no funds available to pay the
court costs, and said he was distressed by Johnson's insinuation.
Chiefly, however, his response to Johnson was that the law simply
provided no remedy, despite what he considered an obvious case of
injustice:
I could wish for the sake of doing the Indians that Justice they seem really

entitled to, that we were in this Case [less] tied down to the Observance of
these Rules, which tho in general are just and equitable, seem here something
contrary to natural Justice and I fear the Indians not seeing it in its proper
Light, will conceive the worst and persuade themselves they have Reason to
think little of our Honesty & the Publick Faith.380

Three years later Kempe was ordered to press charges against
Flock, as a common disturber of the peace, but the patent, so far
as I could determine, was not disturbed.
The disruptive potential of the Indian deed problem was so
great that more direct efforts were made to quash it. The case of
Samuel Monroe provides a dramatic illustration. In that case the
Wappinger Indians, led by Daniel Nimham, had challenged the
Philipse Highland Patent because it had not been fairly purchased
from the Indians. The Wappingers appointed as guardian Samuel
Monroe, who convinced a number of settlers that Philipse did not
have good title and that they could purchase deeds directly from
the Indians. He then argued, before a special three day meeting of
the Council, that the settlers' "equitable" claim based on Indian
deed and possession should supersede Philipse's title without good
Indian deed: "every Settler purchased his own particular Farm
from the Indians and that all the improvable Lands were so
purchased."3 1
The Board of Trade favored Monroe in this case, 8 2 but the
379. Letter from John Tabor Kempe to William Johnson, Sept. 13, 1762, in Papers,
supra note 239, Box 5, Sorted Legal Manuscripts, Kings against George Klock folder.
380. Id. Another "rule" which prevented "justice" related to evidence: Indians were all
considered interested parties in suits concerning Indian claims. Once Colden said their testimony was excluded altogether, but I am not sure that was really true. Kempe simply said it
was "better" not to use Indian testimony. Id.
381. Letter from John Tabor Kempe to William Johnson, Mar. 17, 1767, in Papers,
supra note 239, Box 1, Letters A-Z, Jackson-Kuyser folder.
382. See Report of the Lords of Trade on the Petition of the WappingerIndians, Aug.
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Governor and Council found for Philipse. Moreover, they then decided to charge Monroe with maintenance (officious, unlawful interference with suits, so as to stir up controversy). Monroe, they
said, had set up Indian titles as paramount to the king's "in
Dishension of his Majesty, Dangerous to the Tranquillity and disordering the settlement and Improvement of the Colony,

3

83

and

had also read aloud the crown's proclamation concerning fraudu38
lent purchases, "fixing it up to give colour to the Indian claim." '4

Here, both tranquility and settlement were clearly thought to depend upon secure title by crown grant.
When the Council sought Kempe's advice, as attorney general,
his advice was oddly guarded. He acknowledged that to challenge a
crown patent simply on the basis of Indian deeds would be a "high
Crime. It amounts to a Denial of the King's Right to rule here, for
wherever the King has a right to rule he is Lord Paramount."3 s5 On
the other hand, Kempe pointed out that the legal questions were
more complex than the Council supposed. The crown's proclamation concerning fraudulent purchases from the Indians had promised relief in cases where the Indians' land had been taken without
consent and compensation. Therefore, Monroe's challenge to the
patent was not so completely without foundation as to make him
criminally liable. Kempe also pointed out that the proclamation
was by its nature a public proclamation, declaratory of crown intent. Therefore, reading it aloud could not be construed as criminal. Finally, if Monroe were guilty of buying and selling "pretended Titles," then "so is every other person that has taken up
Leases from the Indians, I suppose." '
Kempe's conclusion was that maintenance could not be
charged simply on the grounds of challenging a title held by the
"King's patentee.

'8 17

Although patentees derived their property

right from the crown, a challenge to that right was not, for purposes of criminal law, a challenge to the right of the king himself.
There had to be an additional and more specific intent to "stir up"
30, 1766, in 7 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 870.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Letter from John Tabor Kempe to Beverly Robinson, Mar. 21, 1765, Papers, supra
note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
386. Id.
387. Id.
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the tranquility of the province or challenge the king's authority.
Despite that opinion letter, Kempe was ordered to press
charges against Monroe for "disposing of land under pretended
rights and titles," 8' 8 and Monroe was jailed. The Board of Trade
thought the Council had been unduly harsh, but was not certain
how to proceed legally to help Monroe."" Once imprisoned,
Monroe continued to argue his case by petition from the city jail.
For example, he pointed to the fact that he had himself been in
possession for thirty-two years of land purchased from the Indians;
he had challenged Philipse's title partly to defend his own land
from Philipse's claims. Quoting from Woods Institute ("But if any
man hath an Interest in the thing in dispute he may Lawfully
maintain his action Relating to it" 39 0), he argued that his own possession plus an Indian deed gave him a sufficient "interest" to exempt him from charges.
Eventually, Monroe gave up petitioning and escaped from jail,
where he had remained for at least two years. 9 " Meanwhile, the
complexities posed by crown-endorsed Indian rights continued to
plague lawyers and remained stubbornly unresolved. By denying
the legitimacy of Indian rights, however, lawyers were once again
effectively suppressing the extreme implications of both voluntarist and hierarchical claims.
F.

Possession, Partition,and the Statute of Limitations

Throughout the colonial period, actual occupation continued
to play a role in establishing title although the clear thrust of legal
decision-making was in the direction of establishing the validity of
title over the essentially voluntarist claims based on occupations.
Kempe stated in one argument that the common law clearly forbids grants or conveyances before "being in possession. ' 392 Notably, the reason was that "it tendeth to maintenance disturbing ancient possessions. '3 3 Therefore, before sale, one must have
388. See Report of the Lords of Trade on the Petitionof the Wappinger Indians,Aug.
30, 1766, in 7 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 870.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Notes on Plimouth Colony Grant, in Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal,
B.S.W. 1.
393. Id.
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possession and not "[r]ight only."' ' This rule provided a standard
technique for challenging title-in a long series of conveyances, if
one could show that a party "never ent'd" 395 or that a deed was not
"founded on possession," then the chain of conveyances was
broken.
While the precise meaning of "possession" 3e6 was never fully
clarified, it was evident that actual occupation had important legal
force. When asked to inquire as to the legal status of any particular tract, Kempe would first determine who was in actual occupation, and for how long.397 Similarly, Kempe's notes on trials indicated a considerable amount of testimony going to the question of
occupation-ideally, a client, and his father before him, had both
been in possession. In the notes for one trial, Kempe described testimony about the fact that the land was "still covered with Woods
and witness does not know them to be in any Fence." 398 The word
"any" was heavily underlined, perhaps some indication of the continuing importance of that old symbol of use. Kempe then concluded that particular set of notes with the statement that "[a]s to
Possession ... [the] Law favors ancient possession more than an
ancient deed without possession ...
Possessioii Evidence of
99
right."

In one case where Kempe emphatically argued that a proprietor's title should supersede ancient possession (by the corporation
of Kingston), he stressed in his notes the force of the opposition's
ancient possession claim ("We must watch the Proof they give of
such" and then argue that "if proved do not give a Right of the
Crown."4 00 ). He intended to argue, as in New Canaan, that al-

lowing the claim by possession would "establish a bad principle,"
but even then he pointed out that "[j]ustice would have to be due"
to the "settlers for their improvements." 0 1 Similarly, the old standard of "first settlers" had not completely disappeared. As a defending lawyer asserted (although apparently without success),
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Letter from John Tabor Kempe to W. George Clinton, Feb. 5, 1766, in Papers,
supra note 239, Box 1, Letters A-Z, Caroll-Cuyler folder.
398. Notes on Trial, 1772, in Papers, supra note 239, Sorted Legal, B.S.W. 5.
399. Id.
400. Notes on Trial, in Papers, supra note 239, Sorted Legal, B.S.W. 5 (circa 1765).
401. Id.
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"they were first occupiers. Humanity requires they should have
2

been preferred."

40

In large part the question of actual possession was a question

of the statute of limitations. At the Moot proceedings the assembled colonial lawyers solemnly and unanimously agreed with the
statement: "[I]f A is deseized by B who continues in possession
above 60 yr. A cannot recover, his entry being tolled by the Statute
of Tenures. '403 Oddly, the sixty years acknowledged at the Moot

was the period attached in England to the then obsolete writ of

right, rarely brought in New York.'14 By parliamentary act in Eng-

land, according to Blackstone, only twenty years possession tolled
the statute in an ejectment action. 5 The difficult question in the
colony, therefore, was whether less than sixty years- was sufficient

to base a suit. Kempe's notes on the subject are unclear: "If possession has continued 60 years the Right of Recovery is barred and

if only for 20 years, it has of late been doubted whether an Ejectment will lie, 'tho in that Case there will be another Remedy.

' 408

Kempe did not specify the alternative remedy; ejectment was the
402. Id.
403. Proceedings of the Moot, 1770-1774, N.Y. His. Soc. This society was designed to
foster excellence in the profession through serious discussion of legal issues; younger lawyers
atiended for instruction.
404. Papers, supra note 239, Sorted Legal, B.S.W. 3. During this same period, there was
a discussion at the Moot of the writ of right for knight service, which the lawyers thought
would still lie in New York. Duane, Kempe, Benion, Jones, and Jay all agreed that substantial freeholders may be returned and serve, instead of knights. Proceedings of the Moot,
1770-1774, N. Y. His. Soc. It is hard not to see these discussions as part of an intellectual
restructuring of the hierarchies of property relations, although it might also be simply a part
of th e eighteenth century colonial interest in legal formality. During this period there was
also a considerable interest in the formality of legal dress:
[T]he Court considering that it has been the usage of most of the civilized Nations in Europe to distinguish the different order of Men in the learned professions by their Dress: and the Judges in our Mother Country having from the
most early Days been accustomed to appear to Westminster in Term Time in
Robes and Bands and the Counsel in Bar gowns and Bands.... The Court
Conceiving that the practice at Home stands upon good Reasons and that the
Introduction of the like Usage in this province would be very proper and advance the Dignity, Authority, Solemnity and Decorum of the Court and have
many useful Consequences.. ..
RuuLs OF SUPREME COURT NYHS (1764). Therefore there would be a contempt citation for
failure to appear in proper dress.
405. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *263 n.1 (editor's note).
406. Points of Law to be considered, Johannis Hardenbergh v. James Jackson ex dim,
David Turbos & Others, 1764, in Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
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standard procedure for recovering possession. Kempe then continued by noting a jury tendency to favor actual possession:
If the Line which the present Possessors claim is ancient, has been generally
understood to be the Line of subdivision and the Possessions have gone accordingly, we conceive it will be very strong Evidence in Favor of the Possessors, and whatever is the true Construction of the Writ of Partition, we think
a Jury will be inclined to favor the ancient Possessors.' °7

As Kempe indicated, partition was related to the statute of
limitations and to the question of actual possession in complex
ways. After the crown established a definite 2,000 acre limit to individual holdings, it became common for several proprietors to invest in land as tenants in common. Frequently, several family
members of each proprietor would formally join in the purchase, so
that huge tracts of uncultivated land remained concentrated in the
hands of a few families. This practice effectively circumvented the
official limit, which was meant to prevent exactly such speculative
accumulation. 08
With much land held in common, there was often difficulty
determining who owned what land for purposes of sale, inheritance, or quit rent collection. A 1726/7 statute gave blanket approval to extrajudicial partition, even if based on surveys conducted by the proprietors themselves. 409 The danger of this statute
407. Id.
408. Id. One ejectment suit, for example, was brought by "The Honorable Oliver DeLancey, The Honorable John Watts, John Van Cortlandt Esquire, The Right Honorable

Willoughby Berke, the Earl of Abington and Dame Charlotte his Wife, The Honorable
Charles Fitzroy and Ann his Wife, William Skinner and Suzannah his Wife, Jacobus Ver
Planck, John Ver Planck, and Phillip Ver Planck." Id. Kempe stated:
Oliver DeLancey's Mother and Phillip Livingston's Grandfather were own Cousins, Jons Watts and Jons Va Cortlandt are related in the same degree, William
Skinner the Jns Married Oliver DeLancey's Sister-Jns Van Cortlandts Father
was a Brother of Oliver DeLancey's Mother, and was an own Cousin to Phil.
Livingston's Grandfather. Earl of Abington married a daughter of Capt. Warren
and was granddaughter to Oliver DeLancey's Mother Fitzroy. The same William
Skinner's Mother was a Sister to Oliver DeLancey's Mother. Jacobus Ver
Planck's Father was an own Cousin to Philip Livingston's Grandfather Jn Ver
Planck, and Philip Ver Planck the same.
Id. There was a fierce political rivalry between the DeLanceys and Livingstons, but there
was also an obvious underlying consolidation of interests. So too, the Van Rensselaers quarreled with the Livingstons over boundaries, but they were united against settlers. I do not
think the intense infighting should obscure the degree to which these families were attempting to concentrate resources of the colony into their own hands.
409. The New York Act for the Partition of Lands in Common, 1726/7, described in
Memorial of Mr. Colden to the Lords of Trade againstthe New York act for the partition
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was that it allowed patentees with indefinite boundaries (i.e., most
of the proprietors in the colony) to claim land on the basis of their
own surveys. When supposedly surveying for the sake of partitioning among themselves, patentees would also extend their claims.
This was a danger recognized by Colden when the statute was
passed. He had tried, but failed, to have inserted a clause which
called for an initial determination of grant boundaries before allowing essentially private partition among the cotenants. Although
the bounds proprietors claimed for themselves could be contested,
the suits required to do so were burdensome. As Colden stated the
problem:
If the Patentees shall be allow'd to settle their boundarys at their own discre-

tion I apprehended they would take an advantage of what was really a Defect
in their Patents, to encroach upon the King's lands or the lands of his tenants holding small Tracts but paying considerable Rents, & some time ago
many evidences were produced before the Council to prove an encroachment
of near Seventy thousand Acres of land, made by the Patentees of some of

these tracts. Tho it be true that such encroachment cannot give a legal title
to the lands, it is the Duty of the Legislature to prevent Law suits, & not to
encourage them ... 410

Surveys on land settled by farmers generally led to proprietor
claims and then ejectment suits. As a result, settlers frequently resisted surveyors with violence. Because survey commissioners were
authorized by the legislature, however, information could be filed
against those who prevented their entry, and a small body of procedural law developed around surveys and charges based on resistance. Notice of a survey was required in advance, for example,
and a farmer could not be criminally charged unless he broke the
surveyor's lines. Settlers near the New Hampshire border learned
to harass commissioners without actually breaking their survey
cords. 11
I think this procedural protection merely obscured the legal
bind in which the settlers were placed. Of course most farmers
could not afford to defend themselves in a complex suit, yet, unless
legally contested, the surveyor's determinations were considered
strong evidence of boundaries. Farmers often simply defaulted
of lands in common, Dec. 12, 1726, in 5 COL. Docs., supra note 9, at 808.
410. Id.
411. See, e.g., Proclamationof the gov't of New York, for seizing James Brakenridge,
and others, for riotously obstructing the Partitionof Wallumschack Patent, Dec. 12, 1769,
in 4 Doc. HisT., supra note 9, at 379.
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rather than offering a defense to an ejectment suit, and the sheriff
was then authorized to execute the ejectment order.
The easiest defense available to a farmer was based on the
statute of limitations. Notably, during the M~oot proceedings it was
determined (although not unanimously) that any tenant in common could receive the benefit of the possession of another tenant
in common in order to prevent the tolling of the statute." 2 In suits
brought after partition surveys, that rule apparently meant that
possession by any one of the original proprietors precluded a statute of limitations defense. Furthermore, if farmers had resisted
surveyors, that fact could be argued by the proprietor as a valid
reason why he had not earlier settled the land in order to fulfill the
terms of the grant or in order to establish his own possession. For
example, the New Canaan townspeople had forced surveyors off
the land when Van Rensselaer and Schuyler attempted to have it
surveyed under the Partition Act, to settle boundary disputes between themselves and also to include New Canaan in the claim.
This rioting, Van Rensselaer said, had prevented his own efforts to
occupy the patent, therefore his failure to settle could not be argued against him.41 Thus, despite all of the ambiguities inherent
412. Proceedings of the Moot, 1770-1774, N.Y. His. Soc.
413. I think that this is the way the various factors related to each other. I could not
find a case which brought all the issues together. Reports of farmers either defaulting or
rioting against surveys were frequent in both the Kempe materials and the documents. See
generally New Hampshire Grants, in 4 Doc. HIsT., supra note 9, at 329-639.
The early Partition Act was replaced by a statute in 1762 called An Act for the More
Effectual Collecting of His Majesty's Quit Rents and For Petition of Lands in Order
Thereto. The claim was that the Act was to assess quit rent payment. This was probably
true, but the Act's most common function was to extend boundaries.
A fairly complex question which I have not addressed concerns the fairly protective body
of common law which surrounded tenancy, especially with respect to rent collection. Because rents were in the form of perishable wheat, the tenant whose rent was overdue could
claim he was ready with the wheat but the landlord did not collect it. He was not bound to
hold perishable goods. That put the burden on the landlord to collect, and meant that one
could not sue for several years of overdue rents. The same restriction then attached to
bonds accompanying leases; overdue rent did not mean that the bond could be sued upon,
absent other specific agreements. Those restrictions did not seem to apply to mortgages with
bonds, and there was considerable mortgaging rather than renting by mid-century. Under a
forfeited mortgage, an owner could also recover improvements, the value of which he received only in part after the expiration of a lease. Mortgagors were also easier to find than
tenants because the relationship implied independence, although a bill was passed during
the same period prohibiting mortgagors from voting.
It was tempting to see in that transition from renting to mortgaging some interaction
between legal rules, a "market" conception of land, and an abstraction of the notion of title.
I have my doubts about all of that, however; I am also not sure how effective the common
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in their legal claim to title, as a practical matter proprietors were
placed in essentially a "no-lose" position in their legal disputes
with settlers.
G.

Trespass

The increasing legal priority given to grant title over actual
occupation in determining ownership seems to be paralleled by a
similar change in trespass rules. In the seventeenth century it had
been clear that unfenced land could be used by all for wood, lime,
etc. The change which had taken place by the mid-eighteenth century is reflected in an opinion letter to Colonel Bradstreet, who
was charged with repeatedly entering an unused pasture for the
sake of taking wood for boat construction. 1 4 Kempe advised that if
title were proved and if the acts of trespass had been performed, as
alleged, then "your defense must consist entirely in endeavoring to
mitigate the Damages. ' '415 Plaintiff needed to show only title, not
fence. Nevertheless, actual use continued to retain at least some of
its force. When the court considered the question of remedy, a defendant could offer to show that damages were minimal by proving
that "at the time it was used and long before the pasture was without Fence and open to every Thing."'41 Similarly, Bradstreet could
show that the part of the pasture he used "might at a small expense have been fenced in . .. if they had thought fit and they
might have kept all the rest of the Pasture to themselves if they
had thought fit to inclose it.' 417 Consequently, the plaintiff "could
sustain little or no real damage" and the "litigiousness of the suit"
would be obvious. 1 8
A letter from Kempe to one of the claimants of the much disputed Oblong patent suggests some relation between the new treslaw protection was. Distraint was an available remedy, although accompained by procedural
safeguards-all outlined by Kempe. Moreover, the assembly passed an act allowing quit rent
collections against tenants, who then had only a remedy in the court of Common Pleas
against their landlords. Even Kempe found this potentially oppressive (and a hinderance to
settlement) although it was not clear how often officers resorted to it.
414. Letter from John Tabor Kempe to CoL Bradstreet, Sept. 9, 1765, in Papers, supra
note 239, Lawsuits A-B.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
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pass rules and title disputes. 19 Kempe's client, Mr. Farquharson,
wanted to retain his claim to a part of the Oblong. Competing proprietors, including James Alexander and William Smith, sought to
establish possession by forcing tenants of other landlords, as well
as all other possessors, off the land. As Kempe reported:
There were formerly some families of poor people that had settled on some of
the fruitful spots of the equivalent Land ... these the New York Patenters

drove off by Violence, and then many of them went and settled on here and
there a spot which they picked out ...

expecting they should there have

been quiet, as the New York patenters had then no claim to these Lands, but
since their Modem patent, they have endeavored to dispossess them there
likewise and have drove off many of them.... 0
In order to maintain the claim of his client, Kempe convinced
these families to remain in the area as his client's tenants, promising to defend them in any ejectment suits that arose as a result.
Since the New York proprietors did not want to engage Kempe's
client in a law suit, they instead charged the possessing families
with trespass under a law (apparently a statute) which held any
trespasser who cut trees on the lands of another liable for fines of
between six and twenty shillings per tree. According to Kempe:
Upon this Law they have proceded before the Justices of the peace, who here

are for ye most part of the lower kind of people an Alehousekeeper perhaps
or some such person, Creatures of the New York patentees who are ye people
in power here, [against] the people who have consented to hold their posses-

sion.., for cutting the Brush and Underwood to clear their lands, and have
condemned them in the penalty of this act ....
."1

Their only defense to the trespass penalty was Kempe's client's
good title, but Kempe did not think it worthwhile to defend them
against the charges; at least he did not want to be troubled with
the matter himself, and reminded his client that he still had not
been paid for past services. Mentioning another suit, he added:
"Now if you should think fit to make me a Grant of these lands
,"422
7..

he would accept that as full payment but would not un-

dertake a defense to the troublesome trespass charges. The inhabitants were left with the penalties, despite Kempe's evident view
419. Letter from John Tabor Kempe to Mr. Farquharson, in Papers, supra note 239,
Box 6, Westchester County, (circa 1765).
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
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that they had been treated unfairly.4 2 3
H.

The DoctrinalReassertion of Crown Authority

Kempe's easy complacency in the face of what he clearly considered "injustice" both to settlers and (as described earlier) to Indians, is too commonplace to be startling. Perhaps slightly more
surprising is the peculiar combination of honestly conscientious
concern for "legality" mixed with outright refusal to raise those
arguments which threatened to undercut the whole conceptual
structure of property law in the colony. Yet that juxtaposition, too,
is not uncommon, and can be understood within the tradition of
common law thought. A lawyer like Kempe would find it hard to
imagine that rules were ever meant to lead to a complete breakdown of existing structures of order and security: so great an "Inconvenience" could surely be considered alien to the spirit of legality and the grand tradition of the common law. An early realist like
the lawyer for New Canaan might point out that the concept of
legal "right" then dissolves into competing moral and political arguments, but Kempe has not been alone in preferring to ignore the
implications of that insight.
A more striking juxtaposition in Kempe's papers is the intense
preoccupation with legal analysis coupled with reports of mob violence. By the 1760s, the outcome of land disputes tended to hinge,
not on the cogency of legal argumentation, but on whether proprietors could muster enough force to quash local uprisings. Thus, the
legal result of a case might well be irrelevant.
Land rioters, often blending political utopianism with a religious radicalism intensified by the Great Awakening, directed their
attacks specifically against provincial courts and lawyers, as well as
proprietors. Thus their enemies included "[James] Duane and
[John Tabor] Kempe," who strove to set "[tihe Lord's annointed
against his people, falsely accusing them before the Court of Great
Britain. 4 24 Rioters set up committees that took over all government functions, and court houses were used for popular anti-proprietor trials.
Scattered throughout Kempe's papers are depositions describing those takeovers. In Cumberland County, for example, it was
423.

Id.

424. E. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 9, at 54.
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reported that a mob of three hundred had seized the court house,
ordered surveyors to desist, and "do hold town meetings . .. do
execute magisterial powers. ' 42 5 Proprietor representatives were

tied to trees and whipped. Similarly, in Dutchess County, one deponent testified that "upwards of 500 persons in this County have
confederated and conspired together . . . to prevent the due Exe-

cution of the Laws, and the Officers of Justice as the same respects
certain recoverys in Ejectment... they engaged to stand by each
other with Force.14 2 Near New Hampshire settlers declared a

"Last Day of Judgment" against proprietors, and in many areas
authorities lost control completely. One deponent described the
skirmishing which took place when British troops were finally sent
to Dutchess County to restore order: When the regulars came upon
the settlers, hidden in bushes,
[o]ne of the Mob called out "damn them don't run from them turn and fire."
One of the mob fired off his piece immediately thereupon the Deponents
heard an officer of the regular Troops call to his
men saying Now they have
427
fired in us fire And thereupon a firing ensued.

I do not know how grave Kempe considered these threats to
be, but he complained vigorously when local sheriffs did not act
against the rioting near Cortland Manor: "It is absolutely necessary for the public peace and the Safety of the King's subjects that
such Enormities be punished as an Example to Others." His papers also include descriptions of the much-feared revolutionary
Prendergast group and of the New York trial which sentenced
Prendergast to death-with John Morin Scott as judge. 28
As against that threat of direct popular seizure, the crown's
feudal authority over land still provided the single source of title
legitimacy. The Kempe materials indicate how pressing the need to
assert that doctrinal authority Was perceived to be. An important
and illustrative provincial case on the subject was King v.
Lydius,429 for which there were over sixty-five pages of briefs in the
425. Papers, supra note 239, Box 6, New Hampshire Grants Folder.
426. Papers, supra note 239, Unsorted Legal including Lawsuits, V-Z.
427. Deposition of Gideon Prindle, July 28, 1766, in Papers, supra note 239, Sorted

Legal, B.S.W. 5.
428. See Mark & Handlen, Land Cases in ColonialNew York 1765-1767, The King v.
William Prendergast,19 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rnv. 165 (1941-42).

429. New York Supreme Court, July Term 1764, in Papers, supra note 239, Box 5,
Sorted Legal Manuscripts.
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Kempe materials. Lydius was an Albany speculator with a long
history of obtaining Indian deeds by getting Indians drunk. When
Lydius, with Massachusetts backing, sold land in the Green Mountains to settlers, his land deals became incongruously linked to
Ethan Allen's more idealistic struggles with New York proprietors
over land and border claims. The settlements on land purchased
from Lydius were challenged by New York proprietors, with the
backing of the provincial government, 3 0 and Lydius was charged
by information with intrusion upon the king's land. Unlike Van
Rensselaer, facing the same charges, Lydius claimed actual possession and an Indian deed, but held no crown grant issued under a
New York governor.
Briefly, Kempe based his argument against Lydius on the
"General Principle of Law, that the Crown by the Policy of our
Constitution, is the Original Proprietor of all the Lands within the
King's Dominions, and that there can be no Right to any Lands
within the King's Dominions not derived from the Crown."43 This
principle, he stated, "is sufficient in the first instance to prove the
King's Original Property, and the Right of the Lands must be presumed to be in the Crown, unless the Defendant can show the
Crown has disposed of them and this disposal of them must be
under the Great Seal or is illegal and not binding. ' 43 2 Kempe carefully cited five authorities for that general principle.
Three objections were raised by Lydius. First, he argued that
whereas that principle held good as to lands in England, it could
not be applied to lands in the province. Here, he said:
The Native Indians are the Original Proprietors and not the King of England, and consequently the King can have no Right to the Lands of the Indians unless by Conquest-Surrender or Sale - neither of which is the present
Case. It therefore is not shown on the part of the Crown, that the King has a

Title from the Native Indians the real Original Proprietors, it must be presumed the Right to [Possession] was in them at the Time the Defendant en430. It is perhaps some evidence of the importance attached to the case that Dr.
Thomas Young, a well-known New York revolutionary, wrote his first radical political tract
in support of Lydius and against New York officials and proprietors. He argued that land
belonged neither to the crown nor to the "gentlemen in the province of New York" who
stood in Lydius' way. E. CoumaymAN, supra note 9, at 158. New York proprietors obstructed settlers and cultivation, he claimed, for the sake of their own capital gains.
431. Brief for Petitioner, King v. Lydius, in Papers, supra note 239, Box 3, Sorted Legal Manuscripts.
432. Id.
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tered on the lands. 33

The defendant therefore could not be charged with trespassing on
the crown's lands, since it was the Indians who held the possessory
right.
Kempe's answer was simply and emphatically that "[t]he
Court cannot hear of an Indian Title paramount to the Crown's
within the King's Dominions it being contrary to the policy of the
Constitution. . .

."s

Therefore, the Indians' deed could convey

"no Title" to the plaintiff, but could only be "introduced as explanatory [evidence] of the Land's" ambiguous boundaries. 435'
The second objection was procedural. Kempe sought a special
verdict based upon the fact of actual entry upon the lands, and
upon defendant's failure to plead good title (by crown grant). Once
entry was shown, the burden, he said, was on the defendant to
show title. In England, however, by statute, when the king was out
of possession for twenty years he could not bring information for
intrusion except upon a showing of his own good title-proved by
office or record.4 3 6 Kempe dealt with this point by once again

stressing the crown's unlimited power over his colonial dominions.
Kempe noted that this shift in the burden of proof Lydius pointed
to in England was considered a gracious premission of prerogative
powers assumed to exist ("the King's most excellent Majesty out of
his gracious Disposition to his loving Subjects", etc.) 437 and then

argued that this remission was not conceived to extend to the dominions. In England there was no waste land, and the act was
meant chiefly to apply to lands escheating to the king from long
dormant titles. In this case, however, the judge was bound to take
judicial notice of the king's presumed possession of all lands, and
to place the burden of showing that the king had surrendered possession onto the defendant.
The third objection raised the most complex set of issues, all
related to the long-standing border disputes between New York
and the New England colonies. Lydius had objected that he had
good evidence of crown surrender of the Green Mountains when he
received permission from Massachusetts to settle the area: a grant
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1982]

ORIGINS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

from any colonial government carried with it a presumption of
crown surrender. 438 This, Kempe insisted, should have been
pleaded in abatement, to challenge jurisdiction.4 39 By pleading
"not guilty" Lydius had accepted jurisdiction and therefore was
bound to assume that all lands not granted under the Great Seal
and through the New York governor, were in the possession of the
crown, irrespective of official grants from other colonies.44
In cases involving border disputes, it is difficult to separate the
issue of legal title from the issue of jurisdiction. The two were related in complex ways, both socially and in doctrine. New England
settlers had been a part of New York history since the time of the
Dutch, and they represented to most New Yorkers both the advantages and dangers of a voluntarist model of political, religious, and
economic organization. Thus, the accounts of border disputes between New York proprietors and radical New England settlers are
simply a continuation of old themes.
Moreover, as in so many other instances, the crown had favored the voluntarist model represented by the New Englanders.
The Board of Trade, after attempting to resolve conflicts by setting definite boundaries between New York and the New England
colonies, had explicitly instructed the New York governor to favor
the property "rights" of those who either held land under New
England governments or who could show "industrious" cultivation
and use. The Board also prohibited New York officials from issuing
grants along the disputed New England borders. It was, of course,
New York's violation of exactly those instructions which led to
conflicts like the one with Lydius.
Once again, however, there was an evident tension between actual crown policy and the somewhat abstracted legal conception of
crown authority as the paramount source of authority in the colony. The latter was as crucial to the question of jurisdiction as it
was to the conception of title and provided the only answer to
Lydius' third objection. Kempe argued that in property disputes
after boundary determination, neither the competing colony nor
the private landowner could claim rights or jurisdiction based on
previous boundary assumptions. This was so because it was the
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
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king who officially settled these disputes, and as feudal lord he
alone had authority to determine what were (however whimsically,
as in the case of New York boundaries) supposed to be ancient and
preexisting jurisdictional rights. Those crown decisions represented
the royal adjudication of "Ancient right, his Majesty in his Privy
Council exercising original jurisdiction on the principles of Feudal
Sovereignty when Questions of this kind arise. 441
Even within the province the crown's authority was considered
necessary to settle jurisdictional disputes. "Very warm Disputes
between many People. . . for several years" 442 had prevented the
Assembly from reaching a firm determination of county boundaries. Since grants sometimes contained reference to county lines,
property interests were at stake. In 1733 the king in Council had
set the boundary lines, which had been considered valid until challenged in a dispute concerning the bounds of Albany and of Ten
Broeck's patent. It was then alleged that the king had no authority
to set boundaries within the province, but Kempe clearly perceived
the king's jurisdictional authority as essential to prevent
"confusion":
No jurisdiction, No crimes punishable, Jurisdiction as uncertain as ever-Absurd!... Counties in general have been so considered-jurisdiction so exercised-In Trespass Ejectment Crime... What confusion if all this should be
new thought wrong.... The ordinance has ever been received as valid By
Government, in the Grants By the Judges on the Bench By the Practices of
the Law. If not supported All Grants in any of the Counties since the year
1601 are void.443

In this argument, the crown once again embodied that ultimate authority, the unity of jurisdiction and property, upon which the coherence of Kempe's doctrinal structure depended.
As I have tried to show, however, the "confusion" resulting
from a denial of that authority was matched by the confusion
which would follow if that authority were always to be taken literally-if, in other words, the king could enforce the conditions he
attached to grants, could vest legal rights to the soil in Indians as
well as in patentees, or could resume the land he granted when he
was, in fact, dead. Smith could argue the heavy hand of the crown
in such instances and could invoke the policy of free use and set441.. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
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tlement against oppressive grant conditions; but it was never quite
explained why the settlers of vacant land could not argue the same
principles against the king's "patentees."
CONCLUSION

What emerged from the doctrinal incoherence in the provincial concept of right to property-from the inability to either reject
or fully assert the crown's ultimate authority without jeopardizing
the entire structure of property ownership-was an early, tentative
step in the formation of a safe middle ground of "right." That middle ground was protected by the decisions of Kempe and others
like him in the provincial legal system. The selective assertion of
crown right and crown policy began, at least partially, to secure
title from the claims of both the republican vision of property as
an extension of the "robust" will of an independent people and the
hierarchical vision of property as the direct extension of royal prerogative. Nevertheless, as Kempe foresaw, however unwittingly in
his practice, a concept rooted in nothing more substantive than
"selective assertion" was necessarily fragile. In a world where morality and politics were inseparable, to deny the claims of crownbased hierarchy might unleash the same union of virtue and authority steming from a source completely free of hierarchical control-i.e., from the free will of a republican community. Categories
like God and king at the top, with their legitimacy so obviously
rooted in morality, held open the possibility that people would see
in those categories the potential for their own soveriegnty and immediate spirituality. Thus, while Kempe and his colleagues sought
to retain elements of both hierarchy and voluntarism within their
notion of property rights, their rudimentary efforts were for a time
inadequate. By the time of the Revolution, that most radical potential was realized and the connection between people and crown
was dissolved-many settlers then declared that the "people outof-doors" were the only true sovereign, concretely embodying
within their own local republican communities a new unity of the
ancient categories of custom, virtue, and authority. They found
themselves saying "Damn the King" as they set up their own local
courts, designed to protect the freedom of their labor on the land.
Despite the logical and political force of that radical vision of
sovereignty and property, a much less threatening middle position
ultimately prevailed. Through a number of elaborate conceptual
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ploys, the strategy of the middle position simultaneously, assimilated and denied the extremes of hierarchy and voluntarism. The
end product was the formation of what we have come to know as
the liberal conception of private, individualized rights in stark confrontation with a potentially oppressive sovereign power-the
model which by the end of the nineteenth century had attained the
gothic elegance of classical legalism.
In the years shortly after the Revolution, one can see the
emergence of the elements from which that elegant structure was
later fashioned. First, "the sovereignty of the people" was lifted
out of the local, concrete community that was central to the authentic republican vision. The will of the people became only an
abstract idea, embodied in a written constitution, the interpretation of which was divorced from the direct will of the people who
ostensibly created it-and from the will of any concrete people at
any particular time. In effect, "the people" became that vaguely
mystical body which stepped onto the political stage only once,
distributed its sovereignty within the spheres delineated by the
constitution,' and was never seen again.
Similarly, the notion of property was lifted out of the community of voluntary labor and active participation from which it had
once derived its meaning. Rather than an expression of popular
will, property as an abstract constitutional right was conceptually
insulated from the will of the people-standing as a right in opposition to participation. Moreover, after the Revolution the link between property and liberty was asserted, ironically, not on behalf
of republican communitarianism, but most often on behalf of hierarchical power relations-yet without hierarchy's traditional ethical claims.
This process of abstraction, so crucial to the liberal model of
rights and sovereignty, required dramatically new configurations of
elements which were once located within either the republican or
hierarchical models; in particular, the new deployment of private/
public distinctions. The first and most important of these, of
course, was the wedge driven between state (public) and civil (private) society, around which were organized all of the other distributions. That initial wedge served to break apart the old unity of
religion, economics, politics, and law. The first two were transformed into negative private rights to be protected from the third;
and law, which now alone lay claim to reason and objectivity (even
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while renouncing its old link to morality), became the crucial barrier between rights and politics. The virtue of the republic came to
be defined, especially in legal rhetoric, not by the active moral
vigor of the participatory community, but by the strength of that
legal barrier.
This new configuration, in turn, borrowed from both the
Anglican and sectarian models, placing elements of each in dramatically new combinations. For example, from the voluntarist tradition of sectarian independence came the notion of diversity implicit in the "free exercise of religion;" yet from Anglicanism came
the notion that the religious experience (redemption) is, at its core,
so personal, private, and subjective as to pose no threat to existing
structures of economic hierarchy and political authority. The result
was the transformation of the religious experience into a civil right
which was both tolerated and harmless.
In a parallel move, from the hierarchical model of property
came the notion of formal title and protected inequality, from
which property as the protection of free labor and independence
within republicanism came the rhetoric which described property
as a sphere of autonomy and freedom protected from state impostion. Yet that same rhetoric was invoked consistently to justify
rather than condemn the hierarchical exploitation of labor for
"private" gain, serving the needs of capital accumulation. The
public, communitarian potential within the ideal of free labor had
been stripped away. Labor was then treated as no more than a private contract right, an object of "free" exchange on a market. Ironically, the only continuing invocation of labor as participation
emerges in time of war, when the old republican martial spirit
helps to mobilize the people. Otherwise, all that remains of the
public side of property is the assumption that "people" have willed
its protection, a protection which is no more than a negative immunization of hierarchical property relations from the old claims
that both the hierarchical and the voluntarist models once made in
the name of morality and justice.

